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ABSTRACT
CORPORATE INVESTMENT ACTIVITY,
INDUSTRIAL AND GLOBAL DIVERSIFICATION 
AND INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS
Ozgur Berk KAN 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. John Doukas
Recent empirical studies document the average industrially diversified firm trades at a discount 
than a portfolio of comparable single-segment firms while geographically diversified firms are 
shown to face similar, if not higher, discounts. They attribute the diversification discount to 
inefficient allocation of capital in diversified firms. Most of this literature uses aggregate capital 
expenditures and cash flows data across divisions obtained from Compustat industry-segment and 
geographic-segment data tapes. In our first paper, we employ firm-specific data to examine the 
pre- and post-acquisition performance of firms engaging in diversifying and non-diversifying 
investments in order to determine whether the diversification discount may be attributed to the act 
of diversification itself. Consistent with the diversification literature, our results show, prior to the 
acquisition, diversified firms trade at a discount in comparison to their imputed values and single­
segment firms. We also find the valuation of single- and multi-segment bidders deteriorates 
systematically as we approach the acquisition year. Post-acquisition evidence indicates the 
valuation of diversifying and non-diversifying single- and multi-segment firms worsens. Our 
results suggest the core cash flows of multi-segment diversifying (focusing) bidders are used to 
finance both core and non-core capital expenditures despite the fact that the non-core (core) 
business exhibits superior performance relative to the core (non-core) business while the non-core 
(core) business should have been allocated more funds based on segment performance. Overall, 
our results suggest diversification fails to reverse poor performance in multi-segment firms 
because they retain relatively poor performing business segments where considerable amount of 
capital resources are transferred from the better performing segments of the firm. In our second 
paper, we investigate whether the act of geographic and industrial diversification destroy value 
when they take place by employing firm-specific data of bidders that engage in diversifying and 
non-diversifying overseas investments in the form of M&As. Our results indicate the valuation of 
single- and multi-segment overseas bidders worsens as the acquisition year nears. Consistent with 
the recent industrial and geographic diversification literature, our findings indicate not only the 
extent of industrial diversification, but also the extent of international involvement of bidders has
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
significant adverse valuation consequences. Our results also show the act of geographic 
diversification destroys value when it takes place in the form of M&As for domestic bidders. 
Post-acquisition evidence indicates diversifying multi-segment bidders gain from overseas 
acquisitions lending support to Morck and Yeung (1998), while single-segment bidders and 
focusing multi-segment bidders face valuation declines, domestic single-segment bidders 
diversifying overseas being hurt the most. The workings of the internal capital markets around the 
overseas investment decision indicate both core and non-core capital expenditures of multi­
segment bidders utilize their own segment cash flows providing evidence against cross- 
subsidization in industrially diversified bidders. The cross-sectional examination of bidders’ 
valuation lends some support to agency theory and internalization theory explanation of 
geographic diversification. The cash flow of the core business seems to contribute to firm value 
of single-segment and focusing multi-segment bidders suggesting the value losses associated with 
industrial diversification might stem from the inadequate contribution of non-core lines of 
business. The evidence that both core and non-core cash flows of diversifying multi-segment 
bidders contribute to firm value 2 years after the acquisition implies that these firms reap the 
benefits in an expanded multinational network as suggested by Doukas and Travlos (1988).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent empirical evidence documents the average diversified firm trades at a 
discount than a portfolio o f comparable single-segment firms. This literature implies 
diversification itself is the reason that diversified firms produce different cash flows than 
they would if split into single-segment firms (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek 
(1995)).1 Empirical evidence also shows diversified firms that regain focus elicit positive 
stock market reactions and improve their subsequent performance (Bhagat, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Scharfstein (1998), 
Megginson, Morgan and Nail (1999), Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999), 
Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2001)).
While the recent empirical literature documents diversification is associated with 
significant value losses, there is no agreement on how diversification destroys firm value. 
Researchers have identified a number of explanations for this discount. Jensen (1986) 
and Stulz (1990) argue that cash-rich firms may overinvest in lines o f business with poor 
investment opportunities. Namely, inefficient investments in diversified firms lead to 
agency costs that outweigh the benefits o f  internal capital markets. In support o f this 
view, Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Scharfstein (1998) show diversified firms 
trade at a discount because they inefficiently allocate funds (cross-subsidization) among 
divisions.2 Another plausible reason for the diversification discount is that division 
managers o f diversified firms have weak incentives to maximize firm value (Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1994), Hermalin and Katz (1994)). Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) argue rent-seeking 
behavior by segment managers may lead to inefficient investment decisions in diversified 
firms. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) also find diversified firms with greater 
dispersion of investment opportunities tend to transfer resources from divisions with 
good investment opportunities to small divisions with poor investment opportunities.
1 See also Berger and Ofek (1996), Servaes (1996) Lins and Servaes (1999a, 1999b), Graham, Lemmon 
and W olf (2002), Billett and Mauer (1999), Campa and Kedia (1999), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000)).
2 This draws on Jensen’s (1986) "free cash flow hypothesis" that states that managers o f firms with excess 
cash flow tend to invest more than they should.
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Lang and Stulz (1994), however, argue that diversification could be motivated by firm’s 
lack o f internal growth prospects, implying that the act o f diversification itself may not 
necessarily be harmful to firm value. Similarly, Jensen (1986) asserts poorly managed 
firms with limited growth opportunities are more likely to diversify. Indeed Hyland
(1999) and Campa and Kedia (1999) find firms that diversify trade at a discount relative 
to their industry peers prior to undertaking diversification, implying that the 
diversification discount itself may be partly attributable to selection bias. Chevalier
(2000) also provides evidence in support o f the selection bias hypothesis. Graham, 
Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), however, show diversifying firms do not trade at a discount 
prior to diversification, but target firms do trade at a substantial discount prior to being 
acquired.
Unlike the industrial diversification, most of the theoretical and empirical studies 
on global diversification suggest a wealth increasing effect on the firm in terms of 
profitability, excess returns and higher market value. (Leftwich (1974), Mikhail and 
Shawky (1979), Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984), Kim and Lyn (1986)). The theoretical 
and empirical literature argues for value enhancing aspects o f geographic diversification. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) literature argues that firms expand overseas to exploit 
firm specific information based intangible assets by transferring the intangible assets 
overseas within an internal market in the same firm (Caves (1971), Buckley and Casson 
(1976), Dunning (1977), Rugman (1980), Prahalad (1998)). However, in the theoretical 
and empirical literature, not so many studies have addressed the valuation impacts of 
industrial and global diversification at the same time. Sambharya (199S) finds only the 
interaction o f global and product diversification leads to an enhancement in the 
performance of multinationals. Morck and Yeung (1998) find industrial diversification, 
global diversification and firm size enhance value in the presence o f intangible assets. 
Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (1998) find that global diversification leads to significant 
increases in value measures, while industrial diversification leads to significant value 
losses.
On the other hand, a recent stream o f literature provides empirical evidence that 
global diversification hurts firm value. Christophe (1997) and Christophe and Pfeiffer 
(1998) provide evidence that geographical diversification makes U.S. multinationals
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destroy value. Similarly, Denis, Denis and Yost (2000) document that U.S. firms pursue 
further global diversification even though it leads to valuation losses. Their results 
suggest, on average, global diversification leads to valuation losses o f  18 percent while 
industrial diversification leads to valuation losses o f 20 percent.
In addition, very few studies in the theoretical or empirical literature have 
addressed the direct link between the nature o f the corporate investment activity and the 
valuation consequences associated with it. The empirical evidence available only for 
domestic acquisitions in the U.S. has produced conflicting results. Graham, Lemmon and 
W olf (2002) find single-segment firms that diversify by reporting changes or internal 
growth do not experience a valuation discount while single-segment firms that diversify 
by acquisitions experience a significant discount. Billett and Mauer (1999) find that the 
internal capital markets have an adverse effect on the value o f industrially diversified 
firms but they cannot find any evidence o f a significant link between diversification 
discount and inefficient capital markets. Their main finding is that internal capital market 
activity influences the valuation o f industrially diversified firms only when resources are 
transferred to business segments with good investment opportunities and that would be 
financially constrained if they were operating as single-segment firms. Chevalier (2000) 
finds evidence that the cash flows of one merger partner are predictive o f the investment 
behaviour of the other partner in the pre-merger period which might be interpreted as 
evidence o f cross-subsidization. Chevalier further demonstrates the evidence in favor of 
cross-subsidization in the empirical literature may be due to perseverant differences 
between the investment opportunities o f single- and multi-segment firms. However, no 
study in the theoretical or empirical literature has addressed the nature o f domestic and 
international investment activity, the changes in industrial and geographic focus and their 
valuation consequences.
In the first paper, we investigate whether the act o f industrial diversification 
destroys value. We analyze the performance of single- and multi-segment firms that 
undertake diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions in the years before and after an 
acquisition. In addition, we compare how the internal capital markets o f diversified firms 
work before and after an acquisition in an attempt to gain additional insights about the 
efficiency o f allocating capital across core and non-core business segments. These issues
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are addressed for an initial sample o f 10128 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) completed 
by U.S. firms over the 1991-1997 period.
Consistent with the diversification literature, our results show that diversified 
firms, expected to conduct acquisitions, trade at a discount in comparison to their 
imputed value and single-segment firms that conduct similar types o f acquisitions. We 
also show the valuation o f single- and multi-segment bidders deteriorates considerably 
with respect to their industry peers prior to the act o f diversification. Post-acquisition 
results indicate the valuation of diversifying single- and multi-segment firms worsens. A 
similar performance is also recorded for focusing single- and multi-segment firms. This 
evidence casts doubt that the act o f diversification itself is harmful to firm value.
An examination o f bidders' internal capital markets around major investment 
decisions reveals that the internal capital markets o f bidders are active. Interestingly, 
even though core business o f multi-segment firms subsidize the capital expenditures of 
their non-core business segments, we find capital resources in multi-segment bidders 
before and after the merger are allocated to business segments that have previously 
achieved higher growth in sales and cash flows. This evidence is in contrast with the 
view o f inefficient internal capital markets in diversified firms. A closer analysis o f the 
influence o f internal capital market and firm specific variables suggests the act of not 
divesting the inferior performing business segment (core business in diversifying and 
non-core business in focusing multi-segment bidders) might be held largely responsible 
for the value loss o f resource constrained firm in the post-acquisition period, especially in 
multi-segment bidders that diversify further.
In the second paper, we employ a sample o f 1599 pure overseas M&As 
completed by the U.S. firms over the 1991-1997 period to examine the impact o f global 
and industrial diversification on firm value when they take place. First, we analyze the 
valuation o f single- and multi-segment firms that pursue global expansion through 
industrially focusing/diversifying investments before and after investment is made via 
overseas M&As. Our evidence indicates the bidders included in our sample, especially 
single-segment bidders, experience deteriorating performance prior to an overseas 
acquisition and further confirms the well-documented diversification discount arising 
from industrial diversification between single- and multi-segment bidders. Interestingly,
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stand-alone bidders exhibit a severe discount in year 0, the year in which they expand 
their international involvement by engaging in overseas acquisitions. Further analysis 
indicates not only the extent of industrial diversification, but also the extent of prior 
international involvement o f bidders has significant adverse valuation consequences. Our 
post-acquisition results show the act o f global diversification destroys value when it takes 
place in the form of M&As for domestic bidders. A detailed analysis indicates multi­
segment bidders that diversify into unrelated lines o f business gain from overseas 
acquisitions while single-segment bidders and focusing multi-segment bidders 
experience subsequent valuation declines. The bidders that already have international 
exposure experience further valuation declines and can not gain any benefits from further 
global expansion. The bidders that face the most severe valuation losses are the domestic 
single-segment bidders that conduct diversifying acquisitions.
Second, we examine the internal dynamics o f firms involved in capital 
investments and analyze the workings o f the internal capital markets around the overseas 
investment decision o f the firm. The pre-acquisition analysis indicates focusing multi­
segment firms use more assets and make larger capital expenditures in core than in non­
core divisions because they generate more sales than their non-core divisions while 
diversifying multi-segment firms commit larger capital expenditures in non-core 
divisions as the sales and assets of their core and non-core segments are virtually 
undistinguishable. Single-segment firms, on the other hand, invest in unrelated business 
when they experience higher growth in sales than single-segment firms that choose to 
invest in related business. Following the overseas acquisition, the core (non-core) 
business segments o f focusing (diversifying) bidders continue to generate higher cash 
flows per dollar o f sales than their non-core (core) business segments and they also begin 
to generate significantly more cash flows than the core business o f  diversifying multi­
segment bidders. Likewise, the bidders continue to invest more o f their segment sales in 
the relatively efficient line o f business in terms o f cash generating ability after the 
acquisition, as well. In addition, a closer examination o f core and non-core capital 
expenditures yields different results about the workings o f internal capital markets in 
bidder firms making diversifying and non-diversifying overseas acquisitions. Our 
evidence suggests core capital expenditures o f diversifying single-segment bidders are
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influenced by cash flows o f the core business. Both core and non-core capital 
expenditures o f focusing multi-segment bidders seem to rely on their own segment cash 
flows and diversifying multi-segment bidders exhibit similar but nor persistent behavior.
Finally, a closer look at the valuation o f bidders shows, in support o f the agency 
theory explanation o f diversification, the higher presence o f insider ownership in 
focusing bidders is accompanied by higher valuations. In support o f the internalization 
theory o f global diversification, the presence o f knowledge based (R&D) and marketing 
based (advertising) intangibles seem to contribute to overseas bidders’ valuation. Only 
multi-segment bidders that diversify into unrelated lines of business seem to benefit from 
global diversification while all other bidders seem to suffer from its adverse impact. The 
cash flow o f the core business seems to contribute to firm value o f single-segment and 
focusing multi-segment bidders while the cash flow of the non-core business seems to 
play a trivial role on valuation suggesting that the value losses associated with industrial 
diversification might stem from the inadequate contribution o f peripheral (non-core) lines 
o f business in industrially diversified firms. The evidence that both core and non-core 
cash flows of diversifying multi-segment bidders adds to firm value only 2 years after the 
acquisition suggests that they might have begun to harvest the benefits in an expanded 
multinational network as suggested by Doukas and Travlos (1988).
The remainder of the papers proceed as follows. Section 2.1 describes the sources 
o f data and sample selection. Section 2.2 presents evidence on the pre-acquisition 
performance o f bidders. Section 2.3 examines the determinants o f firm's diversification 
activities. Section 2.4 examines the post-acquisition performance o f single- and multi­
segment bidders involved in diversifying and non-diversifying investments. Section 2.5 
examines the workings and efficiency of bidder's internal capital markets. Section 2.6 
examines the role o f internal capital markets and other firm specific characteristics on 
bidders' valuation and Section 2.7 concludes the first paper.
Section 3.1 describes the sources o f data and sample selection. Section 3.2 
presents evidence on the pre-acquisition performance o f the bidders. Section 3.3 
examines the determinants o f firm’s industrial diversification motives overseas. Section 
3.4 examines the post-acquisition performance o f bidders that engaged in diversifying 
and non-diversifying acquisitions. Section 3.5 examines the working o f bidder’s internal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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capital markets. Section 3.6 examines the role o f internal capital markets and other firm 
specific characteristics on bidders’ valuation and Section 3.7 concludes the second paper.
Finally, Section 4 makes concluding remarks about the two papers that analyze 
the valuation and internal dynamics o f the bidders that prompt industrial diversification 
and industrial and global diversification by engaging in domestic and overseas 
acquisitions, respectively.
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2. DOMESTIC CORPORATE INVESTMENT ACTIVITY, INDUSTRIAL 
DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS
Recent empirical evidence documents that the average diversified firm trades at a 
discount than a portfolio o f comparable single-segment firms. This literature implies 
diversification itself is the reason that diversified firms produce different cash flows than 
they would if  split into single-segment firms (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek 
(1995)).3 Empirical evidence also shows that diversified firms that regain focus elicit 
positive stock market reactions and improve their subsequent performance (Bhagat, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995), 
Scharfstein (1998), Megginson, Morgan and Nail (1999), Gertner, Powers and 
Scharfstein (1999), Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2001)).
While the recent empirical literature documents diversification is associated with 
significant value losses, there is no agreement on how diversification destroys firm value. 
Researchers have identified a number o f explanations for this discount. Jensen (1986) 
and Stulz (1990) argue that cash-rich firms may overinvest in lines o f business with poor 
investment opportunities. Namely, inefficient investments in diversified firms lead to 
agency costs outweighing the benefits of internal capital markets. In support o f this view, 
Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Scharfstein (1998) show diversified firms trade at 
a discount because they inefficiently allocate funds (cross-subsidization) among 
divisions.4 Another plausible reason for the diversification discount is that division 
managers o f  diversified firms have weak incentives to maximize firm value (Rotemberg 
and Saloner (1994), Hermalin and Katz (1994)). Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) argue that rent- 
seeking behavior by segment managers may lead to inefficient investment decisions in 
diversified firms. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) also find diversified firms with 
greater dispersion o f investment opportunities tend to transfer resources from divisions
3 See also Berger and Ofek (1996), Servaes (1996) Lins and Servaes (1999a, 1999b), Graham, Lemmon 
and W olf (2002), Billen and Mauer (1999), Campa and Kedia (1999), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales
(2000)).
* This draws on Jensen's (1986) "free cash flow hypothesis” that states that managers o f  firms with excess 
cash flow tend to invest more than they should.
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with good investment opportunities to small divisions with poor investment 
opportunities. Lang and Stulz (1994), however, argue that diversification could be 
motivated by firm’s lack o f internal growth prospects, implying that the act of 
diversification itself may not necessarily be harmful to firm value. Similarly, Jensen 
(1986) asserts that poorly managed firms with limited growth opportunities are more 
likely to diversify. Indeed Hyland (1999) and Campa and Kedia (1999) find firms that 
diversify trade at a discount relative to their industry peers prior to undertaking 
diversification, implying the diversification discount itself may be partly attributable to 
selection bias. Chevalier (2000) also provides evidence in support o f the selection bias 
hypothesis. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), however, show diversifying firms do 
not trade at a discount prior to diversification, but target firms do trade at a substantial 
discount prior to being acquired.
In this paper we investigate whether the act of diversification destroys value. We 
analyze the performance o f single- and multi-segment firms that undertake diversifying 
and non-diversifying acquisitions in the years before and after an acquisition. In addition, 
we compare how the internal capital markets of diversified firms work before and after 
an acquisition in an attempt to gain additional insights about the efficiency of allocating 
capital across core and non-core business segments. These issues are addressed for an 
initial sample o f 10128 mergers and acquisitions completed by U.S. firms over the 1991- 
1997 period.
Consistent with the diversification literature, our results show diversified firms, 
expected to conduct acquisitions, trade at a discount in comparison to their imputed value 
and single-segment firms that conduct similar types o f acquisitions. We also show the 
valuation of single- and multi-segment bidders deteriorates considerably with respect to 
their industry peers prior to the act o f diversification. Post-acquisition results indicate the 
valuation o f diversifying single- and multi-segment firms worsens. A similar 
performance is also recorded for focusing single- and multi-segment firms. This evidence 
casts doubt that the act o f diversification itself is harmful to firm value.
An examination o f bidders' internal capital markets around major investment 
decisions reveals that the internal capital markets o f bidders are active. Interestingly, 
even though core business o f multi-segment firms subsidize the capital expenditures of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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their non-core business segments, we find capital resources in multi-segment bidders 
before and after the merger are allocated to business segments that have previously 
achieved higher growth in sales and cash flows. This evidence is in contrast with the 
view o f inefficient internal capital markets in diversified firms. A closer analysis o f the 
influence o f internal capital market and firm specific variables suggests that the act o f not 
divesting the inferior performing business segment (core business in diversifying and 
non-core business in focusing multi-segment bidders) might be held largely responsible 
for the value loss o f resource constrained firm in the post-acquisition period, especially in 
multi-segment bidders diversifying further.
The remainder o f the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 .1 describes the sources 
of data and sample selection. Section 2.2 presents evidence on the pre-acquisition 
performance of bidders. Section 2.3 examines the determinants o f firm's diversification 
activities. Section 2.4 examines the post-acquisition performance of single- and multi­
segment bidders involved in diversifying and non-diversifying investments. Section 2.5 
examines the workings and efficiency of bidder's internal capital markets. Section 2.6 
examines the role o f internal capital markets and other firm specific characteristics on 
bidders' valuation and section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.1. Data Selection, Sources and Industrial Classification
2. l.A. Sources o f  Data and Sample Selection
Our sample consists o f domestic acquisitions made by the U.S. bidders between 
January 1, 1991 and December 31, 1997 reported in the Domestic Acquisitions roster o f 
Securities Data Corporation’s Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Journal. The rosters o f 
M&A Journal include all acquisitions which are of, or assumed to be of, S 5 million 
value or higher. The rosters report the name, the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code (at 2 digit level before 1993, at 4 digit level starting 1993), the business definition 
o f target firms or businesses, the name, and the business definition o f bidder firms.5 Our 
sample does not include transactions associated with target firms or businesses that 
operated in non-manufacturing industries (i.e., Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2- 
digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89)) as Q
5 They also report the value o f acquisition, the method o f  payment, whether the target is divested or not, the 
completion day o f  the acquisition and the advisors to both parties.
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ratios and other measures may be inappropriate for financial firms. The Domestic 
Acquisitions roster o f M&A Journal reports 11410 domestic acquisitions over the 1991- 
1997 period, o f which 1282 acquisitions were made by bidders that completed 
acquisitions in foreign countries in the same calendar year as well. We focus exclusively 
on domestic acquisitions and, therefore, our initial sample consists o f 10128 acquisitions.
We observe the acquisitions activity in certain industries is more intense than in 
others based on the 2 digit SIC code industrial classification o f target firms in the initial 
sample.6 For instance, in the mining division, oil and gas extraction industry (2-digit SIC 
code 13, 573 acquisitions) is the most active industry. In the manufacturing division, 
food and kindred products (2-digit SIC code 20, 328 acquisitions), printing, publishing 
and allied industries (2-digit SIC code 27, 498 acquisitions), chemicals and allied 
products (2-digit SIC code 28, 573 acquisitions), industrial and commercial machinery 
and computer equipment (2-digit SIC code 35, 704 acquisitions), electronics and other 
electrical equipment (2-digit SIC code 36, 610 acquisitions) and measuring, analyzing 
and controlling instruments (2-digit SIC code 38,648 acquisitions) are the industries with 
high acquisitions activity. In the transportation division, communications, 
communications (2-digit SIC code 48, 866 acquisitions) is the most active industry 
followed by electric, gas and sanitary services (2-digit SIC code 49, 434 acquisitions). 
While previous studies exclude electric, gas and sanitary services out o f their samples 
because they are regulated, we decided to keep them in our sample in the wake of 
deregulation in those industries. In the wholesale trade division, wholesale trade of 
durables (2-digit SIC code 50, 771 acquisitions) is the leading industry followed by 
wholesale trade o f nondurables (2-digit SIC code 5 1,470 acquisitions) and miscellaneous 
retail (2-digit SIC code 59, 372 acquisitions).
2.I.B. Industrial Classification
In the corporate diversification literature, several sources and measures have been 
used to analyze firms that operate in unrelated lines o f  business7. The recent
6 Industrial classification o f  target firms in the initial sample are not reported but available upon request.
7 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use the Line o f  Business sample o f  the Federal Trade Commission. 
Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Liebeskind and Opler (1992), and Lichtenberg (1992) use census data 
to measure diversification in terms o f  different SIC codes for plants. Servaes (1996) uses Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory to determine the number o f business segments operated by a firm for 
the 1962-1974 period. Hubbard and Paiia (1999) obtain the 4 digit SIC code o f bidders and targets from
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diversification literature determines a firm’s industrial diversity by using the 2 digit SIC 
code 8, the 3 digit SIC code9, or the 4 digit SIC code10. In addition, Lamont (1997) uses 
his personal judgement to classify oil dependent and nonoil dependent business 
segments. In a similar fashion, Scharfstein (1998) pools related business segments into 
“divisions” which are unrelated to each other, but the business segments in each division 
are highly related. Matsusaka (1993) uses the most advanced method to identify vertical 
linkages between businesses. He uses economy-wide industry input-output matrices to 
identify vertical linkages between industries.
The Compustat Industry Segment File is used to collect information about the 
business segments o f bidder firms in our sample. SEC regulation S-K. and FASB-SFAS 
No. 14 require firms to report segment information for fiscal years ending after 
December 15, 1977. Firms must report information for segments representing 10 percent 
or more o f consolidated sales. The Compustat Industry Segment File reports this 
information: net sales, operating profit (earnings before interest and taxes; EBIT), 
depreciation, assets, and capital expenditures on a segment level basis for all active 
Compustat firms other than utility subsidiaries. Compustat assigns a primary and a 
secondary SIC code to each business segment o f the firm, as well as a main SIC code to 
the firm at the 4 digit level. However, we must point out that the main SIC code of the 
firm reported by Compustat is not always representative o f the firm’s main cash 
generating line o f business (core business). For example, Compustat reports that General 
Electric has a main SIC code of 3600; Electronic and Electrical Equipment and 
Components for 1997. Nevertheless, the business segment that generates the highest 
amount o f  sales in GE (both in amount and percentage o f annual sales) is Financing 
activities; SIC codes 6141 and 6159 by about half of the aggregated sales o f GE in year 
1997.
As Servaes (1996) points out, a straightforward examination of the 4-digit SIC 
codes o f the segments o f the firm does not reveal the degree o f diversification of the firm.
different issues o f Standard and Poor’s Register o f Corporations, Directors and Executives to construct 
their sample o f mergers for thel961-1970 period but make their classification based on 2 digit SIC codes.
8 See Servaes (1996), Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Lins and Servaes 
(1999a, 1999b).
9 See Shin and Stulz (1998), Scharfstein (1998), and Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999).
10 See Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1995).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
He argues that the use o f  the 4-digit SIC code would be too wide to identify the industrial 
structure o f the firm. The rationale for using 2-digit SIC codes is that industries with the 
same 2 digit SIC codes are closely related and require comparable management skills. In 
addition, as Shin and Stulz (1998) note, one o f the difficulties in using segment data is to 
identify the business segments that are reorganized by firms over time. Rajan et. 
al.(2000) mention this type of inconsistency in reporting from year to year and they 
circumvent this problem mainly by making sure that no data is obtained from data stretch 
over a period o f more than one year for their specific diversity computations. Similarly, 
Shin and Stulz eliminate high cash flow segment-years and the firms whose largest and 
smallest segments share the same 2 digit SIC code. However, the elimination o f high 
cash flow segment-years may disguise the impact o f cross subsidization on firm’s 
investment activity. In addition, the elimination of the largest and the smallest segments 
with the same 2 digit SIC code may bias the results by ignoring the comparable 
management skills between those segments. As reported by Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 
(2002) single-segment firms that diversify by reporting changes do not experience any 
diversification discount while those that diversify through acquisitions experience 
significant valuation discount suggesting that the investment activity rather than the 
reporting changes has a significant impact on the industrial diversity o f the firms and the 
related valuation consequences. In this study, we also examine the effects o f cross 
subsidization on the investment activity o f the other segments o f the firm. Therefore, we 
need a more refined measure o f segment information to determine the industrial structure 
o f and the capital allocation within the firm.
Following Servaes (1996), we define a line o f business at the 2 digit SIC level 
augmented by a procedure similar to those used by Lamont (1997, p i06) and Scharfstein 
(1998). We make use o f the primary and secondary SIC codes o f each segment in the 
bidder firm as reported by Compustat Industry Segment File. Lamont is mainly 
concerned with the presence o f oil drilling industries (2 digit SIC code o f 13) in primary 
and/or secondary SIC codes o f  business segments in oil dependent firms, with more 
weight on primary SIC codes. We treat the primary and secondary SIC codes o f  business 
segments to be o f equal importance and we partition the sales, operating income, assets, 
capital expenditures and depreciation o f each reported segment into two. The resulting
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figures are aggregated into distinct business segments based on their 2-digit SIC code to 
determine the sales, operating income, assets, capital expenditures and depreciation of 
each distinct segment defined at the 2 digit SIC code. Our procedure resembles that o f 
Scharfstein (1998) who pools related segments into “divisions” depending on his 
judgement o f relatedness. Our measure of relatedness for distinct business segments is 
based on sharing the same 2-digit SIC code obtained from our procedure explained 
above. We do not count the segments having less than 10 percent o f the sales or assets as 
a viable segment in compliance with FASB-SFAS No 14. We, then, define the “core 
business” o f the firm as the 2-digit SIC code o f the business segment that has the highest 
share o f aggregated sales o f the firm (either in million dollars or in percentage o f sales) 
for a given year. All the remaining business segments are counted as “non-core business” 
segments. For stand-alone (single-segment) bidders, the only business segment is defined 
as the core business. This procedure, for instance, classifies General Electric as a 
Financing firm whose core business has a 2 digit main SIC code of 61 for 1997, rather 
than an Electric and Electronics firm with a 2 digit main SIC code of 36. The distinct 
business segment which brings in the highest amount o f cash into General Electric is the 
Financing activities in 1997.
Unlike Chevalier (2000) we are not in search of an overlap between the SIC code 
o f the target firm and the SIC code of any one o f the reported business segments o f the 
bidder at any SIC level. Chevalier (2000), who concentrates on “diversifying mergers” 
only, classifies mergers as related in instances o f an overlap o f 2-digit SIC codes among 
any o f the reported business segments of the target and the bidder firms in the merger of 
industrially diversified firms. We define acquisitions as “diversifying” (or unrelated) 
when the 2-digit SIC code of the target does not match with the 2-digit SIC code o f the 
bidder’s core business generating the highest amount (and percentage) o f sales for the 
bidder. On the other hand, we define acquisitions as “focusing” when the 2 digit SIC 
code o f the target matches with the bidder’s core business that generates the highest 
amount (and percentage) o f sales. We carry out this classification both for the year prior 
to the acquisition and for the year o f the acquisition. Both procedures yield almost 
identical results. Throughout the study, we will report results based on the classification 
prior to the year o f the acquisition (year-1).
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When we examine the type o f domestic acquisitions by the industrial 
classification o f bidder firms based on the 2-digit SIC codes o f their core business we 
observe that target firms in manufacturing industries having been acquired by bidder 
firms in finance and service industries as well.11 Most o f these acquisitions have been 
carried out by bidders with core businesses in holding offices and business services. The 
evidence suggests the bulk o f the acquisitions (2994 out of 5247 classified acquisitions) 
is “focusing” in nature and certain industries are more active investing through 
acquisitions than others Our research focus is not on non-manufacturing industries: 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2- 
digit SIC codes from 70 to 89) and bidders in those industries will be eliminated from our 
sample in later stages.
2. l.C. Sample Characteristics and Summary Statistics
Table I presents the annual number and frequency o f 10128 domestic acquisitions 
included in the initial sample. The number o f acquisitions is increasing systematically 
over the years. The majority o f acquisitions is focusing in nature throughout the 1991- 
1997 period. It is interesting to note the number of focusing acquisitions has increased 
over the years as well. More than 57 percent o f acquisitions represent investments within 
the core business o f the bidder. In 1997, 59.30 percent o f acquisitions are classified as 
focusing relative to 53.37 percent in 1991. A considerable portion of the investment 
activity, however, is directed outside the core business of the bidder. About 43 percent of 
bidders’ investments, on average, are directed towards unrelated lines o f business.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ]
Table 2 presents the description and number o f acquisitions included in our final 
sample o f domestic acquisitions. We identified 10128 domestic acquisition 
announcements in the M&A journal that were also confirmed by The Wall Street Journal. 
The initial sample included the group o f acquisitions in which both the bidder and the 
target firm were domiciled in the U.S. The group of acquisitions made by bidders 
undertaking acquisitions overseas on the same calendar year were excluded because of 
the difficulty in identifying their expansion motives. As a result o f  this process we ended 
up with 10128 acquisitions in our initial sample.
"  Industrial classification o f  bidder firms in the initial sample are not reported but available upon request
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Out of our 10128 acquisitions o f the initial sample, we could not find any 
information about bidder firms in Compustat for 4881 acquisitions. This brought the 
sample size down to 5247 from 10128 acquisitions. Then, we eliminated acquisitions 
made by firms whose core businesses lie in non-manufacturing industries: Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC 
codes from 70 to 89). We eliminated 393 M&As, made by firms operating in non­
manufacturing industries, that brought our sample size down to 4854 acquisitions from 
5247 acquisitions. The acquisitions by non-manufacturing bidders were eliminated 
because they are likely to be driven by the diversification or investment motives of 
financial, holding and service firms.
The next step involved the elimination o f bidder firms that acquired several 
targets operating both within their own core business and outside their core line of 
business. We found 845 acquisitions o f this nature (i.e., investments classified as 
focusing and diversifying). This brought our sample size down to 4009 acquisitions. 
Finally, we combined several acquisitions made either within the core (focusing) or 
outside the core (diversifying) line o f business by the same bidder on the same calendar 
year into one firm-year observation. We found 829 additional acquisitions made by the 
same bidder in either core or non-core lines o f business and, therefore, our final sample 
includes 3180 firm-year observations. On average, 61.79 percent of bidders in our final 
sample invest in lines o f business identical to their core business (focusing acquisitions). 
Over the years, there is a slight increase in pursuing focusing rather than diversifying 
acquisitions o f bidders included in our final sample.
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ]
Table 3 presents the type o f acquisitions across industries based on the industry 
classification o f bidder’s core business at 2 digit SIC code level. This evidence confirms 
the previous observation that bidders in most industries have a preference for related 
acquisitions (i.e., expand their core line o f business), while in very few industries bidders 
have a preference for unrelated acquisitions (i.e., expand outside their core line of 
business).
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ]
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Table 4 provides summary statistics o f bidders included in the final sample. The 
statistics in this table are calculated based on information available the year before the 
acquisition. The mean [median] annual sales o f bidder firms is $ 1.845 billion [$276 
million], implying that bidders are on average mid sized firms. The average [median] 
market value o f bidders is $1,623 billion [$ 232 million] and the average [median] value 
o f total assets o f bidders is $1,879 billion [$230 million]. These statistics also suggest 
that bidders are mid sized firms.
The average [median] foreign sales to total sales ratio o f bidders is 7.86 percent 
[0.00 percent] indicating that bidders that made acquisitions in U.S. have a very low 
degree o f international involvement. The average [median] debt to total capital ratio is 
39.25 percent [37.73 percent] suggesting that bidders are considerably levered and, 
therefore, at substantial creditor scrutiny. The average [median] insider ownership is 
20.37 percent [12.83 percent] indicating that insiders o f bidding firms have large 
ownership stakes. However, these figures are almost double o f what Denis et. al. (1997) 
report for percentage ownership o f officers and directors12. In addition, the average 
[median] institutional ownership is 38.72 percent [39.70 percent]. Both average and 
median values o f debt and ownership structure demonstrate that managers o f bidding 
firms are under considerable scrutiny by creditors, insider and institutional owners that 
might explain the larger number of focusing acquisitions.
The average [median] number of lines o f business (number o f business segments) 
is 1.45 [1.00] implying the bidders in this sample are mostly single segment (specialized) 
firms. The summary statistics also show the average [median] number of acquisitions 
made in a single year is 1.26 [1.00]. This seems to suggest that bidders are not desperate 
seeking growth through multiple acquisitions per year. The average [median] size of 
firm-year acquisitions is $248 million [$42.5 million] indicating that most o f the target 
firms are not large firms in terms of value. The average [median] o f size o f firm-year 
acquisitions scaled by firm sales (not reported) is 51.83 percent [16.11 percent]. 
Similarly, the average [median] o f size o f firm-year acquisitions scaled by firm assets 
(not reported) is 40.71 percent [18.92 percent]. These observations support that the
12 Denis et. al. (1997, Table 0  report percentage ownership o f  insiders with a mean o f  11.7 percent and a 
median o f  6.4 percent The difference between our results and Denis e t  al. might help to explain higher 
frequency o f  focusing acquisitions in our sample.
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amount o f  capital spent in acquisitions are enough to create a new business segment and 
to significantly change the corporate structure within the bidder firm as they exceed the
10 percent threshold imposed by SFAS No 14 for segment information.
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ]
2.2. Bidder's Pre-Acquisition Performance
One o f our objectives in this study is to measure the effects o f diversification on 
bidder's performance after the acquisition and draw inferences about the value of internal 
capital markets associated with diversification. To gain insights into the effects of 
diversification itself, we estimate bidder's pre- and post-acquisition performance using 
two valuation measures. The valuation measures consist o f Tobin’s Q and Excess Market 
Value (EMV). Tobin’s Q is computed as the market value o f outstanding shares plus the 
liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by 
total assets. Excess Market Value is defined as the market value o f equity less book value 
o f equity normalized by total sales.
The imputed value o f a segment is computed by multiplying sales-based (asset- 
based) multiples, or weights, o f the distinct business segments at the 2 digit SIC level 
with the median valuation measures (Q or EMV) obtained from single-segment firms 
operating in the same 2 digit SIC industries. We compute the sales-based (and asset- 
based) multiples as the ratio of annual segment sales (assets) for each distinct line of 
business defined at 2 digit SIC code divided by the total sales (assets) o f the bidder firm 
in that year13. Sales-based and asset-based computations yield very similar results and we 
will report results based on sales-multiples computations. We compute the median of 
valuation measures o f single-segment firms that share the same 2 digit SIC code with the 
distinct business segments o f the bidder. Even though previous studies in the literature 
have controlled for industry effects, none has controlled for the size o f the business 
segments o f the firm. The size o f the stand-alone firms in our study has to fall within the 
range o f 50% to 200% o f the size o f the business segment o f the bidder in that year. If  the
11 Several studies attach no weights to different business segments within a firm while computing the 
diversification discount (Servaes (1996) and Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999)). Such diversification 
discount measures might prove fruitful only if  diversified firms consist o f  business segments when no 
distinct business segment information is available. Some other studies (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and 
Ofek (1995,1996) among others) measure the diversification discount using industry matched stand alone 
firms to determine the imputed value o f  diversified firms by sales or assets multiplier approaches.
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number o f stand alone firms are less than five in a year, we extend the size restriction to 
within 25% and 400% o f the size o f the segment’s assets. Thus, we obtain imputed value 
o f measures for bidders as weighted sum of median valuation measures o f size-matched 
stand-alone firms operating in the same 2 digit SIC code with the distinct business 
segments o f  the bidder as follows:
n n
IMPUTEDQ= Z  WjQ INDj = Z  w, median {Qu, Q:j, QSj} (1)
j - i  j - i
where Wj is the sales-based (asset-based) weight o f the firm’s sales (assets) in 
business segment j, and Q(or EMV) [NDj is the size matched median valuation o f single­
segment bidders that operate in the same 2 digit SIC code business with the business of 
segment j  o f the bidder.
We also estimate the bidders' industry-adjusted valuation measures (valuation 
premium /discount) using the approach o f Berger and Ofek (1995). Namely, we compute 
the natural logarithm of the ratio o f raw valuation measures of bidders to their imputed 
values; that is ln(Q/IMPUTEDQ) or ln(EMV/IMPUTEDEMV), as industry-adjusted 
valuation variables.
2.2.A. Pre-Acquisition Performance: Tobin's Q Values
Pre-acquisition raw and industry-adjusted performance measures for bidder firms 
are presented in Table 5. Panel A reports bidders' raw and industry-adjusted values of 
Tobin’s Q 3 years before the acquisition (year -3 ) till the year o f the acquisition (year 0). 
Bidders experience increasing mean and median raw Q values from year -3  to year 0 and 
mean Q values persistently exceed median Q values. Bidders with diverse business 
operations (multi-segment bidders) always have significantly lower mean and median 
raw Q values than bidders with a single line o f business (single-segment bidders) during 
the pre-acquisition period, suggesting that single-segment firms have superior pre­
acquisition performance than multi-segment firms. This result holds for every single year 
throughout the pre-acquisition period for all acquisitions as well as for firms conducting 
focusing and diversifying acquisitions. Namely, the pre-acquisition performance of 
focused (single-segment) bidders is considerably stronger in comparison to the pre­
acquisition performance of diversified (multi-segment) bidders regardless o f whether 
they invest in related or unrelated business.
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The prc-acquisition industry-adjusted Q values indicate that multi-segment 
bidders, whether they plan to focus or diversify later, bear a significant valuation 
discount in the pre-acquisition period. The valuation discount for focusing and 
diversifying multi-segment bidders does not appear to be significantly different in any of 
the pre-acquisition years. Interestingly, the valuation discount in multi-segment firms 
increases significantly with median discount values o f -13.52%, -14.92%, and -17.61% 
in years -3 , -2, and -1 , respectively. This phenomenon is more pronounced for multi­
segment bidders that make further diversifying acquisitions. If Q values attest 
performance, the evidence suggests that the performance of diversified firms decreases as 
we near the acquisition year. The poor performance of diversified firms is consistent with 
the extant diversification literature documenting that diversified firms trade at a discount, 
but inconsistent with the view that internal capital markets improve corporate 
performance. Moreover, the results seem to support the argument that the weak pre­
diversification performance of diversified firms might be the reason firms undertake 
diversifying investments.
On the other hand, single-segment bidders trade at par or exhibit mildly inferior 
performance relative to their industry peers for the same period, with median values o f -  
1.52%, 0.00%, and -1.42% in years -3 , -2, and, - I, respectively. It is interesting to note 
most o f this marginal valuation discount in single-segment bidders stems from bidders 
that conduct focusing acquisitions in year 0. While this does not represent a significant 
decline relative to comparable industry Q values, it indicates mild weakness relative to its 
industry that might be associated with the decision to invest externally. The mean and 
median valuation difference between focusing and diversifying single-segment bidders is 
statistically significant at conventional levels in all three pre-acquisition years.
In general, the pre-acquisition evidence indicates that multi-segment bidders trade 
at a considerable discounts than single-segment bidders, with median difference values o f 
-12.00%, -13.87%, and -15.26% in years -3 , -2, and, -1, respectively. Focusing single­
segment bidders trade at minor valuation discounts than multi-segment bidders that 
conduct similar type of acquisitions, with median difference values o f -10.89% (with p- 
value o f 0.002), -14.65%(with p-value of 0.002), and -12.62%(with p-value o f 0.002) in 
years -3 , -2, and, -I, respectively. Diversifying single-segment bidders trade at an
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insignificant premium or at par while multi-segment bidders that engage in similar 
acquisitions trade at deep discounts in the pre-acquisition period. The mean and median 
valuation difference is statistically significant in all three pre-acquisition years.
This result and the more dramatic declines in Q for diversified bidders 
corroborates the view that external investments through acquisitions are likely to be 
motivated by valuation declines. The evidence appears to be consistent with several 
studies finding that the typical bidder has a lower Q ratio before diversifying (Lang, Stulz 
and Walkling (1989), Hyland (1999) and Campa and Kedia (1999)). While our results are 
also consistent with diversification discount literature documenting that diversified firms 
trade at a discount, it does not necessarily imply the act o f diversification itself destroys 
firm value. Based on these results, however, it can be argued that past diversifying 
investments by multi-segment firms have failed to improve performance. Hence, the pre- 
acquisition evidence appears to cast doubt on the value o f internal capital markets.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ]
2.2.B. Pre-Acquisition Performance: Excess Market Value
Panel B o f Table 5 presents bidders' raw and industry-adjusted excess market 
values for the pre-acquisition period. The raw EMV of bidders represents the additional 
market value created by bidders above their book value per unit o f sales while the 
industry-adjusted EMVs measure bidders' value creation relative to that o f their industry 
peers (i.e., measured by the weighted sum of similar stand-alone firms). To a large extent 
these valuation results resemble those of Q values. The raw results show that, on average, 
bidders experience positive and increasing excess market values as they near the 
acquisition year. Multi-segment bidders have considerably lower excess market values 
than single-segment firms. The mean and median differences are statistically significant.
Industry-adjusted mean and median excess market values fall as we draw closer 
to the acquisition year. The industry-adjusted excess market values o f multi-segment 
bidders confirm that they trade at a loss ranging from 14.90 percent in year-3 to 22.18 
percent in the acquisition year. Single-segment bidders, however, experience significant 
gains relative to their industry peers with the exception o f a sharp decline in year 0. 
Single-segment firms' excess market value is above their industry peers in the year of 
acquisition by 5.22 percent, while multi-segment bidders incur a 22.18 percent value loss
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in year 0. It is also interesting to note that the excess market value o f single-segment 
bidders declines relative to their industry peers during the pre-acquisition period. The 
overall evidence suggests the excess market value o f multi-segment firms is significantly 
lower in comparison to the excess market value o f single-segment firms. This is 
consistent with our previous evidence and the diversification literature (Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), among others) reporting that diversified firms trade at a 
discount relative to focused firms. Furthermore, these findings suggest the firm's 
acquisition activity is related to its pre-acquisition value losses. The losses are 
pronounced for diversified bidders as we draw closer to the acquisition year, while 
focused firms realize small declines during the acquisition year only. It is also important 
to note the pre-acquisition median difference between the excess market values of 
diversified and focused bidders is more pronounced for firms that do not plan to invest 
outside their core business. This seems to suggest that diversified firms that decide to 
undertake acquisitions in their core business do so because they have experienced 
somewhat greater losses during the pre-acquisition period than diversified bidders that 
plan to pursue diversifying acquisitions. For instance, in year -1 the median losses are 
24.36 percent for multi-segment firms that add related assets to their operations and 
13.43 percent for multi-segment firms that diversify outside their core business a year 
later, respectively. The difference, however, is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.
Overall, the pre-acquisition valuation analysis confirms that multi-segment 
bidders have inferior performance than their industry peers. Single-segment bidders, 
however, experience minor discounts. In addition, multi-segment bidders experience 
significantly lower industry-adjusted Qs and EMVs than single-segment bidders making 
similar acquisitions. Furthermore, the valuation discount in multi-segment bidders 
appears to increase as they near the acquisition year. These findings are consistent with 
the recorded discount in the diversification literature that implies that diversification does 
not create value. However, if diversification has not worked in the past, an important 
question that remains unanswered is why firms undertake investment strategies that 
appear to destroy firm value. Namely, while both single- and multi-segment firms engage
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in focusing and diversifying investment, it is not yet known what determines the bidder’s 
type o f investment activity. In the next section we attempt to shed light on this issue.
2 J  Why Firms Diversify: Logistic Regression Analysis
The pre-acquisition analysis seems to link the acquisition activity o f the firm to its 
valuation decline prior to its external investment decision. This association appears to be 
strong for multi-segment firms. In this section we use logistic regression analysis to 
investigate why firms are likely to diversify. Specifically, we focus on the determinants 
o f firm's diversification decision. This is expected to shed more light on the relative 
importance o f the external growth, cash flow/agency cost, and internal capital markets 
hypotheses that have been put forward as explanations o f the corporate diversification 
motive. The external growth hypothesis asserts that bidders' poor performance and their 
low internal growth opportunities force them to undertake diversifying investments. The 
free cash flow/agency cost hypothesis, however, states that the diversifying investment 
activities are driven by managers' objectives at the expense o f shareholders wealth. 
Finally, the internal capital markets hypothesis argues that corporate diversification stems 
from the efficiency gains of internal capital markets in diversified firms.
In the multivariate logistic regressions the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable, DIVERD, that takes the value of one when a bidder undertakes a diversifying 
acquisition and zero otherwise. The following variables are included in these regressions: 
The natural logarithm o f annual firm sales, LN(SALES), is used to control for the size of 
the bidders. We include the imputed Q value of the firm, IMPUTEDQ, that is computed 
based on sales multiples o f distinct business segments. This measure allows us to 
determine whether the diversification decision o f the firm is driven by the state of growth 
opportunities o f  the bidder's industry. Namely, whether diversifying investments are 
linked to the low growth opportunities o f the bidder’s industry. The industry-adjusted 
Tobin's Q, INDADJQ, the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f the firm Q divided by its 
imputed value; is used to measure the growth opportunities (and the valuation) o f the 
firm relative to its industry peers.14
14 Chevalier (2000), however, suggests that actual Q values are more representative o f the investment 
opportunities o f  the firm rather than its industry adjusted values.
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The DEBT variable is the amount o f total debt as percentage o f invested capital. 
DEBT is used to capture the monitoring effect o f external capital markets on managers 
(Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), among others). The INSIDER variable is the percentage of 
the outstanding shares o f  the bidder held by the insiders. The insider ownership variable 
is used to test whether firms with lower insider ownership are more likely to diversify. 
The percentage o f the outstanding shares o f the bidder held by institutions, INSTITUTE, 
is also used in the analysis. We use the institutional ownership variable to examine 
whether firms with lower institutional ownership are more likely to diversify, revealing 
agency costs in the firms as a complement to insider ownership IS.
The RDEXP measures the R&D expenditures o f the bidder normalized by its total 
sales. It is a continuous variable used to control for the firm's level o f growth 
opportunities. Namely, to examine how much the firm is investing in its growth 
opportunities (Hyland (1999)). In addition to the intangible nature o f R&D expenditures, 
bidders may also possess intangibles observed in their advertising expenditures. The 
ADVEXP variable measures bidder's advertising expenditures normalized by its total 
sales. This is also a continuous variable. The core cash flow (CCF) and non-core cash 
flow (NCCF) variables are used to explore the cash generating ability o f the core and 
non-core segments o f bidders in the pre-acquisition period. They are defined as the cash 
flows (operating income plus depreciation) from the operations o f the core and non-core 
business segments o f the bidder, respectively, normalized by bidder's segment sales. 
Furthermore, we account for the method of payments using two indicator variables. 
CASHD takes the value o f one if the payment was made in cash and zero otherwise. 
STOCKD is set equal to one if the payment was made in stock and zero otherwise 16.
We also include a binary variable that identifies whether the target was a 
divestiture, DIVESTD. This variable takes the value o f one if the target was divested by 
its parent company. All independent variables are measured in year -1, the calendar year 
before the acquisition. Besides, we include calendar year dummies in the regression to 
control for changes in the corporate control market. The logistic regression takes the 
following form:
15 See McConnell and Servaes (1990,1995), Denis et al (1997).
16 See Travlos (1987), Servaes (1991), Martin (1996), Megginson, Morgan and Nail (1999), and Rappaport 
and Sirower (1999)
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DIVERD = f  ( LN(SALES), IMPUTEDQ or (EMV), INDADJQ or (EMV), DEBT, INSIDER, 
INSTITUTE, RDEXP, ADVEXP, CCF, NCCF, CASHD, STOCKD, DIVESTD)
Table 6 presents the regression results. Panel A reports the coefficients o f the 
logistic regressions for single-segment firms while Panel B reports results for multi­
segment firms. The intercept, as shown in Panel A, is positive and statistically 
significant, implying single-segment bidders are likely to consider diversification 
strategies. However, the intercept ranges between 0.315 and 0.4130, indicating only 32- 
41 percent o f single-segment firms are likely to undertake diversifying acquisitions. The 
size variable, LN(SALES), is statistically significant in only the last two regressions 
suggesting single-segment bidders with high annual sales are significantly more likely to 
acquire targets operating outside their core business.
The coefficient o f the imputed Q variable, IMPUTEDQ, is negative and 
significant implying the bidder's diversification decision is influenced by the growth 
opportunities o f its industry. The coefficient o f the industry-adjusted Q variable, 
INDADJQ, is insignificant suggesting the bidder’s decision to diversify is not likely to be 
influenced by its performance relative to its industry. Similar results are obtained in 
regressions 2 and 7 when EMV is used as an alternative valuation measure to Tobin’s Q. 
In regression 2, the coefficient o f the industry adjusted EMV turns positive and 
significant at the 10% level suggesting the relative valuation o f the firm to its industry 
might encourage the firm to pursue industrial diversification.
Leverage appears to discourage single-segment bidders from making diversifying 
acquisitions. The coefficient o f the DEBT variable is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This is consistent with the view that debt serves as a monitoring mechanism of 
managerial misconduct. Hence, we conclude that debt serves as a monitoring mechanism 
o f managerial misconduct for single-segment firms. We also find that the coefficients of 
INSIDER and INSTITUTE variables are negative and significant, suggesting insider and 
institutional owners o f single-segment firms discourage diversifying acquisitions. These 
results imply diversification is likely to be more pronounced in firms with weak insider 
and institutional ownership characteristics.
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The coefficient o f the R&D expenditures variable, RDEXP, is positive and 
significant suggesting single-segment firms with high knowledge-based intangibles are 
more likely to diversify. This observation suggests single-segment firms in our sample 
are unlikely to diversify because they have depleted their internal growth opportunities. 
In sum, diversification o f single-segment firms appears to be driven by opportunities to 
exploit their knowledge-based advantage. On the other hand, the coefficient o f ADVEXP 
variable is negative, but not significant in all regressions, implying marketing-based 
intangibles are unrelated to the firm's decision to diversify.
The coefficient of core cash flow variable (CCF) is negative and insignificant 
implying cash flow increases are not likely to encourage expanding outside the core 
business o f single-segment firms. Among the other control variables, the CASHD 
variable has the strongest association with diversification. Its coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant in all regressions, implying single-segments firms would prefer to 
invest in non-diversifying projects if  the transaction was required to be settled in cash.
The coefficients o f similar regressions for multi-segment bidders are reported in 
Panel B and suggest they have a stronger diversification motive than single-segment 
firms. The intercepts o f multi-segment bidders are not only positive and statistically 
significant, as before, but substantially larger in comparison to those of single-segment 
firms. The intercept ranges between 0.555 and 0.668, indicating 56-67 percent o f these 
firms are likely to undertake diversifying acquisitions. The size variable, LN(SALES), 
gains significance in the last two regressions suggesting larger multi-segment firms are 
more likely to conduct acquisitions outside their core business. Consistent with the 
single-segment results, the coefficient o f the imputed Q, IMPUTEDQ, variable is 
negative and significant. Hence, multi-segment bidder's diversification decision is also 
influenced by the growth opportunities o f its industry. Specifically, this result suggests 
that firms that operate in high-Q industries are unlikely to diversify, while firms that 
operate in low-Q industries are more likely to invest and expand outside their core 
businesses. Consistent with Campa and Kedia (1999), Lamont and Polk (2001), and 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), this result implies adverse industry shocks are likely to 
drive the firm's decision to invest in peripheral lines o f business.
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The coefficient o f the industry-adjusted Q variable, INDADJQ, is insignificant 
indicating multi-segment bidder's decision to diversify is unlikely to be influenced by its 
performance relative to its industry. Similarly, the coefficient of the INDADJEMV 
variable is statistically insignificant.
In contrast with the evidence on the effects o f leverage on the diversification 
decision o f single-segment firms, leverage appears to have a positive and significant 
influence on the diversification decision of multi-segment bidders. The coefficient o f the 
DEBT variable is 0.001 and significant at conventional levels. This implies the 
investment activities o f diversified firms are less likely to be subject to the same degree 
o f market scrutiny than single-segment bidders. This, then, might be one of the reasons 
diversified firms are found to trade at a discount. We conclude that debt serves as a 
monitoring mechanism of managerial misconduct for single-segment firms, but not for 
multi-segment firms. Increases in debt by multi-segment firms are likely to fund 
unrelated acquisitions.
The coefficients o f INSIDER and INSTITUTE variables are negative and 
significant, suggesting the monitoring power o f insider and institutional is more stringent 
on the diversifying activities o f managers ownership in multi-segment firms. Therefore, 
these results mean diversification is likely to be more pronounced in firms with low 
levels o f insider and institutional ownership.
The coefficient of the R&D expenditures variable, RDEXP, is insignificant 
suggesting the knowledge-based intangibles of multi-segment bidders does not lead to 
greater diversification. This is in sharp contrast with the evidence reported for single­
segment firms in our sample. In brief, diversification o f multi-segment firms does not 
appear to be influenced by their knowledge-based assets. The coefficient o f ADVEXP 
variable is not significant in all regressions, implying marketing-based intangibles are 
unrelated to the firm's decision to diversify.17
The relation between the firm's diversification decision and the different cash 
flow streams (i.e., core and non-core cash flows) is intended to shed light on how internal 
capital markets impact on the nature of the investment decision. Unlike the single­
17 See Doukas, Pantzalis and Kim (1999) for a detailed discussion o f  knowledge based and marketing 
based intangibles
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segment bidders, the coefficient o f the core cash flow variable, (CCF), is -0.274 and 
significant at 5% level. This result suggests multi-segment firms that have higher core 
cash flows are not likely to invest in unrelated lines o f businesses. The results also show 
non-core cash flows in multi-segment bidders do not influence the diversification 
decision o f the firm, as shown by the insignificant coefficient o f the NCCF variable. 
These results suggest bidders' internal capital markets appear to be active.
Finally, the STOCKD variable has a strongest association with diversification 
relative to the other control variables. Its coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant in most regressions, pointing out that multi-segments firms prefer to invest in 
non-diversifying projects if the transaction requires to be settled in stock. This suggests 
diversifying acquisitions are viewed as riskier projects by multi-segment firms and, 
therefore, they would prefer to hedge by using stock instead.
In sum, the evidence shows single- and multi-segment firms in good performing 
industries are less likely to diversify. For single-segment bidders, debt, insider and 
institutional ownership act as diversification deterrents. However, for multi-segment 
firms debt does not appear to have the same adverse effects on diversification. High 
intangible assets are more likely to encourage diversification in single- than multi­
segment firms. While core cash flows influence the diversification decision o f multi­
segment firms, they do not have same effect on the investment decision of single­
segment firms. Moreover, the evidence supports that single-segments firms do not seem 
to prefer investing in diversifying projects when the transaction is required to be settled 
in cash.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ]
2.4. Post-Acquisition Performance
Having examined the pre-acquisition performance and the determinants of the 
diversification decision o f single- and multi-segment bidders, in this section we examine 
their post-acquisition performance associated with diversifying and non-diversifying 
investments in order to gain additional insights about the long-term effects o f their 
investment decisions. Specifically, we are interested to determine whether the post­
acquisition performance o f the firm is linked to the act o f diversification itself.
2.4.A. Single- and Multi-Segment Bidders ’ Post-Acquisition Performance
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The post-acquisition raw and industry-adjusted performance measures for single- 
and multi-segment bidders are reported in Table 7. Panel A reports bidders' raw and 
industry-adjusted values o f Tobin’s Q 3 years after the acquisition (year +3) from the 
acquisition year (year 0). The evidence shows the post-acquisition performance of single- 
and multi-segment bidders is inferior to their industry peers regardless o f the type o f 
investment they engaged in. This implies their investments have failed to add firm value. 
Given that single-segment firms did not have a persistent inferior performance than their 
industry peers during the pre-acquisition period, their performance deterioration after the 
acquisition suggests, in general, that their investment is an important determinant o f their 
post-acquisition performance. The industry-adjusted performance of multi-segment 
firms, however, is worse than that o f  single-segment firms throughout the three-year 
post-acquisition period. The difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
This indicates that acquisitions failed to reverse the poor pre-acquisition performance of 
multi-segment firms while they had an adverse effect on the post-acquisition 
performance o f single-segment firms. Hence, the investment decision of single-segment 
firms appears responsible for their post-acquisition performance decline. However, to 
what extent the poor post-acquisition performance o f multi-segment firms is attributed to 
their investment decision remains unknown, given that their pre-acquisition performance 
was inferior to that o f their industry peers as well.
What is more interesting is that the post-acquisition performance of multi­
segment bidders that acquired firms outside their core business gets much worse than that 
o f similar bidders that did not diversify their operations. The evidence suggests that 
focusing investments by multi-segment firms did not worsen their post-acquisition 
performance while further diversifying investments did. Therefore, increased corporate 
diversity by multi-segment bidders seems to exacerbate the poor industry-adjusted pre­
acquisition performance after the acquisition. The industry-adjusted Q median difference, 
however, between focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. While these results suggest further diversification is 
more harmful than corporate focus and, perhaps, not an optimum investment strategy for 
multi-segment firms, non-diversifying investments by multi-segment firms also fail to 
reverse bidders' performance considerably. Therefore, these findings seem to suggest that
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the weak post-acquisition performance of multi-segment firms can be partially attributed 
to both the level o f diversity and the act o f diversification itself.
Multi-segment bidders with poor pre-acquisition performance remain poor 
performers even after the acquisition regardless o f what investment strategy they pursue. 
When multi-segment firms invest inside their core business, they continue to 
underperform their industry at the same level in the years after the acquisition. This 
implies that their core investments fail to restore the overall competitive advantage of the 
firm. When multi-segment firms with poor past performance undertake diversifying 
investments they fail to enhance their post-acquisition performance and suffer from 
further performance declines. Hence, expansion outside their core business worsens the 
overall firm performance instead of improving it. These findings also suggest the 
expansion o f their internal capital market does not help to reverse their past poor 
performance. While this evidence suggests the benefits o f internal capital markets fail to 
outweigh the costs o f diversification, the inferior pre-and post-acquisition performance of 
diversified firms also suggests their past and recent investments have consistently failed 
to enhance firm value. This seems to lead to the conclusion that diversified firms are 
plagued by operating and structural inefficiencies they can not overcome by undertaking 
either diversifying or non-diversifying investments. This result seems to be consistent 
with another stream o f empirical literature showing diversified firms that regain focus, 
especially by divestitures, experience positive stock market reactions and improve 
subsequent performance In addition, our results lend some support to Rajan et. al. 
(2000) who find that increases in corporate diversity are followed by firm value 
decreases.
The evidence also points out that the creation o f internal capital markets by 
single-segment firms does not enhance performance. If internal capital markets work to 
the benefit o f firm performance, single-segment bidders should benefit from diversifying 
acquisitions. In contrast to the prediction o f the internal capital market hypothesis, 
diversifying investments by single-segment firms fail to enhance their post-acquisition 
performance. In fact, the evidence shows that diversifying investments by single-segment
18 See Bhagat and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Scharfstein (1998), 
Megginson, Morgan and Nail (1999), Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999), and Schlingemann, Stulz, 
and Walkling (1999).
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firms with good past performance experience performance declines during the post­
acquisition period. In addition, their post-acquisition performance seems to be 
significantly lower in comparison to that o f their industry peers and diversifying single­
segment firms suffer from the same degree of percentage valuation discount as focusing 
single-segment firms do in the post-acquisition period. What is important to note here is 
that the pre-acquisition performance of single-segment firms, especially that of 
diversifying single-segment bidders, was not persistently inferior to that o f their industry 
peers. Therefore, the pre- and post-acquisition performance o f single-segment firms 
reveals that their investments have been detrimental to firm value. The post-acquisition 
performance of single-segment firms that expand their operations in the same industry 
deteriorates dramatically relative to that o f their industry peers. This significantly poor 
post-acquisition performance of single-segment firms might be related to overinvesting. 
Single-segment firms that invest in new lines of business realize further losses after the 
acquisition and their post-acquisition performance is significantly below that of their 
industry peers. Consequently, the benefits derived from the creation of internal capital 
markets by the diversifying acquisitions o f single-segment firms do not seem to offset the 
costs o f diversification.
Panel B reports similar post-acquisition performance results for both single- and 
multi-segment bidders based on the excess market value performance metric. Overall, 
regardless o f  the performance measure used, the evidence indicates that single- and 
multi-segment bidders, whether they undertake focusing or diversifying investments, 
experience negative performance relative to their industry peers after the acquisition.
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE ]
2.4.B. Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis o f  Bidders ’ Post-Acquisition Performance
In this section we examine further the relation between the change in post­
acquisition performance and the type of assets acquired by single- and multi-segment 
bidders. We measure the change in the post-acquisition performance o f bidders using 
changes in Q and EMV values in the three years after the acquisition relative to their 
values in year - I ,  the year prior to the acquisition, scaled by average Q and EMV values 
during the three year pre-acquisition period. We also estimate the change in the industry
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adjusted valuation of bidders in all three years after the acquisition relative to the 
valuation prior to the acquisition year.
We regress the post-acquisition change in the different performance measures 
against the following indicator variables: MULTIDIVERD is a variable that takes the 
value o f one when a multi-segment bidder conducts a diversifying acquisition and zero 
otherwise, SINGLEFOCUSD takes the value o f one if a single-segment bidders makes a 
focusing acquisition and zero otherwise, SINGLEDIVERD takes the value o f one if a 
single-segment bidders conducts a diversifying acquisition and zero otherwise. Hence, 
the constant captures the impact on post-acquisition performance when a multi-segment 
bidder makes a focusing acquisition.
Table 8 reports the coefficients o f the three indicator variables. The constant is 
positive and significant in the six regressions o f Panel A implying that the post­
acquisition raw performance of focusing multi-segment bidders improves. As the 
coefficients o f the other three indicator variables show, the post-acquisition performance 
of diversifying multi-segment bidders as well as that o f the single-segment bidders does 
not improve as much as the performance of focusing multi-segment bidders. 
Interestingly, three years after the acquisition, the performance of these bidders falls 
significantly below that o f focusing multi-segment bidders. It should be noted that the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficients o f the indicator variables in the EMV 
regressions are somewhat smaller. These results are consistent with the evidence reported 
in Panels A and B of Table 7.
Panel B of Table 8 reports similar regressions using the change in bidders' 
industry-adjusted valuation measures as the dependent variable. The constant in these 
regressions is negative and but not statistically significant. In sharp contrast with the 
previous evidence, this suggests that focusing acquisitions by multi-segment bidders do 
not improve their post-acquisition value relative to a comparable portfolio o f stand alone 
firms. The coefficients o f the other indicator variables imply single-segment and 
diversifying multi-segment bidders experience worse valuation relatives. The regression 
results are largely consistent with our previous univariate findings, suggesting both 
single- and multi-segment bidders experience negative performance relative to their 
industry peers and to a comparable portfolio o f stand alone firms, respectively, after the
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acquisition regardless o f  the type o f acquisition they choose to expand their existing 
operations.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE ]
2.5. Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?
The internal capital markets of diversified firms permit them to finance projects 
that external capital markets would not, because o f informational asymmetries and 
agency costs. As a result, it is argued that diversification creates value for shareholders 
because it gives rise to internal capital markets providing increased monitoring 
incentives, easier asset redeployment and allocation o f funds to liquidity-constrained 
divisions relative to external capital markets (Stein (1997) among others). In addition, 
diversification increases efficiency of firms that are liquidity-constrained because 
management allocates more funds to the more efficient divisions. Our analysis so far, 
consistent with a number o f recent papers, shows diversification by diversified and 
focused firms does not enhance performance. In this section, we examine whether the act 
o f diversification is unsuccessful because bidders' internal capital markets fail to allocate 
financial resources efficiently between core and non-core business divisions before and 
after diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions or because performance o f firms is 
held back by the diversity o f business segments even if  their internal capital markets are 
operating efficiently.
2.5.A. Pre-Acquisition Analysis o f  Bidder’s Core and Non-core Sales, Cash Flows, and 
Capital Expenditures
2.5.A. 1 Core and Non-core Sales
In this section we analyze the cash flows and investments o f the core and non­
core business segments o f bidders before they engage in diversifying and non­
diversifying acquisitions. The results are reported in Table 9. Panel A shows the mean 
and median sales o f  the core and non-core businesses o f bidders measured as the natural 
logarithm o f segment sales in dollar values. Mean and median sales o f single- and multi­
segment bidders show diversified bidders generate more sales indicating a difference in 
size. It is also shown that the core sales o f multi-segment bidders exceed those o f the 
non-core sales o f  multi-segment bidders whether they elect to diversify two years later or 
not. The difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. This pattern holds
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the year before and the acquisition year as well. This suggests that the core business of 
multi-segment bidders in our sample are, indeed, the main cash generating entities of 
these firms. When we compare the mean and median core sales between focusing and 
diversifying multi-segment bidders, we do not find a substantive difference. Similarly, 
the difference between the mean and median values of non-core sales o f focusing and 
diversifying multi-segment bidders is not statistically significant at any conventional 
level. The pre-acquisition core and non-core sales o f multi-segment bidders suggest that 
there is not any dramatic difference in the sales generating ability o f core and non-core 
segments between focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders. Focusing single­
segment bidders, however, have greater mean and median sales than diversifying single­
segment firms, but this is statistically significant at 10% level only in year o f the 
acquisition.
2.5.A.2 Core and Non-core Assets
Panel B o f the same table presents the size o f assets, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the assets in dollars, for the core and non-core business o f multi-segment 
bidders. The size o f assets of single-segment firms is also reported. The mean and 
median values indicate the core business of focusing multi-segment bidders rely on a 
much greater asset base than their non-core business segments during the pre-acquisition 
period. The difference is statistically significant at 1% level. Less dramatic difference is 
observed for multi-segment bidders that plan to invest outside their core business two 
years later. It is interesting to note, there is no difference between multi-segment firms 
that eventually invest in unrelated business relative to similar firms that invest in core­
related business. Consistent with our previous results, this suggests that multi-segment 
firms deploy more assets in the lines o f  business that generate more sales. That is, more 
capital was invested in the core business o f multi-segment firms, and as a result they 
generate greater sales.
Mean and median differences in terms o f size o f assets, as shown in Panel B, 
confirm there is a significant difference in size between single- and multi-segment 
bidders that engage in a similar type o f acquisition. This difference is significant at 1% 
level o f significance in the pre-acquisition period. Moreover, the asset size o f core 
business o f focusing multi-segment bidders is larger than that o f diversifying multi­
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segment bidders, but the difference is not statistically significant with the exception of 
means in year 0 at 10% level o f significance. Similarly, the non-core businesses of 
focusing multi-segment bidders are smaller than those of their diversifying counterparts, 
but the difference is not statistically significant at any conventional level in the pre­
acquisition period. However, sales and asset based Herfindahl indexes19 show the degree 
of diversity for focusing multi-segment bidders is considerably lower compared to 
diversifying multi-segment bidders in the pre-acquisition period.
On the other hand, focusing single-segment bidders exhibit greater mean and 
median asset values than diversifying single-segment bidders in the pre-acquisition 
period. The assets o f focusing single-segment bidders increase over time and at a higher 
rate than those o f diversifying single-segment bidders in the pre-acquisition period. Mean 
and median differences become significant in years -1 and 0.
2.5.A.3 Core and Non-core Growth in Sales and Cash Flows
Panel C presents and compares the sales growth of bidders' business segments in 
the pre-acquisition period. In general, irrespective o f the acquisition motive o f the bidder, 
single- and multi-segment firms experience growth in sales. The core business o f multi­
segment bidders achieve lower mean and median growth in sales than single-segment 
firms that engage in a similar type o f acquisition. The median difference is consistently 
significant at 1% level. This result suggests that single-segment firms that plan to expand 
their operations through acquisitions achieve higher growth in sales than the core 
business segment o f multi-segment firms irrespective of the type o f acquisition. This 
further implies the decision to invest in core-related or core-unrelated lines o f business 
might be driven by different motives in single- and multi-segment firms. This is 
consistent with Chevalier (2000) who argues that previous diversification studies might 
be subject to selection bias because single- and multi segment firms are unlikely to have 
identical investment opportunities.
From year -2  to year -  I the core business segments o f focusing and diversifying 
multi-segment bidders experience a lower but not statistically significant growth in sales 
than their non-core business segments. From year -1  to the year o f acquisition, the core 
businesses o f diversifying multi-segment bidders continue to experience lower growth in
19 The asset and sales based Herfindahl indexes are not reported but available upon request.
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sales than their non-core business segment. The median difference is -0.043 (-4.3 
percent) and statistically significant at 1% level. For the same period, the core business of 
focusing multi-segment bidders achieve significantly higher growth in sales (with a 
median o f 1.134) than their non-core (with a median o f 1.107) segments that is 0.027 (2.7 
percent) and it is statistically significant at 5% level. This suggests the core business of 
diversifying multi-segment firms have incurred a growth-in-sales decline relative to that 
o f their non-core business in years -2 and -1, while similar firms that plan to invest in 
their core business have experienced a growth-in-sales increase relative to that o f their 
non-core business over the same period. Namely, multi-segment bidders that focus 
(diversify) experience greater sales increases (decreases) in their core than their non-core 
business from year -2 and -1 to the acquisition year. The mean and median core growth- 
in-sales difference between diversified firms that focus relative to similar firms that 
diversify further is 0.025 and 0.020, respectively, from year -2 to -I and the median 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. From year -1 to 0 the mean and 
median difference in growth of sales is 0.141 and 0.070, respectively, and significant at 
the 1% level. These results suggest diversification is inversely related with the growth-in- 
sales o f the core business of multi-segment firms. Diversified firms that do not 
experience declines in their core sales are more likely to invest inside their core, while 
diversified firms that experience declines in their core sales are more likely to invest 
outside their core business.
Similarly, single-segment firms that invest in unrelated business appear to 
experience lower growth in sales than single-segment firms that choose to invest in 
related business. The mean and median difference is 0.084 (8.4 percent) and 0.031 (3.1 
percent) from year -1 to 0, respectively, and significant at the 5% level. This might 
suggest single-segment bidders that have reached their full potential in their business 
need to invest in other lines o f business to achieve comparable growth in sales to single­
segment firms that do not diversify. In general, single-segment firms enjoy higher growth 
in sales than the core and non-core segments o f multi-segment firms.
Panel D presents cash flows for core and non-core business segments o f bidding 
firms during the pre-acquisition period. We define cash flows as the operating income 
plus depreciation for core and non-core business segments scaled by segment sales from
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the previous year. These results confirm our previous pre-acquisition findings for both 
single- and multi-segment bidders. Diversified firms that choose to diversify further 
experience lower cash flows from their core business than similar firms that do not 
diversify. The median differences are 0.027 (2.7 percent) and 0.031 (3.1 percent) in 
years-1 and 0, respectively, and statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, the core 
segments o f focusing multi-segment firms generate 2.7 and 3.1 dollars more per 100 
dollars o f sales in years -1 and 0, respectively, than the core segments o f similar firms 
that diversify. These differences are economically significant as well.
The pre-acquisition cash flows suggest diversifying multi-segment bidders are 
able to generate significantly more cash flows from their non-core competencies and 
capitalize on them by strengthening their non-core businesses. This implies diversifying 
multi-segment bidders might have reached a saturation state in their core business and 
therefore search for growth outside o f their core business. This is consistent with the 
view of buying external growth opportunities conjectured by Lang and Stulz (1994) and 
Hyland (1999). Our results are consistent with those reported in Panel B of Table 6 that 
revealed that the core cash flows of diversified bidders have a significantly negative 
impact on their diversification decision. Namely, multi-segment bidders that generate 
higher cash flows from their core business elect to acquire targets that would augment 
their core business while those that can not generate high cash flows choose to conduct 
acquisitions unrelated to their core businesses.
Single-segment firms that diversify are firms that generate lower cash flows than 
similar firms that invest in related business during the pre-acquisition period. The median 
differences are 0.003 and 0.019 in years -1 and 0, respectively, and statistically 
significant at 1% level in year 0. Focusing single-segment bidders experience 
considerable cash flow increases in the pre-acquisition period while diversifying single­
segment bidders experience a decline. Mean and median cash flows o f focusing single­
segment bidders exceed those of diversifying single-segment bidders. The mean and 
median differences are significant at conventional levels in year 0.
Overall, the evidence implies when the core business o f single- and multi­
segment firms achieve higher cash flows they tend to invest in their core business. On the 
other hand, they invest outside their core business when the sales growth and cash flows
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o f the core business are considerably lower, especially when the core cash flows o f multi­
segment bidders fall significantly behind the cash flows o f non-core segments in the pre­
acquisition period.
2.5.A.4 Core and Non-core Capital Expenditures
Panel E provides a comparison of bidder’s core and non-core capital expenditures 
relative to their corresponding segment sales in the pre-acquisition period. The results 
show multi-segment bidders invest more (less) in their core lines o f business when their 
core (non-core) sales growth and cash flows exceed the sales growth and cash flows of 
their non-core (core) business. The difference between the core capital expenditures of 
multi-segment firms that invest more of their capital resources in their core relative to 
those that invest more in non-core business is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. These results do not appear to support cross-subsidization between the core and 
non-core divisions o f multi-segment firms that invest more in their core business during 
the pre-acquisition period. However, the evidence indicates internal capital markets are 
active in that transfer o f funds from core to non-core lines of business occurs in multi­
segment firms that elect to invest outside their core business, but it should be noted that 
these firms generate more cash flows per dollar o f sales from their non-core business. 
Consequently, the extent o f cross-subsidization in diversifying multi-segment firms is 
rather difficult to be assessed from these univariate results.
The capital expenditures o f single-segment firms that undertake focusing 
investments exceed those o f similar firms that invest in unrelated lines o f business. This 
pattern o f capital expenditures coupled with the evidence reported in Panels C and D 
suggest single-segment firms that remain focused generate more cash flows and achieve 
higher sales growth than their counterparts that diversify.
Overall, the pre-acquisition analysis indicates multi-segment firms deploy more 
assets and undertake larger capital expenditures in those divisions generating more sales 
growth and cash flows. This is consistent with Whited (2001) who finds that there is no 
inefficient allocation o f funds in diversified firms after controlling for measurement 
errors. Focusing multi-segment firms use more assets and make larger capital 
expenditures in core than in non-core divisions because they generate more cash flows 
than their non-core divisions. Diversifying multi-segment firms, however, employ more
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assets in core divisions, but commit larger capital expenditures in non-core divisions 
when the growth in sales and cash flows of their core division are inferior than those of 
their non-core divisions prior to the acquisition. Single-segment firms invest in unrelated 
business when they experience lower growth in sales and cash flow than single-segment 
firms that choose to invest in related business. Furthermore, the capital expenditures o f 
single-segment firms that make focusing investments exceed those o f similar firms that 
invest in unrelated business.
In sum, the pre-acquisition analysis highlights that multi-segment firms tend to 
invest more in those lines o f business that generate superior performance results in terms 
o f growth in sales and cash flows. This pattern is also observed in single-segment firms 
undertaking similar investments. This does not appear to be consistent with non-optimal 
investing. Consequently, the claim that the act o f diversification itself is the cause o f the 
diversification discount, documented in Section 2 and other studies, does not appear to be 
corroborated from the analysis thus far.
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE ]
2.5.B. Post-Acquisition Analysis o f  Bidder's Core and Non-core Sales, Cash Flows, and 
Capital Expenditures
In this section we examine the post-acquisition segment performance of both 
single- and multi-segment bidders involved in diversifying and non-diversifying 
investments in order to gain additional insights about the long-term effects o f their 
investment decisions. The results are reported in Table 10.
2.5.B.I Core and Non-core Sales
Consistent with the pre-acquisition pattern o f sales o f  diversified firms, Panel A 
shows the mean and median sales o f the core business o f multi-segment bidders investing 
within their core business persistently generate more sales than their non-core business 
during the post-acquisition period. The difference is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Similarly, multi-segment bidders that invested outside their core 
business continue to create significantly more sales from their core rather the non-core 
lines o f business in the post-acquisition years. A comparison o f the mean and median 
post-acquisition core sales o f multi-segment bidders that invested inside their core 
business relative to those that invested outside their core business shows no significant
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difference. The mean and median differences o f the non-core sales between diversifying 
and non-diversifying bidders are also statistically insignificant. These results imply both 
core and non-core segment sales o f multi-segment firms do not dramatically differ in the 
post-acquisition period regardless o f whether they diversify or not. Mean and median 
sales o f single- and multi-segment bidders show diversified bidders generate more sales 
consistent with the pre-acquisition sales, indicating a difference in size.
Overall, the post-acquisition core and non-core sales o f multi-segment bidders, 
consistent with the pre-acquisition evidence, suggest there is no substantive difference in 
the sales generating ability o f core and non-core segments between focusing and 
diversifying multi-segment bidders. Focusing single-segment bidders also register 
insignificant mean and median differences in sales than diversifying single-segment 
firms, implying single-segment bidders that invest outside their core business did not 
increase their core sales dramatically as well.
2.5.B.2 Core and Non-core Assets
Panel B presents the size o f assets o f the core and non-core business of multi­
segment bidders in the post-acquisition period. The size o f assets of single-segment firms 
is also reported. The mean and median values show the core business o f multi-segment 
bidders continues to exceed the asset base of their non-core business segments during the 
post-acquisition years. The median difference is statistically significant at 1% level for 
non-diversifying and at 5% level for diversifying bidders. The mean and median core 
difference between diversifying and non-diversifying bidders is marginally significant, 
implying that the core-asset base of focusing bidders is marginally larger than that of 
diversifying bidders. The mean and median non-core difference between diversifying and 
non-diversifying bidders is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. However, 
sales and asset based Herfindahl indexes20 show that the degree of diversity in focusing 
multi-segment bidders continues to be significantly lower compared to diversifying 
multi-segment bidders in the post-acquisition period, as they were in the pre-acquisition 
period.
Focusing single-segment bidders have a larger asset base than that o f the core- 
asset base o f diversifying single-segment firms. The mean and median difference is
30 The asset and sales based Herfindahl indexes are not reported but available upon request.
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statistically significant at 1% level. Mean and median differences in core and non-core 
assets between single-and multi-segment bidders that engage in acquisitions show that 
multi-segment bidders are much larger in size. The mean and median differences are 
significant at 1% level o f significance.
2.5.B.3 Core and Non-core Growth in Sales and Cash Flows
The growth in sales for the core and non-core business segments o f focusing and 
diversifying bidders for the post-acquisition period is presented in Panel C. In the post­
acquisition period, the core business o f focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders 
reach lower growth in sales than single-segment firms that engaged in a similar type of 
acquisitions. These results are consistent with the pre-acquisition sales, indicating the 
growth in sales o f diversified firms remains lower relative to that o f single-segment firms 
irrespective of their investment strategy. The mean and median differences are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. This difference persists in year +1 and +2 
after the acquisition. The pre- and post-acquisition growth in sales comparison between 
single- and multi-segment firms is consistent with the diversification discount literature.
The median growth in sales difference between focusing multi- and single­
segment bidders in favor o f single-segment bidders ranges from 7.2 percent in year +1 to 
3.5 percent in year +2. For the core business segments o f diversifying multi- and single­
segment bidders the median growth in sales difference ranges from 9.4 percent in year + 1 
to 5.8 percent in year +2. For the non-core business segments of diversifying multi- and 
single-segment bidders the median growth in sales difference ranges from 13.2 percent in 
year +1 to 7.0 percent in year+2. These results suggest diversifying investments 
undertaken by single-segment firms produce greater growth in sales than that o f multi­
segment firms. Hence, diversity increases by single-segment firms yields superior sales 
performance relative to that o f diversifying multi-segment firms in the post-acquisition 
period.
A comparison between focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders shows 
the core sales growth of focusing multi-segment bidders are significantly higher in 
year+1, but not different than that o f diversifying multi-segment bidders in year+2. 
Moreover, the evidence shows there is no significant difference between the non-core 
sales growth of focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders in the post-acquisition
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years. While the post-acquisition non-core sales growth for multi-segment firms that 
diversify improves during the post-acquisition period, it is not different from that of 
multi-segment firms that remain focused. Namely, multi-segment bidders that diversified 
as a result o f lower sales increases in their core relative to their non-core business prior to 
the acquisition years fail to alter that pattern in the post-acquisition years. Multi-segment 
bidders, however, that invest inside their core business because their core sales were 
superior to those o f their non-core segments, continue to have superior core growth in 
sales in the post-acquisition period.
Cash flows for core and non-core business segments o f bidding firms during the 
post-acquisition period are presented in Panel D. We have documented that firms 
investing outside their core business had lower sales growth and cash flows from their 
core business than similar firms that did not diversify during the pre-acquisition period. 
This pattern o f  sales growth and cash flow performance persists in the post-acquisition 
period. The superior sales performance o f the core sales o f focusing multi-segment 
bidders translates into superior cash flows as well. In both post-acquisition years, the core 
cash flows o f focusing multi-segment bidders substantially exceed those o f the 
diversifying multi-segment bidders. The median cash flow differences are statistically 
significant at the I percent level as well. The evidence shows even though the non-core 
sales o f diversifying multi-segment bidders are larger than those o f focusing multi­
segment bidders in the post-acquisition years they do not translate into cash flows. The 
non-core cash flows o f diversifying multi-segment bidders are not significantly different 
from the non-core cash flows of focusing multi-segment bidders in the post-acquisition 
years, indicating that diversification by multi-segment bidders did not improve the cash 
flow performance o f their non-core business significantly. Hence, in the post-acquisition 
period diversifying multi-segment firms continue to have inferior core cash flows relative 
to that o f  focusing multi-segment firms, while their non-core cash flows are not 
significantly different from those o f focusing multi-segment firms. The median core cash 
flow difference between focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders is 0.029 and 
0.021 in years +1 and +2, respectively, and statistically significant at 1% level of 
significance. For the non-core cash flows, the difference shows the non-core cash flows 
o f diversifying bidders do not exceed those o f focusing bidders. The median non-core
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cash flows difference is 0.004 and 0.001 in years +1 and +2, respectively, and is 
insignificant at conventional levels.
The median difference in core cash flows between focusing and diversifying 
single-segment bidders is statistically significant at conventional levels in favor of 
focusing single-segment firms. The post-acquisition non-core cash flows o f diversifying 
single-segment bidders are found to be even greater [0.195 in year+l and 0.175 year+2] 
than the core cash flows o f the focusing single-segment bidders[0.152 in year+l and 
0.140 in year+2] in the post-acquisition years. These results suggest when a single­
segment firm experiences an adverse cash flow shock, it is able to reverse it by 
diversifying into a new line o f business generating higher cash flows compared to the 
core business o f the firm. Consequently, we interpret these results as demonstrating 
internal capital markets play a non-trivial role when firms face the choice o f investing 
within or outside their core business.
Our pre- and post-acquisition analysis of cash flows in multi-segment bidders that 
undertake either focusing or diversifying investments shows these transactions are not 
beneficial because they fail to reverse past poor performance. This leads to the 
conclusion that the benefits o f diversification fail to emerge even though these firms 
invest in the more efficient lines of business. However, these firms still retain inefficient 
business segments.
2.5.B.4 Core and Non-core Capital Expenditures
Our pre-acquisition analysis, reported in Table 9, indicates multi-segment bidders 
that invest more (less) in their core lines o f business generate more (less) cash flows and 
sales growth from their core (non-core) business. Bidder's core and non-core capital 
expenditures for the post-acquisition period, presented in Panel E, show focusing 
(diversifying) multi-segment bidders invest more (less) in their core than in their non­
core lines o f business. This seems to be dictated by the differences in their core and non­
core sales growth and cash flows reported earlier. The difference between multi-segment 
firms that invest more in their core relative to those that invest more in non-core business 
is statistically significant at conventional levels. The median difference is 0.009 and 
0.013, and is significant at the one percent level. This evidence suggests the core capital 
expenditures o f focusing multi-segment firms rise with the cash flow increases o f the
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core business segment. Diversifying multi-segment firms invest significantly more in 
their non-core than core business because they have substantially more cash flows from 
their non-core lines o f business over the same period. Consistent with our regression 
results in Table 11, this indicates there is no inefficient allocation of capital between core 
and non-core business segments in diversifying multi-divisional firms.
The post-acquisition capital expenditures o f single-segment firms show those that 
diversify commit significantly more capital resources in their non-core than core business 
investment activities. The median difference is -0.022 and -0.018 in year +1 and +2, 
respectively, and significant at the one percent level. A comparison between the core 
capital expenditures o f non-diversifying and diversifying single-segment bidders 
indicates that the former use somewhat more capital on their core business than similar 
firms that diversify. This evidence suggests the non-core capital investments of 
diversifying single-segment firms grow at a lower rate than their cash flows, indicating 
there is cross-subsidization of capital from core to non-core business segment.
[ INSERT TABLE 10 HERE ]
2.5.C. Core and Non-core Capital Expenditures o f  Bidders: A Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis
In this section we examine the relation between capital expenditures and cash 
flows in an attempt to shed more light on whether capital resources are allocated 
efficiently between core and non-core businesses. If internal capital markets in 
diversified firms work efficiently, they should finance projects o f business segments with 
the highest growth opportunities. Therefore, given that the core (non-core) business 
segments o f focusing (diversifying) multi-segment firms generate significantly more cash 
flows than their non-core (core) business segments, and to the extent that cash flows of a 
business segment are recognized as a proxy for its own investment opportunities 
(Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)), it is expected that the core (non-core) capital 
expenditures o f focusing (diversifying) multi-segment firms should primarily be 
determined by its own cash flows. If, however, capital expenditures o f non-core business 
o f focusing multi-segment firms are sensitive to the core cash flows that would imply 
capital resources are inefficiently allocated from core business to non-core business.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
We use cross-sectional regressions to examine whether systematic capital 
misallocation takes place across the core and non-core divisions of bidding firms while 
we control for firm characteristics21. We examine whether diversified bidders practice 
inefficient capital budgeting in the sense that they underinvest in the divisions generating 
relatively high percent o f cash flows to sales and overinvest in divisions generating a 
relatively low percent o f cash flows to sales. If segment cash flows to sales measure 
growth prospects, investing in segments with relatively low (high) cash flows to sales is 
equivalent o f overinvesting in lines o f business with relatively low (high) growth 
opportunities. If diversified firms have greater access to capital, they are also expected to 
invest more than single-segment firms.
We regress the core capital expenditures o f the firm in year 0, the year of the 
acquisition, normalized by the segment sales in year -1, against the core-cash flow, CCF, 
and the non-core-cash flow, NCCF, variables in year -1 while we control for other firm 
effects as well. Similar regressions are estimated for the core capital expenditures in 
years +1 and +2 after the acquisition. A similar set of regressions is estimated using the 
non-core capital expenditures as the dependent variable.
Table 11 presents the regression results. The regressions in Panel A1 show the 
capital expenditures o f focusing single-segment firms are significantly and positively 
affected by their own cash flows while the regressions in Panel A2 show none o f these 
variables can explain the core capital expenditures of diversifying single-segment firms. 
The regressions in Panel B show the non-core capital expenditures o f diversifying single­
segment firms are sensitive to the firm's core cash flows in years +1 and +2. The non­
core cash flows, however, do not have the same influence on the non-core capital 
expenditures in year +1 as they do in year +2. In year +2, the non-core capital 
expenditures are slightly more sensitive to the non-core than core cash flows. These 
results confirm there is an active internal capital market even in newly diversifying stand­
alone firms. This result coupled with their post-acquisition cash flows, reported in Panel 
D of Table 10, suggests non-core business investments are supported by core cash flows 
because these firms generate more cash flows from their non-core than core business.
21 The rationale o f  routine capital misallocation in diversified firms is based on the free cash flow 
hypothesis o f  Jensen (1986) that posits that managers with excess free cash flows tend to overinvest.
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Hence, the use o f core cash flows to finance the capital expenditures of their non-core 
business does not appear to be inefficient since capital resources are directed to the 
business segment with greater growth opportunities.
The regressions in Panel C l show there is a positive and significant relation 
between core-cash flows and the core capital expenditures o f the multi-segment firm that 
undertake focusing acquisitions. All coefficients of the core-cash flow variable are 
positive and significant at conventional levels, implying core-cash flows are consistently 
used for investments in the core business of the firm. However, the non-core cash flow 
variable has a negative and insignificant impact on the capital expenditures o f  the core 
business of the firm, implying there is no transfer o f capital from non-core segments to 
the core segment o f focusing multi-segment firms. The core capital expenditures o f 
multi-segment firms that invest outside their core business, reported in Panel C2, also 
show that core-cash-flows are employed for investments in the core business o f  the firm. 
As before, the non-core cash-flow variable has no significant bearing on the core capital 
expenditures o f diversifying multi-segment bidders.
The non-core capital expenditures o f non-diversifying and diversifying multi­
segment bidders, shown in Panels D land D2, are sensitive to both core and non-core cash 
flows, implying that core cash flows are also used to fund the capital expenditures of 
non-core business in diversified firms. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Shin and Stulz (1998) who find the capital expenditures o f the largest business segments 
depend only on their own cash flows while the capital expenditures o f the smallest 
segments depend on the cash flows o f the largest segment as well as their own. There is a 
systematic transfer o f funds from the core to the non-core business in multi-segment 
firms. This is consistent with the internal capital market efficiency hypothesis that 
predicts that capital resources should be used to finance projects with higher growth 
opportunities in diversifying multi-segment firms. Hence, the allocation o f capital 
between core and non-core business segments in diversifying multi-segment firms does 
not seem inefficient. This is consistent with Whited (2001) who finds no inefficient 
allocation of resources in diversified firms after controlling for measurement errors. It is 
also interesting to note that the non-core capital expenditures o f diversifying multi­
segment firms are primarily determined by their own cash flows. The non-core
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businesses o f diversifying multi-segment firms, as seen in Table 9, generate higher cash 
flows to sales and have higher growth in sales than their core business. In contrast with 
the internal capital market efficiency hypothesis, there is diversion of capital in focusing 
multi-segment firms from core to non-core business despite the fact that their core cash 
flows and growth in sales exceed those o f their non-core business, as shown in Panel D 
o f Table 10. These results are in support o f cross-subsidization in internal capital markets 
o f diversified firms.
In sum, these results suggest that there is misallocation o f capital to inefficient 
uses (i.e., business segments with low growth opportunities) in focusing but not in 
diversifying multi-segment bidders. The allocation o f capital resources in focusing and 
diversifying single-segment bidders appears to be consistent with internal capital market 
efficiency.
[ INSERT TABLE 11 HERE ]
2.6. Explaining the Diversification Discount
Our results so far show that both single- and multi-segment firms that diversify do 
so because the benefits o f diversification into lines o f business other than their core 
competency seem more lucrative than they would have obtained by focusing on their 
core business. Tables 9 and 10 show focusing single- and multi-segment firms achieve 
higher cash flows from their core business compared to similar firms that diversify into 
non-core related lines o f business both in the pre- and the post-acquisition period. 
Similarly, focusing multi-segment firms generate higher cash flows from their core 
business while single- and multi-segment firms that choose to diversify generate more 
cash flows per unit o f sales from their new or already existing non-core business 
segments compared to their core business segments. In support of this contention, our 
evidence in Tables 9, 10, and 11 show when bidders create higher cash flows from their 
core business they have a propensity to invest in their core business while bidders that 
generate lower cash flows from core business compared to other lines o f business tend to 
invest outside their core business. To examine what causes the momentum in value loss 
in diversified firms, we regress bidders’ post-acquisition valuation measures on segment 
cash flow and capital expenditure variables while we account for firm specific effects.
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The emphasis o f  our analysis is on the cash flows o f both core and non-core 
business segments o f the bidders. Our previous results from Table 11 show that the core 
cash flows explain much o f the core capital expenditures o f both focusing and 
diversifying multi-segment firms as well as the core capital expenditures o f focusing 
single-segment firms while both core and non-core cash flows explain the non-core 
capital expenditures o f  multi-segment firms irrespective o f their diversification motive. 
However, we have no information about how segment cash flows translate into the 
valuation of single- and multi-segment bidders that make acquisitions either inside or 
outside their core business. We also include calendar year dummies and control for the 
firm specific effects. The firm specific control variables (not reported in the tables) 
capture the effects o f debt, insider and institutional ownership, R&D expenditures and 
the medium o f payment used in the acquisitions.
Panel A of Table 12 report the results o f our regressions for overall single­
segment bidders as well as focusing and diversifying single-segment bidders. The 
coefficient o f the diversifying acquisition dummy, DIVERD, is positive and significant in 
years 0 and 1 implying that focusing single-segment bidders are invariably discounted 
relative to diversifying single-segment bidders. The coefficient o f the size variable, 
LN(SALES), is negative and statistically significant suggesting that larger single­
segment bidders have lower valuations, and this size effect is valid for both focusing and 
diversifying bidders. This observation suggests the valuation o f bidders that grow beyond 
their optimal size, especially the ones that diversify into unrelated lines o f business, are 
discounted by the markets. However, we must note that the bidders in our sample are the 
firms that elect to grow rapidly by engaging in diversifying and non-diversifying 
acquisitions. The insider ownership variable, INSIDER, has positive and significant 
coefficient. This evidence suggests the monitoring ability o f insiders might contribute to 
firm valuation by avoiding inefficient investment behavior. Similarly, the presence of 
knowledge based intangible assets, captured by positive and significant coefficient of 
R&D expenditures, has a positive impact on valuation o f single-segment bidders. 
However, such a positive effect arising from high R&D expenditures is mainly 
pronounced for focusing single-segment bidders. The core capital expenditures o f single­
segment firms was found to be higher than that o f diversifying single-segment bidders in
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the pre- and the post-acquisition period. However, the coefficient o f the core cash flow 
variable, CCF, is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in all 
regressions. This suggests the valuation o f  single-segment bidders, that engaged in either 
diversifying or non-diversifying acquisitions in year 0, is primarily determined by the 
cash flows of core business in years 0, 1 and 2. On the contrary, the non-core cash flow 
of diversifying single-segment firms, even though their cash generating ability is higher, 
has no significant influence on their valuation 2 years after the acquisition. These are the 
lines o f business that diversifying single-segment bidders have entered because the cash 
flows of their core business lagged significantly behind those o f focusing single-segment 
bidders but the core business segment still empowers a considerable portion o f  the assets.
Panel B reports the results o f our valuation regressions for overall multi-segment 
bidders as well as for focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders. Similar to single­
segment bidders, the coefficient o f the size variable, LN(SALES), is negative and 
statistically significant suggesting that larger multi-segment bidders have lower 
valuations, but unlike single-segment bidders, this size effect is valid only for 
diversifying multi-segment bidders. This observation, coupled with the fact that focusing 
multi-segment bidders recuperate some of their valuation following an acquisition, 
suggests the valuation o f bidders growing beyond their optimal size into unrelated lines 
o f business are discounted by the markets like in single-segment bidders. However, we 
must note the multi-segment bidders in our sample are the firms that elect to grow rapidly 
by engaging in diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions, too. In contrast to single­
segment bidders, the higher presence o f insiders in multi-segment bidders seems to 
destroy value.
The univariate results in Table 9 and 10 indicated the cash flow generating ability 
o f core business o f focusing multi-segment firms is higher than that o f their non-core 
business segments and is significantly higher than that o f core business o f diversifying 
multi-segment bidders both in the pre- and the post-acquisition period. The same variable 
was also found to have a significant impact on how much the firm invested in the core 
and non-core business o f the firm in Table 11. Similar to single-segment firms, the 
valuation o f multi-segment firms is positively and significantly influenced by the cash 
flows o f the core business, and this result is valid for both focusing and diversifying
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bidders. Even though the non-core cash flows seem to have a contribution to valuation o f 
multi-segment firms, the non-core cash flows of focusing multi-segment firms, however, 
do not have a significant impact on firm valuation. These findings suggest the valuation 
o f multi-segment bidders that have more productive assets in their core business 
(focusing multi-segment bidders) is principally assessed by the cash flows of the core 
business while the cash flows of the relatively poor performing peripheral lines of 
business do not contribute to the valuation of the firm. However, we must also note the 
capital expenditures o f non-core business segments in focusing multi-segment firms rely 
on the cash flows o f the core business, as well. This points to a valuation opportunity cost 
inherent in this type o f firms and further suggests that they would be better off by 
divesting their non-core business and then by investing the proceeds in their core 
business as larger size firms (the ones beyond their optimal sized) are found to be 
discounted.
The cash flows of the core business and, unlike multi-segment firms that focus, 
the non-core business in diversifying multi-segment firms have a significant contribution 
to firm valuation after the acquisition. However, our previous evidence indicated this 
type o f firms prefer to conduct major investments outside the core business because their 
core business has poor performance relative to non-core business segments. Furthermore, 
our evidence in Table 11 indicated the core cash flows o f diversifying multi-segment 
firms have a significant impact on their non-core capital expenditures as well as on their 
own core capital expenditures. This significant influence o f core business cash flows in 
valuation o f multi-segment firms that elect to diversify can be attributed to the fact that 
the core business continues to be the largest business segment generating the highest 
amount o f cash flows in dollars, even though not per dollar o f sales, and that it continues 
to divert funds from its own cash flows to capital expenditures o f more efficient 
peripheral lines o f business. These findings suggest the diversification might pay off in 
multi-segment bidders that invest firmly in their non-core business segments that 
generate higher cash flows per unit o f sales compared to core business segments.
However, those diversifying multi-segment bidders might still be suffering from 
the relative cash flow generating inefficiency of their core business segments that make 
the bulk o f their assets. We must once more note that larger size firms are found to be
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discounted. This might point to a more severe valuation opportunity cost inherent in 
diversifying multi-segment firms than in the ones that elect to focus on the core business. 
The internal political struggles o f this type o f firms might make it difficult for them to 
divest the inefficient core business that holds more assets to invest the proceeds in their 
efficient peripheral lines o f business.
[INSERT TABLE 12 HERE ]
In sum, our results show that the market assesses the valuation o f diversifying and 
non-diversifying single- and multi-segment firms based on the cash flow generating 
ability o f their core business. In diversifying multi-segment bidders, the non-core cash 
flows have a significant influence on the valuation of the firm, too. However, the market 
also assesses the resource constrained setting of the bidders. Bidders that grow beyond 
their optimal size are penalized, too. The fact that industrially diversified firms do not 
deprive their relatively inefficient segments that generate relatively lower cash flows is a 
burden to be shouldered by the relatively efficient business segments. Such an 
opportunity cost emerges in focusing multi-segment bidders whose poor performing non­
core business segments do not contribute to firm valuation. On the other hand, less 
efficient core business segments of diversifying multi-segment bidders are harder to 
divest as they contribute to the valuation o f firm and fund the capital expenditures of 
more efficient non-core business segments.
2.7.Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether diversification destroys value when it takes 
place. Consistent with the diversification literature, our results show multi-segment firms 
that conduct diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions suffer from a substantial 
discount relative to their imputed value and stand-alone firms that undertake similar 
types o f investments before and after the acquisition. Prior to diversification, the 
valuation o f both single- and multi-segment bidders weakens and, interestingly, 
continues to deteriorate after the acquisition. This result suggests investing merely in a 
certain line o f business does not lead to reversal o f poor performance in neither single- 
nor multi-segment bidders.
We find the internal capital markets o f multi-segment bidders are active around 
important investment decisions and a majority of capital resources are allocated to
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business segments that achieve higher sales growth and cash flows before and after an 
acquisition. However, the evidence also indicates core business segments in multi­
segment firms subsidize the capital expenditures o f non-core business segments 
regardless o f whether they operate efficient or inefficient business segments. These 
findings suggest the internal capital markets o f bidders are not involved in non-optimal 
investment strategies but firms might still face consequences o f cross-subsidization from 
core to non-core business segments In addition, as diversified firms still retain their 
relatively inefficient segments generating relatively lower cash flows, there appears to be 
a strain carried by the relatively efficient business segments. That might explain why our 
results should be interpreted in line with other studies that address the workings of 
internal capital markets and the valuation o f firms around disinvestment (divestiture) 
decision of firms". Our results lend support to Campa and Kedia (1999), who show firms 
diversify and refocus throughout time from poor industries (higher exit industries) into 
industries with better prospects when benefits exceed costs, in addition to a recent stream 
of literature that examines the impact of exogenous shocks to industry cash flows on firm 
valuation23. As a final note, our results may help to explain why General Electric is 
regarded to be one of the exceptional performers in the market despite the fact that it is 
one of the most diversified firms and that it continues to conduct acquisitions 
aggressively in every line o f business that it operates in. Like Rajan et. al (2000) argue 
the success o f GE emanates from the business model that looks at business segments 
independently and divests unprofitable businesses rather than keeping them as 
deadweight in the corporate structure. However, the hesitance o f other diversified firms 
to divest poor performing segments while investing in promising segments does not seem 
to be a viable solution to overcome the discount attributed to diversification.
22 See Scharfstein (1998), Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (1999), and Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling 
(2001), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) in addition to Boot (1992), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), 
Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Daley, Vikas and Ranjini (1997), Allen and 
McConnell (1998).
33 See Lamont and Polk (2000,2001)
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3. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INVESTMENT ACTIVITY, GLOBAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION AND INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS
Over the last decades, stock markets in the U.S., other developed countries, and 
emerging countries have traded industrially diversified firms at significant valuation 
discounts relative to sum o f comparable specialized firms. (Lang and Stulz (1994), 
Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), Servaes (1996), Lins and Servaes (1999a, 1999b), 
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), Billett and Mauer (1999), Campa and Kedia (1999), 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). The recent empirical literature lends some support 
to the view that agency costs in diversified firms exceed the benefits obtained from the 
creation o f internal capital markets and inefficient investment policies or cross­
subsidization in industrially diversified firms lead to a valuation discount (Servaes 
(1996), Berger and Ofek (1995,1996), Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999)). In 
addition to diversification motives o f the managers, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Hyland 
(1999) argue that the firms might have exhausted their internal growth prospects, as well.
Unlike the industrial diversification, most of the theoretical and empirical studies 
on global diversification suggest a wealth increasing effect on the firm in terms of 
profitability, excess returns and higher market value. (Leftwich (1974), Mikhail and 
Shawky (1979), Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984), Kim and Lyn (1986)). Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) literature argues that firms expand overseas to exploit firm specific 
information based intangible assets by transferring the intangible assets overseas within 
an internal market in the same firm (Caves (1971), Buckley and Casson (1976), Dunning 
(1977), Rugman (1980), Prahalad (1998)). However, in the theoretical and empirical 
literature, not so many studies have addressed the valuation impacts o f industrial and 
global diversification at the same time. Sambharya (1995) finds only the interaction of 
geographic and product diversification leads to an enhancement in the performance of 
multinationals. Morck and Yeung (1998) find that industrial diversification, geographic 
diversification and firm size enhance value in the presence o f intangible assets. Bodnar, 
Tang, and Weintrop (1998) find that global diversification leads to significant increases 
in value measures, while industrial diversification leads to significant value losses.
On the other hand, a recent stream o f literature provides empirical evidence 
demonstrating that global diversification hurts firm value. Christophe (1997) and
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Christophe and Pfeiffer (1998) provide evidence that global diversification makes U.S. 
multinationals destroy value. Similarly, Denis, Denis and Yost (2000) document that U.S. 
firms pursue further global diversification even though it leads to valuation losses. Their 
results suggest, on average, global diversification leads to valuation losses o f 18 percent 
while industrial diversification leads to valuation losses o f 20 percent.
In addition, very few studies in the theoretical or empirical literature have 
addressed the direct link between the nature o f the corporate investment activity and the 
valuation consequences associated with it. The empirical evidence available only for 
domestic acquisitions in the U.S. has produced conflicting results. Graham, Lemmon and 
W olf (2002) find single-segment firms that diversify by reporting changes or internal 
growth do not experience a valuation discount while single-segment firms that diversify 
by acquisitions experience a significant discount. Billett and Mauer (1999) find the 
internal capital markets have an adverse effect on the value of industrially diversified 
firms but they cannot find any evidence o f a significant link between diversification 
discount and inefficient capital markets. Their main finding is that internal capital market 
activity influences the valuation o f industrially diversified firms only when resources are 
transferred to business segments with good investment opportunities and that would be 
financially constrained if operating as single-segment firms. Chevalier (2000) finds 
evidence showing the cash flows o f one merger partner are predictive o f the investment 
behaviour o f the other partner in the pre-merger period which might be interpreted as 
evidence o f cross-subsidization. Chevalier further demonstrates the evidence in favor of 
cross-subsidization in the empirical literature may be due to perseverant differences 
between the investment opportunities o f single- and multi-segment firms. However, no 
study in the theoretical or empirical literature has addressed the nature o f international 
investment activity, the changes in industrial and geographic focus and the valuation 
consequences.
In this study, we employ a sample o f 1S99 pure overseas mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) completed by the U.S. firms over the 1991-1997 period to examine the impact 
o f global and industrial diversification on firm value when they take place. First, we 
analyze the valuation o f single- and multi-segment firms pursuing overseas expansion 
through industrially focusing/diversifying investments before and after investment is
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made via overseas M&As. Our evidence indicates the bidders included in our sample, 
especially single-segment bidders, experience deteriorating performance prior to an 
overseas acquisition and further confirms the well-documented diversification discount 
arising from industrial diversification between single- and multi-segment bidders. 
Interestingly, stand-alone bidders exhibit a severe discount in year 0, the year in which 
they expand their international involvement by engaging in overseas acquisitions. Further 
analysis indicates not only the extent o f industrial diversification but also the extent of 
prior international involvement o f bidders has significant adverse valuation 
consequences. Our post-acquisition results show the act o f global diversification destroys 
value when it takes place in the form of M&As for domestic bidders. A detailed analysis 
indicates multi-segment bidders that diversify into unrelated lines of business gain from 
overseas acquisitions while single-segment bidders and industrially focusing multi­
segment bidders experience subsequent valuation declines. The bidders that already have 
international exposure experience further valuation declines and can not gain any benefits 
from further global expansion. The bidders that face the most severe valuation losses are 
the domestic single-segment bidders that conduct diversifying acquisitions.
Second, we examine the internal dynamics o f firms involved in capital 
investments and analyze the workings o f the internal capital markets around the overseas 
investment decision o f the firm. The pre-acquisition analysis indicates that focusing 
multi-segment firms use more assets and make larger capital expenditures in core than in 
non-core divisions because they generate more sales than their non-core divisions while 
diversifying multi-segment firms commit larger capital expenditures in non-core 
divisions as the sales and assets o f  their core and non-core segments are virtually 
undistinguishable. Single-segment firms, on the other hand, invest in unrelated business 
when they experience higher growth in sales than single-segment firms choosing to 
invest in related business. Following the overseas acquisition, the core (non-core) 
business segments o f focusing (diversifying) bidders continue to generate higher cash 
flows per dollar o f sales than their non-core (core) business segments and they also begin 
to generate significantly more cash flows than the core business o f diversifying multi­
segment bidders. Likewise, the bidders continue to invest more o f their segment sales in 
the relatively efficient line o f business in terms o f cash generating ability after the
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acquisition, as well. In addition, a closer examination o f core and non-core capital 
expenditures yields different results about the workings o f internal capital markets in 
bidder firms that make diversifying and non-diversifying overseas acquisitions. Our 
evidence suggests core capital expenditures o f diversifying single-segment bidders are 
influenced by cash flows o f the core business. Similarly, both core and non-core capital 
expenditures o f diversifying and non-diversifying multi-segment bidders seem to rely on 
their own segment cash flows.
Finally, a closer look at the valuation o f bidders shows, in support o f the agency 
theory explanation of diversification, the higher presence o f insider ownership in 
focusing bidders is accompanied by higher valuations. In support o f the internalization 
theory o f global diversification, the presence of knowledge based (R&D) and marketing 
based (advertising) intangibles seem to contribute to overseas bidders’ valuation. Only 
multi-segment bidders that diversify into unrelated lines o f business seem to benefit from 
geographic diversification while all other bidders seem to suffer from its adverse impact. 
The cash flow of the core business seems to contribute to firm value o f single-segment 
and focusing multi-segment bidders while the cash flow o f the non-core business seems 
to play a trivial role on valuation suggesting that the value losses associated with 
industrial diversification might stem from the inadequate contribution o f peripheral (non­
core) lines o f business in industrially diversified firms. The evidence that both core and 
non-core cash flows of diversifying multi-segment bidders adds to firm value only 2 
years after the acquisition suggests that they might have begun to harvest the benefits in 
an expanded multinational network as suggested by Doukas and Travlos (1988).
The remainder o f the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 describes the sources 
o f data and sample selection. Section 3.2 presents evidence on the pre-acquisition 
performance o f the bidders. Section 3.3 examines the determinants o f firm’s industrial 
diversification motives overseas. Section 3.4 examines the post-acquisition performance 
o f bidders that engaged in diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions. Section 3.5 
examines the working of bidder’s internal capital markets. Section 3.6 examines the role 
o f internal capital markets and other firm specific characteristics on bidders’ valuation 
and section 3.7 concludes the paper.
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3.1. Data Selection, Sources, Industrial and Geographic Classification
3.LA. Sources o f  Data and Sample Selection
Our sample consists o f overseas acquisitions made by the U.S. bidders between 
January I, 1991 and December 31, 1997 reported in the U.S. Acquisitions Overseas 
roster o f Securities Data Corporation’s Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Journal. The 
rosters o f M&A Journal include all acquisitions which are of, or assumed to be of, $ 5 
million value or higher. The rosters report the name, the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code (at 2 digit SIC level before 1993, at 4 digit SIC level starting 
1993), the business definition and the country o f target firms or businesses, the name, and 
the business definition of bidder firms.24 Our sample does not include transactions 
associated with target firms or businesses that operated in non-manufacturing industries 
(i.e., Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services 
(2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89)) as Q ratios and other measures may be inappropriate 
for financial firms. The U.S. Acquisitions Overseas roster o f M&A Journal reports 2688 
overseas acquisitions made by the U.S. bidders over the 1991-1997 period, o f which 
1089 overseas acquisitions were made by bidders that completed acquisitions in the U.S. 
in the same calendar year as well. We focus exclusively on foreign acquisitions and, 
therefore, our initial sample consists o f 1599 pure overseas acquisitions.
We classify the geographic diversity o f the target firm’s country as "Developed" 
or "Emerging" in accordance with the emerging market definition o f IFC’s Emerging 
Markets Data Base. According to this definition “All stock markets in developing 
countries are considered to be ‘emerging’. Developing countries are those classified by 
the World Bank as either low- or middle-income economies, regardless o f their particular 
stage o f development.” We notice the majority of the targets in our initial sample are 
located in developed countries on the overall and at the 2 digit SIC code level as reported 
by the U.S. Acquisitions Overseas roster o f  M&A Journal25. 1226 target firms or 
businesses o f  1599 overseas acquisitions (76.67 percent) are in developed countries while 
the remaining 373 acquisitions (23.33 percent) are in emerging countries. This
:4 They also report the value o f  acquisition, the method o f  payment, whether the target is divested or not, 
the completion day o f  the acquisition and the advisors to both parties.
23 Industrial classification o f  target firms in the initial sample are not reported but available upon request
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observation suggests that the U.S. firms prefer to expand into developed overseas 
markets through M&As where they can acquire readily available firms.
We observe the overseas acquisitions activity is more concentrated in some 
industries than in others based on the 2 digit SIC code industrial classification o f target 
firms in our initial sample. For example, in manufacturing division, chemicals and allied 
products (2-digit SIC code 28, 146 acquisitions), industrial and commercial machinery 
and computer equipment (2-digit SIC code 35, 170 acquisitions), electronics and other 
electrical equipment (2-digit SIC code 36, 149 acquisitions) are the dominant industries. 
While previous studies exclude electric, gas and sanitary services ( 2 digit SIC code 49) 
out o f their samples because they are regulated, we decided to keep them in our sample in 
the wake of deregulation in those industries. In wholesale trade division, wholesale trade 
o f durables (2-digit SIC code 50, 125 acquisitions) is the leading industry.
3. LB. Industrial Classification
In the corporate diversification literature, several sources and measures have been 
used to analyze firms operating in unrelated lines o f business26. The recent diversification 
literature determines a firm’s industrial diversity by using the 2 digit SIC code 27, the 3 
digit SIC code28, or the 4 digit SIC code29. In addition, Lamont (1997) uses his personal 
judgement to classify oil dependent and non-oil dependent business segments. In a 
similar fashion, Scharfstein (1998) pools related business segments into “divisions” 
which are unrelated to each other, but the business segments in each division are highly 
related. Matsusaka (1993) uses the most advanced method to identify vertical linkages 
between businesses. He uses economy-wide industry input-output matrices to identify 
vertical linkages between industries.
26 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use the Line o f Business sample o f  the Federal Trade Commission. 
Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Liebeskind and Opler (1992), and Lichtenberg (1992) use census data 
to measure diversification in terms o f different SIC codes for plants. Servaes (1996) uses Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory to determine the number o f  business segments operated by a firm for 
the 1962-1974 period. Hubbard and Palia (1999) obtain the 4 digit SIC code o f  bidders and targets from 
different issues o f Standard and Poor’s Register o f  Corporations, Directors and Executives to construct 
their sample o f  mergers for the 1961-1970 period but make their classification based on 2 digit SIC codes.
27 See Servaes (1996), Berger and Ofek (1995, 1996), Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Lins and Servaes 
(1999a, 1999b).
28 See Shin and Stulz (1998), Scharfstein (1998), and Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999).
29 See Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1995).
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The Compustat Industry Segment File is used to collect information about the 
business segments of bidder firms in our sample. SEC regulation S-K. and FASB-SFAS 
No. 14 require firms to report segment information for fiscal years ending after 
December 15, 1977. Firms must report information for segments representing 10 percent 
or more o f consolidated sales. The Compustat Industry Segment File reports this 
information: net sales, operating profit (earnings before interest and taxes; EBIT), 
depreciation, assets, and capital expenditures on a segment level basis for all active 
Compustat firms other than utility subsidiaries. Compustat assigns a primary and a 
secondary SIC code to each business segment o f the firm, as well as a main SIC code to 
the firm at the 4 digit level. However, we must point out that the main SIC code of the 
firm reported by Compustat is not always representative o f the firm’s main cash 
generating line o f business (core business). For example, Compustat reports that General 
Electric has a main SIC code of 3600; Electronic and Electrical Equipment and 
Components for 1997. Nevertheless, the business segment generating the highest amount 
o f sales in GE (both in amount and percentage of annual sales) is Financing activities; 
SIC codes 6141 and 6159 by about half of the aggregated sales o f GE in year 1997.
As Servaes (1996) points out, a straightforward examination o f the 4-digit SIC 
codes o f the segments of the firm does not reveal the degree o f diversification of the firm. 
He argues the use o f the 4-digit SIC code would be too wide to identify the industrial 
structure o f the firm. The rationale for using 2-digit SIC codes is that industries with the 
same 2 digit SIC codes are closely related and require comparable management skills. In 
addition, as Shin and Stulz (1998) note, one o f the difficulties in using segment data is to 
identify the business segments that are reorganized by firms over time. Rajan et. 
al.(2000) mention this type o f inconsistency in reporting from year to year and they 
circumvent this problem mainly by making sure no data is obtained from data stretch 
over a period more than one year for their specific diversity computations. Similarly, 
Shin and Stulz eliminate high cash flow segment-years and the firms whose largest and 
smallest segments share the same 2 digit SIC code. However, the elimination o f high 
cash flow segment-years may disguise the impact o f cross subsidization on firm’s 
investment activity. In addition, the elimination o f the largest and the smallest segments 
with the same 2 digit SIC code may bias the results by ignoring the comparable
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management skills between those segments. As reported by Graham, Lemmon and Wolf 
(2002), single-segment firms that diversify by reporting changes do not experience any 
diversification discount while those that diversify through acquisitions experience 
significant valuation discount suggesting the investment activity rather than the reporting 
changes has a significant impact on the industrial diversity o f the firms and the related 
valuation consequences. In this study, we also examine the effects o f cross subsidization 
on the investment activity o f the other segments o f the firm. Therefore, we need a more 
refined measure o f segment information to determine the industrial structure o f and the 
capital allocation within the firm.
Following Servaes (1996), we define a line o f business at the 2 digit SIC level 
augmented by a procedure similar to the ones used by Lamont (1997, p i06) and 
Scharfstein (1998). We make use o f the primary and secondary SIC codes o f each 
segment in the bidder firm as reported by Compustat Industry Segment File. Lamont is 
mainly concerned with the presence o f oil drilling industries (2 digit SIC code of 13) in 
primary and/or secondary SIC codes o f business segments in oil dependent firms, with 
more weight on primary SIC codes. We treat the primary and secondary SIC codes of 
business segments to be of equal importance and we partition the sales, operating 
income, assets, capital expenditures and depreciation of each reported segment into two. 
The resulting figures are aggregated into distinct business segments based on their 2-digit 
SIC code to determine the sales, operating income, assets, capital expenditures and 
depreciation o f each distinct segment defined at the 2 digit SIC code. Our procedure 
resembles that o f Scharfstein (1998) who pools related segments into “divisions” 
depending on his judgement o f relatedness. Our measure o f relatedness for distinct 
business segments is based on sharing the same 2-digit SIC code obtained from our 
procedure explained above. We do not count the segments that have less than 10 percent 
o f the sales or assets as a viable segment in compliance with FASB-SFAS No 14. We, 
then, define the “core business” o f the firm as the 2-digit SIC code o f the business 
segment having the highest share o f aggregated sales o f the firm (either in million dollars 
or in percentage of sales) for a given year. All the remaining business segments are 
counted as “non-core business” segments. For stand-alone (single-segment) bidders, the 
only business segment is defined as the core business. This procedure, for instance,
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classifies General Electric as a Financing firm whose core business has a 2 digit main 
SIC code of 61 for 1997, rather than an Electric and Electronics firm with a 2 digit main 
SIC code of 36. The distinct business segment which brings in the highest amount of cash 
into General Electric is the Financing activities in 1997.
Unlike Chevalier (2000) we are not in search o f an overlap between the SIC code 
of the target firm and the SIC code of any one o f the reported business segments of the 
bidder at any SIC level. Chevalier (2000), who concentrates on “diversifying mergers” 
only, classifies mergers as related in instances o f an overlap o f 2-digit SIC codes among 
any of the reported business segments o f the target and the bidder firms in the merger of 
industrially diversified firms. We define acquisitions as “diversifying” (or unrelated) 
when the 2-digit SIC code of the target does not match with the 2-digit SIC code of the 
bidder’s core business that generates the highest amount (and percentage) o f sales for the 
bidder. On the other hand, we define acquisitions as “focusing” when the 2 digit SIC 
code of the target matches with that of the bidder’s core business that generates the 
highest amount (and percentage) o f sales. We carry out this classification both for the 
year prior to the acquisition and for the year o f the acquisition. Both procedures yield 
almost identical results. Throughout the study, we will report results based on the 
classification prior to the year o f the acquisition (year-1).
When we examine the type o f overseas acquisitions by the industrial 
classification o f bidder firms based on the 2 digit SIC codes o f their core business we 
observe target firms in manufacturing industries have been acquired by bidder firms in 
finance and service industries as w e ll30. Most o f these acquisitions have been carried out 
by bidders with core businesses in business services. The evidence suggests the majority 
o f acquisitions (644 out o f  1072 classified acquisitions) is “focusing” in nature and 
certain industries are more active investing through acquisitions. Our research focus is 
not on non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC 
codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89) and bidders in those 
industries will be eliminated from our sample in later stages.
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3. l.C. Sample Characteristics and Summary Statistics
Table 13 presents the annual number and frequency of 1599 overseas acquisitions 
included in the initial sample. The number o f overseas acquisitions is increasing 
systematically over years. The majority o f the overseas acquisitions is focusing in nature 
in the 1991-1997 period. More than 60 percent o f the classified overseas acquisitions 
represent investments within the core business o f the bidder while bidders acquire 
overseas targets in unrelated lines o f business with their own core business in about 40 
percent o f the acquisitions. Interestingly, the U.S. bidders that make acquisitions in 
developed overseas markets are less inclined to acquire targets in their core business. 
More than 56 percent o f target firms or businesses acquired by U.S. bidders in developed 
markets are in the core business o f the bidder, while this percentage is almost 70 percent 
for target firms or businesses acquired in emerging markets. This evidence suggests U.S. 
bidders are more likely to acquire targets in their core businesses when they expand into 
less developed/emerging markets. This result lends some support to internalization 
hypothesis o f global diversification asserting that firms expand overseas to capitalize on 
their intangible assets.
[ INSERT TABLE 13 HERE ]
Table 14 presents the description and number o f overseas acquisitions included in 
our final sample. We initially identified 1599 overseas acquisition announcements in the 
M&A journal that were also confirmed by The Wall Street Journal. The initial sample 
included the group o f acquisitions in which the target firm was domiciled outside the 
U.S. The group of acquisitions made by bidders that carried out acquisitions in the U.S. 
on the same calendar year were excluded because of the difficulty in identifying their 
expansion motives. As a result o f this process we proceeded with 1599 overseas 
acquisitions in our initial sample.
Out o f our 1599 acquisitions in the initial sample, we could not find any 
information about bidder firms in Compustat for 541 acquisitions. This brought the 
sample size down to 1058 from 1599 acquisitions. Then, we eliminated acquisitions 
made by firms whose core businesses lie in non-manufacturing industries: Finance,
30 Industrial classification o f  bidder firms in the initial sample are not reported but available upon request.
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Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC 
codes from 70 to 89). We eliminated 55 M&As, made by firms operating in non­
manufacturing industries and that brought our sample size down to 1003 acquisitions 
from 1058 acquisitions. The acquisitions by non -manufacturing bidders were eliminated 
because they are likely to be driven by the diversification or investment motives o f 
financial, holding and service firms.
The next step involved the elimination o f bidder firms that acquired several 
targets operating both within their own core business and outside their core line of 
business. We found 142 acquisitions of this nature (i.e., investments classified as 
focusing and diversifying). This brought our sample size down to 861 acquisitions. 
Finally, we combined several acquisitions made either within the core (focusing) or 
outside the core (diversifying) line o f business by the same bidder on the same calendar 
year into one firm-year observation. We found 117 additional acquisitions made by the 
same bidder in either the core or the non-core lines o f  business and, therefore, our final 
sample includes 744 firm-year observations representing the pure global expansion 
objective o f bidder firms through M&As. On average, 63.31 percent of bidders in our 
final sample acquire target firms operating in lines o f  business that share the same 2 digit 
SIC code with their core business (focusing acquisitions) while bidder firms that invest in 
overseas target firms operating outside their core lines o f business (diversifying 
acquisitions) represent 36.69 percent o f firm-year observations in our final sample.
[ INSERT TABLE 14 HERE ]
Table 15 presents the type o f overseas acquisitions across industries based on the 
industry classification o f bidder’s core business at 2 digit SIC code level. This evidence 
confirms the previous observation that bidders in most industries have a preference for 
related acquisitions (i.e., expand their core line o f  business), while in very few industries 
bidders have a preference for unrelated acquisitions (i.e., expand outside their core line o f 
business).
[ INSERT TABLE 15 HERE ]
Table 16 provides summary statistics o f  overseas bidders included in the final 
sample. The statistics in the table are calculated based on information available the year
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before the acquisition. The mean [median] annual sales o f bidder firms is $ 3.969 billion 
[S739 million], implying the overseas bidders are on average mid sized firms. The 
average [median] market value o f bidders is $4 billion [$676 million] and the average 
[median] value o f total assets o f bidders is $4,573 billion [$594 million]. These statistics 
also suggest that bidders are mid sized firms.
The average [median] foreign sales to total sales ratio (FSTS) o f bidders is 21.53 
percent [16.38 percent] indicating the bidders that made overseas acquisitions already 
have a considerable degree o f international involvement before they conduct an overseas 
acquisition. The average [median] debt to total capital ratio for the bidders in our final 
sample is 38.76 percent [37.40 percent] suggesting bidders are considerably levered and, 
therefore, are at substantial creditor scrutiny. The average [median] insider ownership is 
14.83 percent [7.31 percent] suggesting insiders do not have large stakes31. In addition, 
the average [median] institutional ownership is 47.23 percent [51.14 percent]. Both 
average and median values o f debt and ownership structure show bidder firms are under 
considerable scrutiny by creditors and institutional owners that might explain the larger 
number o f focusing acquisitions.
The average [median] number o f lines o f  business (number o f  business segments) 
is 1.63 [1.00] implying the bidders in the final sample are mostly single-segment 
(specialized) firms. The summary statistics also show the average [median] number of 
acquisitions made in a single year is 1.15 [1.00]. This seems to suggest the bidders are 
not seeking global expansion aggressively through multiple acquisitions. The average 
[median] size o f firm-year acquisitions is $183 million [$54.65 million] indicating most 
of the overseas target firms are not large firms in terms o f value. The average [median] of 
size o f firm-year acquisitions scaled by firm sales (not reported) is 27.90 percent [8.90 
percent]. Similarly, the average [median] o f size o f firm-year acquisitions scaled by firm 
assets (not reported) is 27.57 percent [8.38 percent]. These observations suggest the 
amount o f capital spent in overseas acquisitions are not as great as that spent in domestic 
acquisitions, and are marginally enough to create a new business segment overseas 
within the multinational network of the bidders.
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[ INSERT TABLE 16 HERE ]
3.2. Bidder’s Pre-Acquisition Performance
One o f our objectives in this study is to measure the effects of global and 
industrial diversification on bidder’s performance after the acquisition and draw 
inferences about the value o f internal capital markets associated with global and 
industrial diversification. To gain insights into the effects o f industrial and global 
diversification, we estimate the bidder’s pre- and post-acquisition performance using two 
valuation measures. The valuation measures consist of Tobin’s Q and Excess Market 
Value (EMV). Tobin’s Q is computed as the market value o f outstanding shares plus 
liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by 
total assets. Excess Market Value is defined as the market value of equity less book value 
o f equity normalized by total sales.
The imputed value of a segment is computed by multiplying sales-based (asset- 
based) multiples, or weights, o f the distinct business segments at the 2 digit SIC level 
with the median valuation measures (Q or EMV) obtained from domestic single-segment 
firms operating in the same 2 digit SIC industries32. We compute the sales-based (asset- 
based) weights as the ratio o f annual segment sales (assets) for each distinct line of 
business defined at 2 digit SIC code divided by the total sales (assets) o f the bidder firm 
in that year.33 Sales-based and asset-based computations yield very similar results and we 
will report results based on sales-multiples computations. We compute the median of 
valuation measures o f domestic single-segment firms sharing the same 2 digit SIC code
31 Denis et. al. (1997, Table I) report percentage ownership o f officers and directors with a mean o f 11.7 
percent and a median o f  6.4 percent. Our figures for insider ownership o f  overseas bidders are close to 
what Denis et. al report.
32 In the literature no consensus has been reached about the effects o f  global diversification on firm value 
yet. One stream o f  literature argues for increased values associated with global diversification (Errunza and 
Senbet (1981, 1984), Kogut (1988), Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1998), and Morck and Yeung (1998)). 
On the other hand, a recent stream o f literature provides empirical evidence that global diversification hurts 
firm value (Christophe (1997), Christophe and Pfeiffer (1998), and Denis, Denis and Yost (2000)). The 
domestic single-segment firms included in our control sample have foreign sales to total sales ratio o f  less 
than 10 percent.
33 Several studies attach no weights to different business segments within a firm while computing the 
diversification discount (Servaes (1996) and Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (1999)). Such diversification 
discount measures might prove fruitful only if  diversified firms consist o f  business segments when no 
distinct business segment information is available. Some other studies (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and 
Ofek (1995,1996) among others) measure the diversification discount using industry matched stand alone 
firms to determine the imputed value o f  diversified firms by sales or assets multiplier approaches.
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with the distinct business segments o f the bidder. Even though previous studies in the 
literature have controlled for industry effects, none has controlled for the size of the 
business segments o f the firm. The size of the stand-alone firms in our study has to fall 
within the range o f 50% to 200% of the size o f the business segment of the bidder in that 
year. If the number o f stand-alone firms are less than five in a year, we extend the size 
restriction to within 25% and 400% of the size o f business segment in that year. Thus, we 
obtain imputed value o f measures for bidders as weighted sum of median valuation 
measures o f size-matched domestic stand-alone firms operating in the same 2 digit SIC 
code with the distinct business segments of the bidder as follows:
IMPUTEDQ= £  Wj median {Q„, Q 2j Q S j } (2)
j - i  r i
where ws is the sales-based (asset-based) weight of the firm’s sales (assets) in 
business segment j, and Q(or EMV) 1NDj is the size matched median valuation o f domestic 
single-segment bidders that operate in the same 2 digit SIC code business with the 
business o f segment j of the bidder.
We also estimate the bidders’ industry-adjusted valuation measures (valuation 
premium/discount) using the approach of Berger and Ofek (1995). Namely, we compute 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of raw valuation measures to their imputed values; that 
is LN(Q/IMPUTEDQ) or LN(EMV/IMPUTEDEMV).
3.2.A. Pre-Acquisition Performance: Tobin’s Q and Excess Market Value
Pre-acquisition performance measures for bidder firms are presented in Table 17. 
Panel A reports bidders’ raw and industry-adjusted values o f Tobin’s Q 3 years before 
the acquisition (year -3) till the year o f the acquisition (year 0). Bidders’ mean Q values 
are higher than median Q values, and both mean and median raw Q values increase from 
year -3  to year 0. Multi-segment bidders have lower mean and median raw Q values than 
single-segment bidders in the pre-acquisition period. However, the significance o f that 
relative discount declines gradually as we near year 0 due to the relatively slower pace of 
improvement in single-segment bidders. In year 0, even though multi-segment bidders 
are at a loss compared to single segment bidders, the difference of medians is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. This evidence suggests that multi-segment 
bidders might have improved their raw performance better than single-segment bidders
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before making an overseas acquisition. Such an improvement in the pre-acquisition 
performance is especially notable for focusing multi-segment bidders that are at an 
insignificant discount relative to single-segment bidders that make similar type of 
acquisitions, and their performance improves considerably in the pre-acquisition period. 
On the other hand, diversifying multi-segment bidders are still at a significant loss 
compared to diversifying single-segment bidders prior to the acquisition even though the 
magnitude o f that discount declines as we near year 0.
The industry-adjusted Q values o f bidders, both mean and median, are 
significantly negative in the pre-acquisition period. This suggests both single- and multi­
segment bidders that will conduct overseas acquisitions suffer from a significant 
valuation discount in the pre-acquisition period, and discount increases as we near year 0. 
Median industry-adjusted Q values decline significantly in the pre-acquisition period and 
the decline o f  Q in single-segment firms relative to their industries is more noticeable. 
The industry-adjusted Q values o f multi-segment bidders are always lower than those of 
single-segment bidders in the pre-acquisition period but their difference is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level except in year -3 . In addition, we notice 
such a discount observed in multi-segment bidders relative to single-segment bidders 
exists in the pre-acquisition period for both focusing and diversifying groups o f bidders 
but the difference is not persistently statistically significant. In addition, focusing bidders 
always have lower but occasionally statistically significant industry-adjusted Q values 
than diversifying bidders. This evidence might suggest that focusing bidders, whether 
single- or multi-segment, may be more willing to capitalize on their core businesses by 
performing similar operations overseas.
Panel B o f Table 17 reports the raw and industry-adjusted EMV of overseas 
bidders in the pre-acquisition period. Overseas bidders experience positive and increasing 
EMVs with means greater than medians in the pre-acquisition period. The multi-segment 
bidders always have lower mean and median EMVs than single-segment bidders and 
their difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. Likewise, both focusing 
and diversifying multi-segment bidders have lower EMVs relative to single-segment 
bidders making similar type o f acquisitions. However, the difference o f medians between 
focusing multi- and single-segment bidders is not statistically significant at any
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conventional level while the difference o f both means and medians is statistically 
significant at 1% level for diversifying bidders. In addition, there is not a discemable 
EMV difference between focusing and diversifying bidders in the pre-acquisition period 
other than the insignificantly higher mean EMV of focusing bidders over diversifying 
bidders. Furthermore, focusing multi-segment bidders have greater median EMVs than 
diversifying multi-segment bidders while focusing single-segment bidders have lower 
median EMVs than diversifying single-segment bidders, but again their difference is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level in the pre-acquisition period.
The industry-adjusted EMVs indicate that overseas bidders experience 
significantly lower EMVs than their industry peers and face declines in their industry- 
adjusted EMVs prior to the acquisition. However, the significant discount observed in 
overseas bidders throughout the pre-acquisition period is confined to multi-segment 
bidders while it is pronounced for single-segment firms only in year 0, the year of the 
acquisition. This evidence suggests the act o f geographic diversification might have hurt 
the relative EMV of stand-alone firms. Multi-segment bidders experience significantly 
lower industry-adjusted EMVs than single-segment bidders irrespective o f the type of 
acquisition, except for diversifying bidders in year -2. In addition, the difference in 
industry-adjusted EMVs between multi- and single segment firms is more noticeable in 
focusing group o f bidders. It is also noteworthy that focusing bidders always have higher 
percentage discount, both in Q-based and EMV-based results, in the pre-acquisition 
period relative to bidders that conduct diversifying acquisitions overseas. Hence, when 
we examine the difference between focusing and diversifying groups o f bidders, focusing 
bidders have persistently lower industry-adjusted EMVs than diversifying bidders, unlike 
the raw EMV figures, but this result is not statistically significant at any conventional 
level. In addition, a similar difference between focusing and diversifying bidders is 
observed for both multi- and single-segment bidders, but their difference is not 
significant in the pre-acquisition period, as well. Our main finding so far is that, in year 
0, the year o f the acquisition, the percentage discount in single-segment bidders increases 
abruptly while there is not a notable change in valuation of multi-segment bidders. This 
evidence suggests the act o f overseas investment activity might have hurt the 
performance o f bidders and requires further investigation.
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[ INSERT TABLE 17 HERE ]
3.2.B. Pre-Acquisition Performance, Industrial and Global Diversification
In the literature several studies have addressed the effects o f global diversification 
on firm value but no consensus has been reached yet. Errunza and Senbet (1981, 1984) 
document a positive relationship between the excess value of a firm and its international 
involvement. The FDI literature argues that firms expand overseas to exploit firm 
specific intangibles within an internal market in the same firm34. Kogut (1988) suggests 
the development o f a multinational network systematically contributes to firm value. 
Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1998) find global diversification is associated with 
increases in firm value o f 5.4 percent while industrial diversification is associated with 
value losses o f 2.2 percent. In addition, Morck and Yeung (1998) show industrial 
diversification and geographic diversification contribute to firm value in the presence of 
intangible assets. On the other hand, a recent stream of literature provides empirical 
evidence that global diversification hurts firm value. Christophe (1997) and Christophe 
and Pfeiffer (1998) provide evidence that global diversification makes U.S. 
multinationals destroy value. Similarly, Denis, Denis and Yost (2000) document U.S. 
firms pursue further global diversification even though it leads to valuation losses. Their 
findings indicate global diversification is coupled with value losses o f 18 percent while 
industrial diversification is coupled with value losses o f 20 percent. In the next section, 
we examine whether the international involvement o f bidders has any effect on the value 
o f bidder.
Several measures have been used in the empirical literature to capture the 
multinational involvement of a firm but foreign sales to total sales (FSTS) ratio is the one 
with widest acceptance. Sullivan (1994) shows the foreign sales to total sales ratio is the 
unambiguous measure o f international involvement o f a firm. We classify bidders as 
“multinational” if the bidder has a multinational involvement with foreign sales to total 
sales ratio o f  10 percent or higher, and as “domestic” if the bidder has a foreign sales to 
total sales ratio o f less than 10 percent.35 This procedure classifies the majority o f our
34 See Caves (1971), Buckley and Casson (1976), Dunning (1977), Rugman (1980), Prahalad (1998).
33 Denis, Denis and Yost (2000) define firms as multinationals if  they report any non-zero foreign sales. In 
some regressions they use the benchmark o f  10% as a robustness check to their Table VI and report that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
sample “multinational” in the year prior to the acquisition as the median FSTS was found 
to be 16.38 percent in Table 16.
Panel C o f Table 17 presents the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q o f domestic and 
multinational bidders prior to making a major investment overseas. Domestic multi­
segment bidders suffer from a valuation discount while domestic single-segment bidders 
are at par or at premium relative to their industry peers prior to the acquisition but they 
exhibit some degree o f significant valuation discount in year 0, the year of the 
acquisition. This observation suggests that domestic single-segment firms might have 
experienced some value loss due to the act of global diversification. Consequently, 
domestic multi-segment bidders appear to be at a valuation discount relative to domestic 
single-segment bidders, and the mean and median difference in percentage valuation is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. On the other hand, multinational multi- and 
single-segment bidders experience similar degrees o f valuation discounts in the pre- 
acquisition period, and the mean and median percentage valuation difference between 
multi- and single-segment bidders is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
More interestingly, we note that the mean and median valuation difference 
between domestic and multinational bidders is statistically significant prior to making an 
overseas acquisition. Multinational single-segment bidders are valued at significant 
discounts relative to domestic single-segment bidders while multinational multi-segment 
bidders are at an insignificant discount relative to domestic multi-segment firms. This 
evidence suggests multinational bidders, whether single- or multi-segment firms, might 
be experiencing some value loss due to the level of international involvement. Our results 
also suggest that multi-segment firms, whether domestic or multinational, suffer from 
value losses arising from industrial diversification, and in addition, multinational firms 
experience value destruction due to global diversification. Panel D o f Table 17 provides 
similar evidence based on bidders’ industry-adjusted EMV valuation.
On the overall, our evidence shows that bidders experience some value loss prior 
to making a major investment overseas. In addition, our evidence confirms the 
diversification discount documented in industrially diversified firms, and further
their estimates for diversification discount get smaller but remain statistically significant. In our analysis 
we impose the limit o f  10 percent foreign sales to total sales.
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demonstrates both industrial and global diversification leads to value losses, 
multinational multi-segment firms being hit the worst. The evidence that international 
involvement leads to value destruction lends support to Christophe (1997), Christophe 
and Pfeiffer (1998) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2000) who find that global diversification 
is also associated with value losses. Nevertheless, as all types o f firms conduct focusing 
and diversifying investments overseas no matter how industrially or globally diversified 
they are, we do not know what determines the type o f investment they engage in. In the 
next section, we will try to shed light on this issue.
3 J . The Decision to Diversify Overseas: Logistic Regressions 
The pre-acquisition analysis seems to link the overseas acquisition activity o f the 
bidders to valuation decline, especially in multinational firms, prior to external 
investment decision even though bidders that have overseas exposure trade at a 
significant discount relative to domestic firms. In this section, we investigate why firms 
diversify in overseas markets using logistic regression analysis. Specifically, we focus on 
the determinants of a firm’s industrial diversification activity when they expand globally. 
This is expected to shed more light on the relative importance o f the internalization 
hypothesis o f global expansion in addition to external growth, cash flow/agency cost, and 
internal capital markets hypotheses that have been brought to explain the industrial and 
global diversification motives. The internalization hypothesis o f global diversification 
argues that firms expand overseas to exploit firm specific information based intangible 
assets by transferring the intangible assets within an internal market in the same firm.36 
The external growth hypothesis asserts that bidders’ poor past performance and low 
internal growth opportunities make them undertake diversifying investments. The free 
cash flow/agency cost hypothesis, however, states the diversifying investment activities 
o f  the firm are driven by managers’ objectives rather than the maximization of 
shareholder wealth. Finally, the internal capital markets hypothesis argues that corporate 
diversification stems from the inefficiencies o f internal capital markets in diversified 
firms. Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that firms may be in search o f creating their own 
globally dispersed internal capital markets through their multinational network and
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diversified firms in emerging countries may overcome institutional obstacles by imitating 
the functions o f several institutions present only in developed countries.
In the multivariate regressions, the dependent variable is an indicator variable, 
DIVERD, takings the value o f one when a bidder undertakes an industrially diversifying 
acquisition and zero otherwise. The following variables are included in our logistic 
regressions: as a measure o f international involvement o f a firm FSTSD is a dummy 
variable used to distinguish between domestic and multinational bidders. It takes the 
value o f one when the bidder has multinational involvement with foreign sales to total 
sales ratio o f 10 percent or higher, and zero when the bidder has a foreign sales to total 
sales ratio o f less than 10 percent. We also use the ratio o f foreign sales to total sales, 
FSTS. The natural logarithm of annual firm sales, LN(SALES), is used to control for the 
size o f  the bidders. We include the imputed Q value of the firm, IMPUTEDQ, that is 
based on sales multiples o f distinct business segments. This measure allows us to 
determine whether the diversification decision o f the firm is driven by the state o f growth 
opportunities o f the bidder’s industry. Namely, whether diversifying investments are 
linked to the low growth opportunities o f the bidder’s industry. The industry-adjusted 
Tobin's Q, INDADJQ, is the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f the firm Q divided by its 
imputed value and it is used to measure the growth opportunities (and the valuation) of 
the firm relative to its industry peers37.
The DEBT variable is the amount of total debt as percentage of invested capital. 
DEBT is used to capture the monitoring effect o f external capital markets on managers 
(Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), among others). The INSIDER variable is the percentage of 
the outstanding shares o f the bidder held by the insiders. The insider ownership variable 
is used to test whether firms with lower insider ownership are more likely to diversify. 
The percentage of the outstanding shares of the bidder held by institutions, INSTITUTE, 
is also used in the analysis. We use the institutional ownership variable to test whether
36 See Caves (1971), Buckley and Casson (1976), Dunning (1977), Rugman (1980), Prahaiad (1998). In 
addition, ICogut (1988) suggests that the development o f  a multinational network systematically contributes 
to the value o f the firm.
37 Chevalier (2000), however, suggests that actual Q values are more representative o f  the investment 
opportunities o f the firm rather than its industry adjusted values.
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firms with lower institutional ownership are more likely to diversify, revealing agency 
costs in the firms as a complement to insider ownership.38
The RDEXP measures the R&D expenditures o f the bidder normalized by firm 
sales. It is a continuous variable used to control for the firm’s level o f  growth 
opportunities. It is used to examine how much the firm is investing in its internal growth 
opportunities (Hyland (1999)). In addition to the intangible nature o f R&D expenditures, 
bidders may possess intangibles observed in their advertising expenditures. The 
ADVEXP variable measures bidders’ advertising expenditures normalized by the total 
sales. This is also a continuous variable. The CCF (core cash flow) and NCCF (non-core 
cash flow) variables are used to explore the cash generating ability o f core and non-core 
segments o f bidders in the pre-acquisition period. They are defined as the cash flows 
(operating income plus depreciation) from operations o f the core and non-core business 
segments o f the bidder, respectively, normalized by bidder’s segment sales. Furthermore, 
we account for the method of payments using two indicator variables.39 CASHD takes the 
value of one if the payment was made in cash, and zero otherwise. STOCKD is set equal 
to one if the payment was made in stocks, and zero otherwise. In transactions involving 
both cash and stocks with comparable amounts, both CASHD and STOCKD take on 
values o f one.
We also include a binary variable identifying whether the target was a divestiture, 
DIVESTD. This variable takes the value o f one if the target was divested by its parent 
company, and zero otherwise. In addition, as we observed in Table 13 many overseas 
transactions taking place in emerging markets are focusing in nature. We, therefore, 
include the economic development o f the target as another variable. EMERGE is a 
continuous variable taking values between zero and one. EMERGE is defined as the 
number o f acquisitions made in emerging markets to the overall number o f overseas 
acquisitions by the bidder on the same calendar year. This variable is used to capture the 
geographic internalization motives o f the bidders. In the logistic regressions the constant 
term and all independent variables refer to the overseas diversification motives of 
domestic firms. We also include interactive terms of each independent variable with the
38 See McConnell and Servaes (1990,1995), Denis e ta l. (1997).
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multinational involvement dummy (FSTSD) to find out the impact o f each independent 
variable on overseas diversification decision for domestic and multinational bidders. All 
independent variables are measures in year -1 , the calendar year before the acquisition. 
Besides we include calendar year dummies in the regressions to control for changes in 
the corporate control market. The logistic regression takes the following form:
DIVERD = f(FSTSD (or FSTS), INDADJQ or (INDADJEMV), DEBT, INSIDER, INSTITUTE, 
RDEXP, ADVEXP, CCF, NCCF, CASHD, STOCKD, DIVESTD, EMERGE)
Table 18 reports the results o f the cross-sectional logistics regressions relating the 
firm characteristics to types of overseas acquisition for single-segment and multi­
segment bidders, respectively. On the overall, cross-sectional logistic regressions exhibit 
different underlying incentives for industrial diversification o f single- and multi-segment 
bidders conducting major investments overseas. In addition, the level of international 
involvement of the bidders has a significant impact on most o f the underlying 
characteristics. Both single- and multi-segment bidders have a significant tendency to 
diversify into unrelated activities overseas given that they conduct acquisitions overseas. 
This tendency is highly accounted for in multi-segment bidders. The size effect emerges 
only for single-segment firms and the high growth prospects o f the industry operated in 
has a significant impact on the overseas diversification motives o f multi-segment bidders 
only discouraging them from diversifying into unrelated lines o f business.
Debt does not serve a monitoring mechanism for single-segment overseas bidders 
but the introduction o f debt into the capital structure discourages domestic multi-segment 
bidders from pursuing overseas expansion into lines o f businesses related to their core 
business while multinational multi-segment bidders do not seem to be influenced from 
the scrutiny of lenders in a multinational network structure. The presence o f knowledge 
based (R&D) and marketing based (advertising) intangibles affects single- and multi­
segment bidders differently. Domestic single-segment bidders with knowledge based 
intangibles (R&D intensive) are more likely to focus into related lines o f businesses 
overseas while multinational single-segment bidders with similar intangibles seem to be 
indifferent. On the other hand, multi-segment bidders with high advertising expenditures
39 See Travlos (1987), Servaes (1991), Martin (1996), Megginson, Morgan and Nail (1999), and Rappaport 
and Sirower(1999).
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are more likely to diversify into lines o f businesses unrelated to their core business in 
overseas markets in order to exploit their marketing based intangibles.
The cash flows o f the bidders impact the industrial diversification motive o f  their 
overseas expansion, too. Stand-alone firms with previous multinational exposure are 
more likely to conduct focusing acquisitions overseas if their business generates high 
cash flows. On the other hand, domestic multi segment bidders with higher non-core cash 
flows are significantly more likely to pursue industrial diversification in overseas 
markets. The method o f payment in overseas acquisitions has a different impact on 
bidders. Domestic single-segment bidders that pay their targets in cash and multinational 
single-segment bidders that pay their targets in stock are more likely to make focusing 
acquisitions. Similarly, domestic multi-segment bidders that pay their targets in cash are 
more likely to diversify into unrelated lines o f businesses while multi-segment bidders 
that pay their targets in equity are more likely to make focusing acquisitions overseas. 
Whether the target firm is divested or not has an impact on the overseas diversification 
decision of multi-segment bidders only. Multinational multi-segment bidders are more 
likely to acquire overseas targets operating in their core business if  they are divested 
from their parents. The stage o f economic development o f the target market impacts the 
geographic diversification motives o f single-segment bidders only. Domestic single­
segment bidders are more likely to conduct focusing acquisitions in emerging countries 
while multinational single-segment bidders are indifferent about whether the target firm’s 
country is an emerging or a developed country.
[INSERT TABLE 18 HERE]
3.4. Post-Acquisition Performance
In this section, we examine the post-acquisition performance o f single- and multi­
segment bidders that conducted focusing and diversifying investments overseas in order 
to gain insights about the long-term effects o f  the act o f global and industrial 
diversification.
3.4.A. Post Acquisition Performance: Tobin’s Q and Excess Market Value
The post-acquisition raw and industry-adjusted performance measures for single- 
and multi-segment overseas bidders are reported in Table 19. Panel A reports bidders’
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raw and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q values from the year of the acquisition (year 0) to 3 
years after the acquisition (year +3). Bidders have increasing median Q ratios after an 
overseas acquisition. Both multi- and single-segment bidders exhibit a soundly increasing 
raw performance in the post-acquisition period, too. However, the valuation difference 
that was evident (and statistically significant) prior to the acquisition between multi- and 
single-segment bidders, especially diversifying bidders, does not persist in the post­
acquisition period. Multi-segment bidders exhibit an insignificant value loss relative to 
single-segment bidders in the post acquisition period, and such an insignificant difference 
in Q ratios between multi- and single-segment overseas bidders persists for both focusing 
and diversifying bidders. In addition, there is no statistically significant difference 
between focusing and diversifying groups o f bidders at any conventional level in the 
post-acquisition period.
The industry-adjusted Q ratios demonstrate that bidders experience significant 
valuation discounts following the overseas acquisition. There is not a noticeable 
difference in the valuation of multi-segment bidders before and after the acquisition. The 
most striking evidence is that single-segment bidders that made overseas acquisitions in 
year 0 experience a valuation discount as severe as multi-segment bidders do, 
irrespective of the type of acquisition they conduct. The diversifying single-segment 
bidders begin to experience a significant amount o f discount while the significant 
discount observed in focusing single-segment bidders prior to the acquisition increases in 
the post-acquisition period. Hence, a significant discount is pronounced for both focusing 
and diversifying stand-alone firms in the post-acquisition period. In addition, there is not 
evidence of a significant valuation difference o f bidders whether they are single- or 
multi-segment firms, or whether they engaged in a focusing or a diversifying investment, 
even though industrially diversified bidders appear at a minor value loss relative to stand­
alone bidders.
Panel B o f Table 19 reports the post-acquisition valuation of overseas bidders 
based on raw and industry-adjusted EMV measures. The evidence in Panel B shows 
single-segment bidders experience a severe percentage discount in their EMVs, but not as 
much as multi-segment bidders do, in years 0 and 1. The mean and median difference 
between single- and multi-segment bidders is statistically significant at 1% level in those
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years but it loses significance 2 years after the acquisition. Focusing bidders exhibit a 
similar pattern while there is not such a significant valuation difference between 
diversifying single- and multi-segment bidders in the post-acquisition period.
The evidence in the post-acquisition period suggests the act o f overseas 
diversification hurt value, especially for stand-alone firms. Stand-alone firms conducting 
overseas acquisitions experience significant value losses relative to the pre-acquisition 
period. Diversifying stand-alone bidders are hurt the most as they did not experience any 
significant value loss in the pre-acquisition period while focusing stand-alone bidders, 
that already faced some value loss in the pre-acquisition period, experience further value 
losses. Industrially diversified bidders that conducted focusing investments overseas 
faced further value losses while diversifying multi-segment bidders improved their 
performance after the acquisition. This observation lends some support to Morck and 
Yeung (1998) who find industrial and global diversification coupled with high 
intangibles lead to increases in firm value. In addition, our evidence in Table 17 showed 
there is a significant valuation difference between domestic and multi-segment bidders 
prior to making a major investment overseas. Hence, the international involvement of the 
firm appears to have a significant adverse impact on the value o f the firm and we will 
examine the valuation o f domestic and multinational single- and multi-segment bidders 
next.
[ INSERT TABLE 19 HERE ]
3.4.B. Post-Acquisition Performance: Valuation and Global Diversification
Panel C of Table 19 reports the post-acquisition industry-adjusted valuation of 
domestic and multinational bidders based on Tobin’s Q measure. We note that the 
valuation of single- and multi-segment bidders is not statistically different from each 
other in the post-acquisition period for both domestic and multinational bidders. 
However, the evidence in Table 17 showed there was a statistically significant valuation 
difference between domestic multi- and single-segment bidders prior to acquisition. This 
result confirms our finding that domestic stand-alone firms might have destroyed value 
when they expanded overseas while stand-alone firms having multinational exposure 
were already at a valuation loss prior to making a major investment overseas.
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The extent o f the valuation discount in domestic bidders is always lower than that 
o f multinational bidders in the post-acquisition period, and the difference is statistically 
significant in years 0, 1, and 2. We note that, even though domestic stand-alone bidders 
experienced some value less after conducting an overseas acquisition, a significant 
valuation difference persists between domestic and multinational stand-alone bidders in 
the post-acquisition period. On the other hand, there is not evidence o f a statistically 
significant valuation difference between domestic and multinational industrially 
diversified bidders. This evidence suggests multi-segment firms experience value losses 
due to global diversification in addition to diversifying across different lines o f business. 
The significant global valuation difference we observed in the pre-acquisition period in 
both focusing and diversifying stand-alone bidders persists only between focusing 
domestic and multinational stand-alone bidders while there is not evidence o f a 
significant difference between diversifying domestic and multinational stand-alone 
bidders in the post acquisition period. This result suggests stand-alone firms that 
conducted diversifying acquisitions overseas faced further value losses by diversifying 
into lines o f business unrelated to their core business. The evidence in Table 17 indicated 
there was not any significant difference between domestic and multinational multi­
segment bidders. However, in the post-acquisition period the analysis o f focusing and 
diversifying group o f multi-segment bidders indicates domestic multi-segment firms that 
acquired overseas targets operating in their core business are significantly valued above 
their multinational counterparts in years 0 and I while diversifying domestic multi­
segment bidders have insignificantly lower valuations than diversifying multinational 
multi-segment bidders.
Panel D of Table 19 reports the industry-adjusted valuation o f bidders in the post­
acquisition period based on EMV measure. The evidence yields similar qualitative results 
like we obtained from valuation results computed by Tobin’s Q measure. Overall, our 
results suggest stand-alone firms with some international involvement are always valued 
below their domestic counterparts, and the act o f global expansion leads to value losses 
in both domestic and multinational stand-alone firms. Similarly, multi-segment firms that 
have majority o f their operations in the U.S. do not face a severe discount as much as
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their multinational counterparts do. Our main finding is that, in addition to industrial 
diversification, the act o f global diversification leads to value losses, too.
C. The Effect o f  Overseas Diversification on Bidders' Post Acquisition Valuation
In this section we examine further the relation between the change in post­
acquisition performance and the type o f assets acquired by domestic and multinational 
single- and multi-segment bidders. We measure the change in the post-acquisition 
performance o f bidders using changes in Q and EMV values in the three years after the 
acquisition relative to their values in year -1 , the year prior to the acquisition, scaled by 
average Q and EMV values during the three year pre-acquisition period. We also 
estimate the change in the industry adjusted valuation o f bidders in all three years after 
the acquisition relative to the valuation prior to the acquisition year.
We regress the post-acquisition change in different performance measures against 
the following indicator variables: SINGLEFOCUSD is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one if the bidder is a single-segment firm that makes a focusing acquisition 
overseas, and zero otherwise. MULTIDIVERD takes the value o f one if a multi-segment 
bidder makes a diversifying acquisition overseas, and zero otherwise. MULT1FOCUSD 
takes the value o f one if a multi-segment bidder makes a focusing acquisition and zero 
otherwise. Hence, the constant term captures the impact on post-acquisition performance 
when a single-segment bidder makes a diversifying overseas acquisition in year 0, 
assuming such firms are the ones experiencing the most serious adverse impact arising 
from both industrial and global expansion.
Table 20 presents the coefficients o f the three indicator variables in the post­
acquisition period. The dependent variable in Panel Al is the change in raw Tobin’s Q 
and EMV measures o f overseas bidders from the end o f year -1  till the end of years 1, 2 
and 3 scaled by the average measure o f the bidder in the pre-acquisition period. The 
constant term is positive and statistically significant in Panel A l implying that all bidders 
experience improvement in their raw Tobin’s Q and EMV following an overseas 
acquisition. The coefficients o f indicator variables for raw Q measures are not 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the coefficients of indicator 
variables for SINGLEFOCUSD and MULTIDIVERD are positive and statistically 
significant for the change in raw EMV to years 1 and 2. This suggests that single-
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segment bidders that conducted focusing acquisitions and multi-segment bidders that 
conducted diversifying acquisitions have improved their raw performance better than 
other bidders.
The dependent variable in Panel A2 is the change in the percentage industry- 
adjusted valuation measures o f the overseas bidder from the end o f year -1 till the end of 
years 1, 2 and 3. The constant term is negative and statistically significant in five o f the 
six regressions. This suggests the performance of single-segment bidders that made 
diversifying acquisition overseas deteriorates significantly relative to their industry peers 
following an overseas acquisition, even though they might have improved their raw 
performance over the same period. In addition, the indicator variables for bidders that 
conduct focusing acquisitions, both single- and multi-segment bidders, are not 
statistically significant. This suggests that focusing bidders face deteriorating industry- 
adjusted performance after an overseas acquisition as diversifying single-segment bidders 
experience. Only one o f the indicator variables, MULTIDIVERD, has statistically 
significant and positive coefficients in the cross-sectional regressions for years 2 and 3 
suggesting that multi-segment bidders that acquire overseas targets outside their core 
business are not adversely affected from overseas expansion. Namely, simultaneous 
global and industrial diversification does not seem to hurt multi-segment bidders. This 
result might lend some support to Morck and Yeung (1998) who find that industrial and 
geographic diversification work in the presence of intangible assets.
[ INSERT TABLE 20 HERE ]
We must note the extent o f international involvement o f bidders had a significant 
impact on the valuation o f bidders. Our evidence in Table 17 and 19 indicated both 
global and industrial diversification destroy value. Next, we will examine the impact of 
the international involvement on the change of post-acquisition performance of single- 
and multi-segment bidders that made diversifying and non-diversifying overseas 
investments in year 0. Panels Bl and B2 of Table 20 report the results o f cross-sectional 
regressions relating the change in performance measures o f overseas bidders following 
the overseas acquisition in year 0. The dependent variables in panel B l and B2 are the 
same as we have in panels A l and A2, respectively. We include the degree of 
internationalization o f the bidders as an explanatory variable to capture the effect o f
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previous international involvement o f the bidder firms. We define the bidder firms with 
foreign sales to total sales ratio (FSTS) less than 10 percent as domestic firms and the 
bidder firms with FSTS greater than or equal to 10 percent as multinational firms.
The constant term in the cross-sectional regressions captures the effect o f the 
overseas acquisition on single-segment domestic bidders that make a diversifying 
acquisition in year 0. We include indicator variables to capture the impact o f the 
industrial and global diversification of bidders. The term SINGLE refers to stand-alone 
(single-segment) bidders in our cross-sectional regressions while MULTI refers to 
industrially diversified (multi-segment) bidders. In addition, to capture the type of 
acquisition we introduce FOCUS for bidders that make focusing acquisitions while 
DIVER denotes acquisition outside the core business of the bidder. Similarly 
DOMESTIC refers to domestic bidders that have foreign sales to total sales ratio o f less 
than 10 percent while MNE refers to multinational bidders that have foreign sales to total 
sales ratio of 10 percent or greater.
The constant term has positive and significant coefficients in raw Tobin’s Q 
regressions of Panel Bl indicating single-segment domestic bidders that make 
diversifying acquisitions improve their raw performance significantly in the post­
acquisition period. Single-segment multinational firms that conduct diversifying 
acquisitions have positive and statistically significant coefficients in raw Tobin’s Q 
regressions suggesting that multinational single-segment bidders that conduct 
diversifying acquisitions have significantly improved their raw performance following an 
overseas acquisition. Similarly, the EMV regressions indicate that overseas bidders 
improve their raw performance. In sum, the regression results for raw performance 
measures confirm our results in Table 19 that bidders experience some improvement in 
their raw performance after an overseas acquisition whether measured in Tobin’s Q or 
EMV.
Panel B2 reports the coefficients o f the indicator variables for the change in the 
industry-adjusted valuation measures o f the overseas bidder from the end o f year -1  until 
the end o f years I, 2 and 3. The constant term in the regressions is negative and 
statistically significant suggesting the performance o f single-segment domestic bidders 
that made diversifying investments overseas is severely impaired following the overseas
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acquisition. The indicator variables appear to have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients for almost all o f the post-acquisition period, especially in years 2 and 3 for 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and in year 2 for industry-adjusted EMV. This evidence 
suggests single-segment domestic bidders that make diversifying acquisitions are most 
negatively impacted while all other bidders are not hurt as much as single-segment 
diversifying domestic bidders do following an acquisition. In addition, multi-segment 
bidders, whether domestic or multinational, acquiring overseas targets operating outside 
their core business seem to have benefited from such an investment strategy.
Overall, our results suggest that multi-segment bidders diversifying into unrelated 
lines o f business gain from overseas acquisitions while single-segment bidders and 
focusing multi-segment bidders experience consequent valuation declines. Moreover, our 
results suggest the act o f global diversification destroys value when it takes place in the 
form o f M&As for domestic bidders. The bidders that already have international 
exposure experience further valuation declines and can not recuperate any benefits from 
further global diversification. The bidders facing the most adverse valuation loss are the 
domestic single-segment bidders that expand both geographically and industrially.
3.5. Internal Capital Markets, Are They Efficient?
The internal capital markets o f diversified firms permit them to finance projects 
that external capital markets would not, because o f informational asymmetries and 
agency costs. As a result, it is argued that diversification creates value for shareholders 
because it gives rise to internal capital markets providing increased monitoring 
incentives, easier asset redeployment, and easier allocation of funds to liquidity- 
constrained divisions relative to external capital markets (Stein (1997) among others). 
Additionally, diversification is argued to increase efficiency o f liquidity-constrained 
firms because management allocates more funds to the more efficient divisions. Our 
analysis so far, consistent with a number o f recent papers, shows that global 
diversification by diversified and focused firms does not enhance performance. In this 
section, we examine whether diversification is unsuccessful because bidders' internal 
capital markets fail to allocate financial resources efficiently between core and non-core 
business divisions before and after diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions.
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3.5.A. Pre-acquisition Analysis o f  Bidder's Core and Non-core Sales, Cash Flows, and 
Capital Expenditures
3.5.A.1 Core and Non-core Sales
In this section we analyze the cash flows and investments o f the core and non­
core business segments o f bidders before they engage in diversifying and non­
diversifying overseas acquisitions. The results are reported in Table 21. Panel A shows 
the mean and median sales o f the core and non-core business measured as the natural 
logarithm o f segment sales in dollars. Mean and median sales o f single- and multi­
segment bidders indicate that industrially diversified bidders generate more sales thus 
illustrating a difference in size. In addition, the core business sales o f multi-segment 
bidders that will make focusing acquisitions two years later exceeds their non-core 
business sales significantly. On the other hand, the mean and the median core sales of 
diversifying multi-segment bidders are not significantly different from their sales o f non­
core business segments. This suggests the core business o f focusing multi-segment 
bidders generate more sales relative to non-core business and the fraction of core sales in 
focusing multi-segment bidders is greater relative to diversifying multi-segment firms. 
This also indirectly suggests diversifying multi-segment bidders are more industrially 
diversified.
The mean and median core business sales difference between focusing and 
diversifying bidders, whether single-or multi-segment, is statistically significant. On the 
other hand, the difference between the mean and median values o f non-core sales of 
focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level. This evidence suggests there is difference in sales generating ability 
o f core segments between focusing and diversifying bidders, but not o f non-core business 
segments o f multi-segment bidders. This also suggests that bidders tend to invest outside 
their core business when core sales drop consistent with the growth seeking view o f Lang 
and Stulz (1994) and Hyland (1999).
3.5.A.2 Core and Non-core Assets
Panel B reports the size o f assets, measured as the natural logarithm o f the assets 
in dollars, o f the core and non-core business o f multi-segment bidders. The size o f assets
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o f single-segment firms is also reported. The mean and median values indicate the core 
business o f focusing multi-segment bidders rely on much greater asset base than their 
non-core business segments prior to acquisition. However, such a significant difference is 
not observed in multi-segment bidders investing outside their core business. In addition, 
the asset size o f core business o f focusing bidders is significantly larger than those of 
diversifying bidders in the pre-acquisition period. On the other hand, the non-core 
businesses o f focusing multi-segment bidders are smaller than those of diversifying 
multi-segment bidders, but the difference is not significant at any conventional level prior 
to the acquisition. It is interesting to note that there is a great degree of difference 
between firms that eventually invest in unrelated business relative to similar firms 
investing in core-related business. Consistent with our previous results, this suggests that 
firms deploy more assets in the lines o f business that generate more sales. That is, more 
capital is invested in the core business o f focusing firms as a result of their greater sales 
generating ability. Mean and median differences in terms o f size o f assets, as shown in 
Panel B, confirm there is a significant difference in size between single-and multi­
segment bidders that engage in a similar type o f acquisition.
3.S.A.3 Core and Non-core Growth in Sales and Cash Flows
Panel C presents and compares the sales growth of bidders' business segments in 
the pre-acquisition period. In general, irrespective of the bidder's corporate structure and 
acquisition motive, single- and multi-segment firms experience growth in segment sales. 
The core business o f multi-segment bidders achieve lower mean and median growth in 
sales than single-segment firms engaging in a similar type of acquisition. The median 
difference is persistently significant at 1% level. This result suggests that irrespective of 
the type o f acquisition single-segment firms plan to make, they experience higher growth 
in sales than the core business segment o f multi-segment firms. This further implies the 
decision to invest in core-related or non-core-unrelated lines o f business might be driven 
by different motives for single-segment and multi-segment firms as indicated by 
evidence in Table 18. This also lends support to Chevalier (2000) who argues for 
selection bias while explaining the investment opportunities faced by single- and multi­
segment firms.
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From year -2  to year -1 the core business segment o f focusing (diversifying) 
multi-segment bidders experience a lower (higher), but not statistically significant, 
growth in sales than their non-core business segments. From year -1 to the year o f 
acquisition, the core business of focusing multi-segment bidders achieve insignificantly 
higher growth in sales than their non-core segments. For the same period, the core 
business of diversifying multi-segment bidders experiences insignificantly lower growth 
in sales than their non-core business segment. Namely, multi-segment bidders that focus 
(diversify) experience greater sales increases (decreases) in their core than their non-core 
business from year - I to the acquisition year. The mean and median core and non-core 
growth in sales difference between multi-segment firms that focus relative to similar 
firms that diversify further is not statistically significant at any conventional level. These 
results suggest the industrial diversification direction of geographic expansion is not 
significantly related with the sales growth of the core business o f multi-segment firms 
prior to the acquisition decision.
Similarly, single-segment firms investing in unrelated business appear to 
experience higher growth in sales than single-segment firms choosing to invest in related 
business. The median difference is -0.060 and -0.037, respectively, and significant at the 
5% level from year -2  to year -1. This suggests that single-segment bidders might have 
reached their full potential in their business and might need to invest in other lines of 
business to benefit from the creation o f internal capital markets. In addition, single­
segment firms enjoy higher growth in sales than the core and non-core segments of 
multi-segment firms and the differences are statistically significant in the pre-acquisition 
period.
Panel D presents cash flows for core and non-core business segments of bidding 
firms during the pre-acquisition period. We defined cash flows as the operating income 
plus depreciation for core and non-core business segments scaled by segment sales from 
the previous year. The logistic regressions in Table 18 indicated multinational single­
segment bidders with higher core cash flows are significantly more inclined to focus in 
their core business while multi-segment bidders having higher non-core cash flows are 
significantly more inclined to invest outside their core business. However, our evidence 
in Panel D indicates there is no statistically significant difference in the cash flow
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generating ability between single- and multi-segment and between focusing and 
diversifying bidders. The only exception is the notably high cash flow o f core business of 
focusing multi-segment bidders in year 0 over its non-core business and the core business 
o f diversifying multi-segment bidders.
3.5.A.4 Core and Non-core Capital Expenditures
Panel E provides a comparison o f bidder's core and non-core capital expenditures 
relative to their segment sales in the pre-acquisition period. The results show multi­
segment bidders invest more in their core business when their core sales exceed the sales 
o f their non-core business (focusing multi-segment bidders). On the other hand, multi­
segment bidders invest significantly more in their non-core business when they are more 
diversified or when there is no discemable difference between their core and non-core 
business sales and assets (diversifying multi-segment bidders). In addition, focusing 
multi-segment bidders invest significantly more in their core business than diversifying 
multi-segment bidders. The capital expenditures o f single-segment firms that undertake 
focusing investments exceed those of similar firms that invest in unrelated lines of 
business, but the difference is statistically insignificant. These results do not appear to 
directly support cross-subsidization between core and non-core divisions o f multi­
segment firms conducting major investments overseas. However, the evidence indicates 
that internal capital markets might be active in that transfer o f funds from core to non­
core lines o f business occurs in multi-segment firms that elect to invest outside their core 
business. Consequently, the extent o f cross-subsidization in diversifying multi-segment 
firms is rather difficult to assess from these univariate results.
Overall, the pre-acquisition analysis indicates that focusing multi-segment firms 
use more assets and make larger capital expenditures in core than in non-core divisions 
because they generate more sales than their non-core divisions while diversifying multi­
segment firms commit larger capital expenditures in non-core divisions as the sales and 
assets o f their core and non-core segments are virtually undistinguishable. Single­
segment firms, on the other hand, invest in unrelated business when they experience 
higher growth in sales than single-segment firms that choose to invest in related business. 
Furthermore, the capital expenditures o f  single-segment firms that make focusing
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investments insignificantly exceed those o f similar firms that invest in unrelated 
business.
[ INSERT TABLE 21 HERE ]
3.5.B. Post-Acquisition Analysis o f  Bidder’s Core and Mon-core Sales, Cash Flows, and 
Capital Expenditures
As discussed earlier, the question is whether diversification destroys firm value 
because firms perform poorly in allocating capital across core and non-core business 
divisions or because the greater diversity o f cash generating ability between business 
segments leads to a valuation loss in addition to geographic diversification motives of 
bidders. In this section we examine the post-acquisition performance o f single- and 
multi-segment bidders involved in diversifying and non-diversifying investments in order 
to gain additional insights about the long-term effects o f their investment decisions. The 
results are reported in Table 22.
3.5.B. I Core and Non-core Sales
Consistent with the pre-acquisition pattern o f sales o f diversified firms, Panel A 
shows the core business o f multi-segment bidders that invested in their core business 
generates significantly more sales than their non-core business during the post­
acquisition period while multi-segment bidders that invested outside their core business 
continue to generate comparable amount o f sales from their core and non-core business 
in the post-acquisition years. This result suggests diversifying acquisitions by multi- 
segment firms did not dramatically improve the sales performance of non-core business 
in the post-acquisition period and they are still more industrially diversified compared to 
focusing multi-segment bidders. A comparison o f the post-acquisition core sales of 
multi-segment bidders that invested inside their core business relative to those that 
invested outside their core business, continues to exhibit significant differences in favor 
o f focusing multi-segment bidders. The mean and median differences of the non-core 
sales between diversifying and non-diversifying bidders are statistically insignificant. 
These results imply that non-core segment sales o f multi-segment firms do not 
dramatically differ regardless whether they diversify or not. Similarly, the core business 
o f focusing single-segment bidders generates more sales relative to diversifying single­
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segment bidders like they did prior to the overseas acquisition. Mean and median sales o f 
single- and multi-segment bidders show multi-segment bidders generate more sales 
consistent with the pre-acquisition sales indicating a difference in size. Overall, the post­
acquisition core sales o f multi-segment bidders, consistent with the pre-acquisition 
evidence, suggest there is some degree o f difference in the sales generating ability o f core 
segments between focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders. Focusing single­
segment bidders also register significant mean and median differences in sales than 
diversifying single-segment firms, implying that focusing single-segment bidders that 
invest outside their core business still lag behind focusing single-segment bidders.
3.5.B.2 Core and Non-Core Assets
Panel B presents the size of assets o f the core and non-core business of multi­
segment bidders in the post-acquisition period. The size o f assets of single-segment firms 
is also reported. The mean and median values show the core business o f focusing multi­
segment bidders continues to exceed the asset base o f their non-core business segments 
during the post-acquisition years and the difference is statistically significant at 5% level 
while such a significant difference is not pronounced for diversifying bidders. The mean 
and median core asset difference between focusing and diversifying bidders, whether 
single- or multi-segment, is statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting the 
core asset base o f focusing bidders is significantly larger than that of diversifying 
bidders. The mean and median non-core asset difference between diversifying and non­
diversifying multi-segment bidders is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
The core-asset base o f diversifying single-segment bidders is significantly larger than 
that o f their non-core asset base in post-acquisition period as these segments are in their 
infant stages and are very few in number.
3.5.B.3 Core and Non-Core Growth in Sales and Cash Flows
The growth in sales for the core and non-core business segments o f focusing and 
diversifying bidders in the post-acquisition period is reported in Panel C. The core 
business o f focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders reach lower growth in sales 
than single-segment firms that engaged in a similar type o f acquisition, but only the 
difference in core sales growth between diversifying single- and multi-segment is 
statistically significant in year +1. These results contradict with the pre-acquisition sales
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when the growth in sales o f multi-segment firms remained significantly below that of 
single-segment firms irrespective o f the investment strategy they follow. The median 
growth in core sales difference between focusing multi- and single-segment bidders in 
favor o f single-segment bidders ranges from 1.1% in year +1 to 3.6% in year+2. For the 
core business segments o f diversifying multi- and single-segment bidders the median 
growth in sales difference ranges from 6.3% in year +1 to -1.1% in year +2. For the non- 
core business segments o f diversifying multi- and single-segment bidders the median 
growth in sales difference ranges from -0.2% in year +1 to -14.4% in year+2. A 
comparison between focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders shows the core 
sales growth of focusing multi-segment bidders are significantly higher in year+1, but not 
different than that o f diversifying multi-segment bidders in year+2. Moreover, the 
evidence shows there is no significant difference between the non-core sales growth of 
focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders in the post-acquisition years. Multi­
segment bidders that invest inside their core business because their core sales were 
superior to those o f their non-core segments continue to have superior core sales growth 
in year +1.
Cash flows o f the core and non-core business segments o f bidding firms during 
the post-acquisition period are presented in Panel D o f Table 22. We documented that 
multi-segment firms that invested outside their core business had lower sales and cash 
flows from their core business than similar firms that did not diversify during the pre­
acquisition period. This pattern o f cash flow performance persists in the post-acquisition 
period and the superior sales performance of the core sales o f focusing single- and multi­
segment bidders translates into superior cash flows as well. In both post-acquisition 
years, the core cash flows o f focusing single- and multi-segment bidders substantially 
exceed those o f the diversifying bidders and the median cash flow differences are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The non-core cash flows o f diversifying 
multi-segment bidders are not different from those o f focusing multi-segment bidders in 
the post-acquisition years even though they are greater than their own core cash flows, 
indicating that diversification by multi-segment bidders failed to improve the cash flow 
performance o f their non-core business significantly. Hence, in the post-acquisition 
period diversifying multi-segment firms continue to have inferior core cash flows relative
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to that o f focusing multi-segment firms, while their non-core cash flows are not 
significantly different from those o f focusing multi-segment firms.
Table 21 results indicate that diversifying multi-segment firms generate 
significantly lower sales than similar firms investing in related business during the pre- 
acquisition period. As Panel D shows, focusing multi-segment bidders generate more 
sales and cash flows from their core business by investing within their core businesses 
than similar firms that invest in non-core lines o f business. For the non-core sales and 
cash flows, the difference suggests the non-core sales o f diversifying bidders 
significantly exceed those o f focusing bidders, but not in terms o f cash flows. The 
median non-core cash flows difference are 0.007 and -0.002 and are insignificant at 
conventional levels. These results imply that geographic expansion of the internal capital 
markets o f diversifying bidders does not appear to be beneficial. While single-segment 
bidders that remain focused achieve higher sales growth than the core business o f both 
focusing and diversifying multi-segment bidders, they yield significantly lower cash 
flows. The median core cash flow difference between focusing and diversifying single­
segment bidders is statistically significant at conventional levels in year +2. Consistent 
with previous studies showing that diversification does not enhance shareholders wealth, 
analysis o f pre- and post-acquisition cash flows of multi-segment bidders that engage in 
diversifying investment activities suggests that diversification is not beneficial. In 
addition, overseas diversifying investment activities by single-segment firms show 
diversification is not prosperous.
3.5.B.4 Core and Non-core Capital Expenditures
Our analysis, reported in Table 21 and 22, indicates that multi-segment bidders 
that invest more in their core business generate more sales and employ a greater asset 
base in their core business before and after the acquisition, which translates into higher 
cash flows after the acquisition as well. On the other hand, multi-segment bidders that 
invest outside their core business generate comparable amounts o f sales and employ 
comparable asset base in their non-core business, which translates into weaker cash flows 
relative to focusing multi-segment bidders. Bidder’s core and non-core capital 
expenditures in the post-acquisition period, presented in Panel E o f Table 22, show that 
focusing (diversifying) multi-segment bidders invest significantly more (less) in their
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core than in their non-core lines o f business. This seems to be dictated by the differences 
in their core and non-core sales and cash flows in the post-acquisition period, reported 
earlier. In addition, focusing multi-segment firms invest significantly more capital in 
their core business than diversifying multi-segment bidders. This evidence suggests the 
core capital expenditures o f focusing multi-segment firms rise with core sales and cash 
flow increases. Likewise, our evidence in Table 23 indicate that multi-segment firms that 
do not invest outside their core business appear to avoid cross-subsidization in the post­
acquisition period. Diversifying multi-segment firms, however, invest significantly more 
in their non-core than core business, but they do not generate substantially more sales 
cash flows from their non-core lines of business over the same period. This indicates 
there is misallocation o f capital between core and non-core business segments in 
diversifying multi-divisional firms as evidenced in panel C2 of Table 23.
[ INSERT TABLE 22 HERE]
3.5.C. Core and Non-Core Capital Expenditures o f  Bidders: A Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis
In this section we examine the relationship between capital expenditures and cash 
flows in an attempt to shed more light on whether internal capital markets allocate capital 
resources between core and non-core businesses efficiently. If internal capital markets in 
diversified firms work efficiently, they should finance projects o f business segments with 
the highest growth opportunities. Our evidence so far indicates that focusing bidders 
generate more sales from their core business. Given that focusing multi-segment bidders 
generate more cash flow from their core sales relative to diversifying multi-segment 
bidders and invest more in their core business, it is expected that the core capital 
expenditures o f multi-segment firms should be primarily determined by its own cash 
flows if internal capital markets work efficiently. If, however, capital expenditures of 
non-core business are sensitive to the core cash flows, that would imply the capital is 
diverted from projects with high growth opportunities (core business) to projects with 
low growth opportunities.
We use cross-sectional regressions to examine whether systematic capital 
misallocation takes place across the core and non-core segments o f bidder firms while we
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control for firm characteristics40. We examine whether diversified bidders practice 
inefficient capital budgeting in the sense that they underinvest in divisions generating a 
relatively high percent o f sales and overinvest in divisions generating a relatively low 
percent o f sales. If segment cash flows to sales measure growth prospects, overinvesting 
(underinvesting) in segments with relatively low (high) cash flows to sales is equivalent 
o f overinvesting (underinvesting) in lines o f business with relatively low (high) growth 
opportunities. If diversified firms have greater access to capital, they are also expected to 
invest more than single-segment firms.
We regress the capital expenditures o f the bidders in years 0, the year o f the 
acquisition, being normalized by the segment sales in year -1 against the core-cash flow, 
CCF, the non-core-cash flow, NCCF, variables in year -1 while we control for other 
effects as well. We introduce a dummy variable FSTSD to distinguish between domestic 
and multinational bidders. Following Sullivan (1994), we use foreign sales to total sales 
ratio as the measure o f internationalization. FSTSD is an indicator variable and takes the 
value of one if the bidder has a foreign sales to total sales ratio o f 10 percent or more, and 
a value o f zero if the bidder has a foreign sales to total sales ratio o f less than 10 percent. 
Similar regressions are estimated for the core capital expenditures in year +1 and +2 after 
the acquisition. A similar set o f regressions is estimated using the non-core capital 
expenditures as the dependent variable.
Table 23 presents the regression results. The regressions in Panel A1 show the 
core capital expenditures o f single-segment bidders that make focusing overseas 
acquisitions in year 0 can not be explained by the cash flows of the core business (the 
only business segment) neither in the year o f the acquisition nor in the following two 
years. In Panel A2, we note the core capital expenditures o f domestic single-segment 
firms that make diversifying acquisitions are affected from the cash flows of the core 
business in years 1 and 2. In the last three regressions, we examine the impact of the 
international involvement o f the firm on capital expenditures as well. The coefficient of 
the core cash flow variable is always positive and statistically significant while its 
interactive term is negative and statistically significant. These results suggest the money
40 The rationale o f  routine capital misallocation in diversified firms is based on the free cash flow 
hypothesis o f  Jensen (1986) that posits that managers with excess free cash flows tend to overinvest
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invested in the core business is originated in the core business. However, for single­
segment firms with an overseas exposure the core cash flow variable is not as significant 
as it is for domestic single-segment firms that make diversifying acquisitions in 
explaining the investment in core business in the year o f the acquisition and in the 
following years.
In Panels B1 and B2, we examine the core capital expenditures o f focusing and 
diversifying multi-segment bidders, respectively. Panel B1 results show the cash flow 
generated only in the core business o f the focusing multi-segment firms has a significant 
impact on the core capital expenditures, except for year 1 in which the non-core cash 
flows have a significant impact as well. However, in the last three regressions where we 
include the level o f international involvement o f the bidders, the impact o f the core cash 
flow for core capital expenditures o f focusing multinational multi-segment firms is not as 
strong as it is in focusing domestic multi-segment firms in years 0, +1, and +2. We also 
noticed the coefficient of non-core cash flows is positive and significant in year +1 which 
might be interpreted as evidence in favor o f a subsidy from non-core business segments 
to the core business. However, the same term becomes negative and significant in year 
+2 suggesting the increase in non-core cash flows leads to a subsidization from the cash 
flows o f the core business to non-core business segments. Panel B2 reports the regression 
results o f core capital expenditures o f multi-segment firms that make diversifying 
overseas acquisitions in year 0. In years 0 and 1, only the core cash flows o f diversifying 
multi-segment firms has a significant and positive impact on the core capital 
expenditures, but such an effect does not endure in the next year. This result suggests the 
investments in the core business o f multi-segment firms that make diversifying 
acquisitions overseas are mainly affected by their core cash flows around the time they 
make the investment.
Panels Cl and C2 report the cross-sectional regression results for the non-core 
capital expenditures o f multi-segment bidders that make focusing and diversifying 
acquisitions, respectively. The evidence in Panel C l shows there is a direct and 
significant relationship between the non-core capital expenditures o f focusing multi­
segment firms and their non-core cash flows in years 0, 1, and 2. This relationship retains 
its significance for domestic multi-segment bidders but appears to be weaker for the non­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
core capital expenditures o f multinational multi-segment bidders that make focusing 
acquisitions overseas. In year 2, we also notice the coefficient o f the core cash flows is 
positive and significant implying there is some degree o f cross subsidization from core 
cash flows to non-core capital expenditures o f domestic multi-segment firms two years 
after the focusing overseas acquisition. However, such a relationship is not as significant 
for the multi-segment firms with existing overseas exposure. Panel C2 results show in 
year 0, the year of the acquisition, none o f the internal capital market variables has 
explanatory power on the non-core capital expenditures o f multi-segment firms that make 
diversifying acquisitions overseas. In years I and 2, we see non-core cash flows have a 
positive and significant impact on the non-core capital expenditures o f multi-segment 
bidders that make diversifying acquisitions in year 0. When we examine the impact of the 
degree of international involvement on the non-core capital expenditures, non-core cash 
flows sustain a positive and significant impact on the non-core capital expenditures o f 
domestic multi-segment bidders that make diversifying acquisitions. In addition, the 
coefficient o f the core cash flows gain significance for domestic bidders in years 1 and 2. 
This suggests that some capital is diverted from core business to non-core capital 
expenditures and might be interpreted as evidence of cross-subsidization in domestic 
bidders. However, for multinational multi-segment firms that make diversifying 
acquisitions, the core cash flows lose their significance on non-core capital expenditures 
and non-core cash flows are not as significant as domestic multi-segment bidders that 
make similar type of acquisitions.
Overall our evidence provides different results about the workings of internal 
capital markets and capital expenditures o f bidders that make diversifying and non­
diversifying overseas acquisitions. The core cash flow of bidders significantly and 
positively impacts the core capital expenditures o f single-segment firms that make 
diversifying acquisitions and of multi-segment bidders indicating that own cash flows 
govern the capital expenditures o f these segments. In addition, core cash flows influence 
the non-core capital expenditures of domestic multi-segment bidders that make 
diversifying acquisitions providing evidence in favor o f cross subsidization in those 
firms. Furthermore, only the non-core cash flows o f multi-segment bidders have a 
significant impact on the capital expenditures of non-core business in both focusing and
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diversifying multi-segment bidders. Our evidence suggests the capital expenditures of 
both core and non-core business segments o f focusing multi-segment bidders rely only 
on their own cash flows while those of non-core business segments of diversifying 
domestic multi-segment bidders rely on both core and non-core cash flows.
[ INSERT TABLE 23 HERE ]
3.6. Explaining The Impact of Global and Industrial Diversification
Our results in Table 21 indicated the core (non-core) business segments of 
focusing (diversifying) bidders generated higher cash flows per dollar o f sales than their 
non-core (core) business segments before the acquisition and the bidders invested more 
o f their segment sales in those relatively efficient line o f business. In Table 22, we 
observed the core (non-core) business segments o f focusing (diversifying) bidders 
continued to generate higher cash flows per dollar o f sales than their non-core (core) 
business segments after the acquisition and they also began to generate significantly 
more cash flows than the core business o f diversifying multi-segment bidders. Likewise, 
the bidders continued to invest more o f their segment sales in the relatively efficient line 
o f business in terms o f cash generating ability after the acquisition, as well.
In this section we regress bidders’ post acquisition valuation measures on firm 
specific effects, especially segment cash flows, to examine the link between the valuation 
o f the firm and its drivers. Namely, we are investigating how cash flows translate into the 
valuation o f single- and multi-segment firms that conduct focusing and diversifying 
acquisitions overseas. Thus, the emphasis o f our analysis will be on the cash flows of 
both core and non-core business segments o f the bidders as well as on the extent of their 
geographic diversification. The firm specific control variables capture the effects o f the 
size o f the firm, debt, insider and institutional ownership, and R&D and advertising 
expenditures41.
Panel A o f Table 24 presents the results o f our post-acquisition valuation 
regressions in years 0, 1, and 2 for overall single-segment bidders as well as for focusing 
and diversifying single-segment bidders. The coefficient o f the size variable appears
41 In another set o f  regression (not reported), we introduce interactive terms o f  independent variables with 
the international involvement indicator as we did in Tables 18 and 23. These regressions yield marginally 
different qualitative or quantitative results.
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negative and significant in the year o f the acquisition suggesting that larger single­
segment bidders are valued below smaller ones, but this effect stems mainly from 
diversifying single-segment bidders. Our results confirm our previous findings that 
single-segment bidders that conduct acquisitions overseas suffer from a significant 
valuation discount arising from global diversification. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient o f the international involvement dummy, FSTSD, shows that 
single-segment bidders suffer from valuation losses of 16.0 %, 17.3% and 30.1% in years 
0, 1 and 2, respectively. However, this discount associated with global diversification 
appears mainly in single-segment bidders that conduct focusing acquisitions while it 
becomes apparent in diversifying single-segment bidders only 2 years after the 
acquisition (with a valuation discount o f 38.5% arising from the international 
involvement ). Our results also suggest the presence o f high insider ownership 
contributes to firm value as the coefficient o f the INSIDER variable bears statistical 
significance in years 0, 1 and 2 for focusing single-segment bidders. This effect might 
arise from the prominent monitoring ability of insiders in stand-alone firms that continue 
to invest in their core business. The presence o f high R&D expenditures (knowledge- 
based intangibles) appears to foster the valuation of single-segment bidders, whether they 
made focusing or diversifying acquisitions, in years 1 and 2. Similarly, the presence of 
high advertising expenditures (marketing based intangibles) appears to enhance the firm 
value in the same period, but the following regressions indicate the value enhancing 
effect o f marketing based intangibles is pronounced only for diversifying single-segment 
bidders. More interestingly, the driving force behind the valuation o f single-segment 
bidders is their cash flow generating ability from their core business. In all three years, 
the coefficient o f core cash flow variable, CCF, is positive and statistically significant 
suggesting the cash flow generated in the core business o f the bidder contributes to firm 
value. However, the cash flow generated in the core business o f the diversifying single­
segment bidders appears to contribute to firm value in years 0 and 1 but not in year 2, 
amid they diversified into other lines o f business overseas.
Panel B of Table 24 presents the results o f the same regressions in years 0, I, and 
2 for overall multi-segment bidders as well as for focusing and diversifying multi­
segment bidders. The international involvement dummy, FSTSD, does not have any
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explanatory power for the valuation o f overall multi-segment bidders. However, that 
same variable is negative for focusing and is positive for diversifying multi-segment 
bidders, implying that global diversification might lead to valuation declines in focusing 
multi-segment firms while it might lead to valuation increases in diversifying multi­
segment firms. This observation lends some partial support to Morck and Yeung (1998) 
who find the combination o f industrial and geographic diversification adds to firm value 
in the presence o f intangible assets. The variable that seems statistically significant for 
focusing, but not for overall or diversifying, multi-segment bidders is INSIDER, the 
insider ownership variable. It is positive and statistically significant in years 0 and 1 
suggesting that the monitoring ability o f insiders in focusing multi-segment contributes to 
firm value, like it was in stand-alone firms that continue to invest in their core business. 
The presence of high knowledge-based intangibles, captured by R&D expenditures, 
appears to enhance the valuation o f multi-segment bidders. However, the value 
enhancing peculiarity o f R&D expenditures is primarily pronounced for diversifying 
multi-segment bidders while it appears to lead to valuation declines in focusing multi­
segment firms. Similarly, the presence o f high advertising expenditures (marketing based 
intangibles) appears to enhance the firm value in the same period but, unlike the R&D 
expenditures, the value enhancing effect of marketing based intangibles is pronounced 
only for focusing multi-segment bidders. Furthermore, the valuation of multi-segment 
bidders seem to be influenced by the cash flow generating ability o f their core business in 
years I and 2 and of their non-core business in years 0 and 2. Core cash flows 
significantly, and positively, impact the valuation o f focusing multi-segment bidders in 
years I and 2 while the non-core cash flows appear to be significant in year 0. On the 
other hand, the cash flow generated in the core and the non-core business o f diversifying 
multi-segment bidders contribute significantly to firm value only in year 2. This result 
suggests that diversifying multi-segment bidders might have begun to reap the benefits of 
both core and non-core business segment cash flows 2 years after the acquisition in their 
augmented multinational network42.
[INSERT TABLE 24 HERE ]
42 See Doukas and Travlos (1988).
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Overall, our results show the extent o f international involvement has an adverse 
impact on the valuation o f bidders with the exception o f diversifying multi-segment 
bidders that seem to benefit from pursuing further global and industrial diversification. 
The insider ownership seems to contribute to the valuation of bidders that invest in their 
core business, whether they are single- or multi-segment firms, lending partial support to 
the agency cost theory of diversification. This effect might be explained by the increased 
monitoring ability o f insiders who have better access to firm specific information over 
creditors or institutional stakeholders. The presence o f knowledge based (R&D) and 
marketing based (advertising) intangibles seem to contribute to bidders’ valuation 
lending support to internalization theory o f global diversification. Finally, the cash flows 
o f the bidders seem to dictate their valuation. The cash flow of the core business in 
single-segment bidders, whether they focus or diversify, appears to contribute to firm 
value while focusing multi-segment bidders begin to benefit from the contribution of 
core cash flows after the acquisition. However, the cash flow o f the non-core business 
does not seem to display an enduring effect on firm valuation. This observation casts 
doubt on the contribution o f non-core business segments to firm valuation and might be 
interpreted as one o f the underlying causes o f well documented diversification discount 
in industrially diversified firms.
3.7.Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether the act o f global and industrial 
diversification destroy value when they take place. We find the performance of overseas 
bidders worsens prior to an acquisition. We also confirm the diversification discount 
between stand-alone and industrially diversified bidders. Our findings indicate not only 
the extent o f industrial diversification, but also the extent o f international involvement of 
bidders has significant adverse valuation consequences and our results further 
demonstrate that the act o f global diversification destroys value when it takes place in the 
form o f M&As for domestic bidders. In support o f Morck and Yeung (1998), multi­
segment bidders that diversify into unrelated lines o f business seem to gain from overseas 
acquisitions while single-segment bidders and focusing multi-segment bidders 
experience subsequent valuation declines. The bidders facing the most severe valuation
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losses appear to be the domestic single-segment bidders that conduct diversifying 
overseas acquisitions.
The internal dynamics and the workings o f the internal capital markets around the 
overseas investment decision o f the firm indicate both core and non-core capital 
expenditures o f focusing multi-segment bidders count on their own segment cash flows, 
and diversifying multi-segment bidders exhibit similar behavior to a lesser extent. The 
cross-sectional examination o f bidders’ valuation lend some support to agency theory 
explanation o f diversification by revealing valuation increases in focusing firms with 
high insider ownership and to internalization theory explanation o f global diversification 
with the positive contribution o f R&D and advertising expenditures. The cash flow of the 
core business seems to contribute to firm value of single-segment and focusing multi­
segment bidders while the cash flow o f the non-core business seems to play a trivial role 
on firm valuation suggesting the value losses associated with industrial diversification 
might stem from the inadequate contribution of peripheral (non-core) lines o f business in 
industrially diversified firms. The evidence that both core and non-core cash flows of 
diversifying multi-segment bidders adds to firm value only 2 years after the acquisition 
suggests that they might have begun to harvest the benefits in an expanded multinational 
network as suggested by Doukas and Travlos (1988).
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4. CONCLUSION
In this study we investigate whether the act o f industrial diversification and global 
diversification destroy or enhance value when they take place. In Section 2, we analyze 
the single- and multi-segment U.S. bidders that engage in diversifying and non­
diversifying investments in the form o f domestic acquisitions to examine the impact of 
industrial diversification when it takes place in the form of M&As. Consistent with the 
diversification literature, our results show multi-segment firms that conduct diversifying 
and non-diversifying acquisitions suffer from a substantial discount relative to their 
imputed value and stand-alone firms that undertake similar types o f investments before 
and after the acquisition. Prior to diversification, the valuation o f both single- and multi­
segment bidders weakens and, interestingly, continues to deteriorate after the acquisition. 
This result suggests investing merely in a certain line of business does not lead to 
reversal o f poor performance in neither single- nor multi-segment bidders.
We find the internal capital markets o f multi-segment bidders are active around 
important investment decisions and majority o f capital resources are allocated to business 
segments with higher sales growth and cash flows before and after an acquisition. 
However, the evidence also indicates core business segments in multi-segment firms 
subsidize the capital expenditures o f non-core business segments regardless o f whether 
they operate efficient or inefficient business segments. These findings suggest internal 
capital markets o f bidders are not involved in non-optimal investment strategies but firms 
might still face consequences o f cross-subsidization from core to non-core business 
segments In addition, as diversified firms still retain their relatively inefficient segments 
generating relatively lower cash flows, there appears to be a strain carried by the 
relatively efficient business segments. That might explain why our results should be 
interpreted in line with other studies that address the workings o f internal capital markets 
and the valuation o f firms around disinvestment (divestiture) decision o f firms43. Our 
results lend support to Campa and Kedia (1999), who show firms diversify and refocus 
throughout time from poor industries (higher exit industries) into industries with better
43 See Scharfstein (1998), Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (1999), and Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling 
(2001), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) in addition to Boot (1992), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), 
Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Daley, Vikas and Ranjini (1997), Allen and 
McConnell (1998).
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prospects when benefits exceed costs, in addition to a recent stream of literature that 
examines the impact o f exogenous shocks to industry cash flows on firm valuation44. As 
a final note, our results may help to explain why General Electric is regarded to be one of 
the exceptional performers in the market despite the fact that it is one of the most 
diversified firms and it continues to conduct acquisitions aggressively in every line of 
business it operates in. Like Rajan et. al (2000) argue the success o f GE emanates from 
the business model that looks at business segments independently and that divests 
unprofitable businesses rather than keeping them as deadweight in the corporate 
structure. However, the hesitance o f other diversified firms to divest poor performing 
segments while investing in promising segments does not seem to be a viable solution to 
overcome the discount attributed to diversification.
In Section 3, we analyze the single- and multi-segment U.S. bidders, whether they 
are domestic or multinational firms, that engage in diversifying and non-diversifying 
overseas investments to examine the impact o f both industrial and global diversification 
when they take place in the form of overseas M&As. We find the performance of 
overseas bidders worsens prior to an acquisition. We also confirm the diversification 
discount between stand-alone and industrially diversified bidders. Our findings indicate 
not only the extent o f industrial diversification, but also the extent o f international 
involvement o f bidders has significant adverse valuation consequences and our results 
further demonstrate the act o f global diversification destroys value when it takes place in 
the form o f M&As for domestic bidders. In support o f Morck and Yeung (1998), multi­
segment bidders diversifying into unrelated lines o f business seem to gain from overseas 
acquisitions while single-segment bidders and focusing multi-segment bidders 
experience subsequent valuation declines. The bidders facing the most severe valuation 
losses appear to be the domestic single-segment bidders conducting diversifying overseas 
acquisitions.
The internal dynamics and the workings o f the internal capital markets around the 
overseas investment decision o f the firm indicate both core and non-core capital 
expenditures o f focusing multi-segment bidders count on their own segment cash flows, 
and diversifying multi-segment bidders exhibit similar behavior to a lesser extent. The
44 See Lamont and Polk (2000,2001)
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cross-sectional examination o f bidders’ valuation lend some support to agency theory 
explanation o f diversification by revealing valuation increases in focusing firms with 
high insider ownership and to internalization theory explanation o f global diversification 
with the positive contribution of R&D and advertising expenditures. The cash flow of the 
core business seems to contribute to firm value o f  single-segment and focusing multi­
segment bidders while the cash flow of the non-core business seems to play a trivial role 
on firm valuation suggesting that the value losses associated with industrial 
diversification might stem from the inadequate contribution o f peripheral (non-core) lines 
of business in industrially diversified firms. The evidence that both core and non-core 
cash flows o f diversifying multi-segment bidders adds to firm value only 2 years after the 
acquisition suggests they might have begun to harvest the benefits in an expanded 
multinational network as suggested by Doukas and Travlos (1988).
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Appendix A
Industry Classifications of U.S. Target Firms based on the 2 digit SIC Classification
T he table presents the industry classification o f  target firms based on the 2 d igit SIC code 
classification  o v er the 1991-1997 period. The initial sam ple consists o f  10128 U.S. acquisitions. 
T he sam ple excludes acquisitions o f  b idder firms that m ake overseas acquisitions in the sam e 
calendar year and acquisitions w hich are less than, o r assum ed to be less than, S 5 m illion value. 
A cquisitions in non-m anufacturing industries have also been excluded from  the sam ple such as: 
F inance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-dig it SIC codes from  60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC 
codes from  70 to 89).
Industry Classification of U.S. Target Firms at the 2 Digit SIC Code
2Digit SIC Title and Description o f Industries Number o f
Acquisitions
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 105
Total 105
Divison B: Mining
10 Metal Mining 49
12 Coal Mining 32
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 573




15 Building Construction, Gen Contractors and Oprt 82
Builders
16 Heavy Construction other than Building Const- 43
Contractors
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors 106
Total 231
Division D: Manufacturing
20 Food and Kindred Products 328
21 Tobacco Products 5
22 Textile Mill Products 114
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 113
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 82
25 Furniture and Fixtures 75
26 Paper and Allied Products 142
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 498
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 573
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 41
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 225
31 Leather and Leather Products 27
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 94
33 Primary Metal Products 181
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 257
and Transportation Equipment
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35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
704
36 Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, Except Computer Equipment
610
37 Transportation Equipment 209
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 
Instruments: Photographic; Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks
648




Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
40 Railroad Transportation 43
41 Transit and Passenger Transportation 58
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 141
44 Water Transportation 41
45 Air Transportation 52
46 Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas 24
47 Transportation Services 75
48 Communications 866




Division F: Wholesale Trade
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 771
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 470
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 
and Mobile Home Dealers
41
53 General Merchandise Stores 52
54 Food Stores 122
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 81
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 62
57 Home Furniture, Furnishing, and Equipment 
Stores
105
58 Eating and Drinking Places 197
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Appendix B
Type of U.S. Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on the 2
digit SIC Code
T he table presents the type o f  U.S. acquisitions by the industry classification o f  bidder firm 's core 
business at the 2 d igit SIC code in the year prio r to the acquisition. The initial sam ple consists o f  
10128 U .S. acquisitions. The sam ple excludes acquisitions o f  b idder firms that m ake overseas 
acquisitions in the sam e calendar year and acquisitions w hich are less than, o r assum ed to be less 
than, S 5 m illion value. A cquisitions in non-m anufacturing industries have also been excluded 
from  the sam ple such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), 
and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). W e define acquisitions as “diversifying” w hen the 
2 d ig it SIC code o f  the b idder’s core business does not m atch with that o f  the target firm, and we 
define acquisitions as “focusing” w hen the 2 d ig it SIC  code o f  the b idder’s core business is the 
sam e o f  the target.
Type ofU .S. Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firm s based on the 2 Digit SIC Code
Number
2-Digit SIC Title and Description oflndustries o f Acquisitions
Focusing Diversifying Total
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 35 7 42
Total 35 7 42 42
Division B: Mining
10 Metal Mining 14 4 18
12 Coal Mining 1 - 1
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 236 37 273
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals, 12 II 23
Except Fuels
Total 263 52 315 315
Division C: Construction
15 Building Construction, Gen Contractors and Oprt 30 6 36
Builders
16 Heavy Construction other than Building Const- 7 24 31
Contractors
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors 7 11 18
Total 44 41 85 85
Division D: Manufacturing
20 Food and Kindred Products 120 59 179
21 Tobacco Products 2 - 2
22 Textile Mill Products 44 40 84
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 25 25 50
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 19 22 41
25 Furniture and Fixtures 16 15 31
26 Paper and Allied Products 56 34 90
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 166 63 229
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 207 131 338
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 7 44 51












Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products
Leather and Leather Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products
Primary Metal Products
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery
and Transportation Equipment
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and
Computer Equipment
Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, Except Computer Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 
Instruments: Photo graphic; Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks 



































Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, 
Sanitary Services
40 Railroad Transportation 21 5 26
41 Transit and Passenger Transportation 12 2 14
42 Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 44 20 64
44 Water Transportation 17 14 31
45 Air Transportation 15 5 20
46 Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas 1 9 10
47 Transportation Services 4 3 7
48 Communications 255 22 277
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 140 137 277
Total 509 217 726 726
Division F: Wholesale Trade
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 191 156 347
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 99 93 192
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 4 7 11
53
and Mobile Home Dealers 
General Merchandise Stores 17 13 30
54 Food Stores 34 7 41
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 20 2 22
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 20 12 32
57 Home Furniture, Furnishing, and Equipment 18 7 25
58
Stores
Eating and Drinking Places 82 14 96
59 Miscellaneous Retail 150 64 214
Total 635 375 1010 1010
Division G: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
60 Depository Institutions 8 8
61 Non-Depository Institutions - 7 7
62 Security and Commodity Brokers, - 3 3
63
Dealers, Exchanges and Services 
Insurance Carriers 35 35
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Services - 3 3
65 Real Estate - 12 12
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices - 60 60
68 Unclassified - I I
Total 129 129 129
Division H: Services
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and other 
Lodging Places
- 1 1
72 Personal Services - 13 13
73 Business Services - 132 132
75 Automotive Repair Services and Parking - 1 1
78 Motion Pictures - 7 7
79 Amusement and Recreation Services - 9 9
80 Health Services - 67 67
82 Educational Services - 1 I
87 Engineering, Accounting and Research Services - 32 32
Total 263 263 263
Division It: Services






TOTAL 2994 2253 5247 5247
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Appendix C
Sales-Based Herfindahl Index for Bidder Firms That Make (J.S. Acquisitions
T o ta l
A c q u is itio n s
F o c u s in g
A c q u is i tio n s
IF )
D iv e rs ify in g
A c q u is itio n s
(D )
Y e a r - 2 M u lti S e g m e n t 5021 5 2 1 7 4891
(M ) [ 5 0 1 6 ] [ 5 2 0 0 | [ 4 9 3 8  ]
( n -5 2 2 ) ( n - 2 0 9 ) ( n = 3 l3 )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 9 5 6 2 9 6 1 9 9 4 2 9
(S ) [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0000  |
( n = l 5 l l ) < n= 1064) <n=447)
Y e a r - 1 M u lti S e g m e n t 4 9 0 8 5 0 3 6 4 8 2 3
(M ) [ 5 0 0 2 ] [ 5 0 2 6  | [ 4 9 6 6  ]
(n = 6 5 2 ) (n = 2 6 0 ) (n-=392)
S in g le  S e g m e n t 9621 9 6 9 0 9 4 6 3
(S ) [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0000  ]
(n -1 9 0 0 1 I n = l 3 3 l ) ( n - 5 7 8 )
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S in g le  S e g m e n t 9 4 4 7 9 5 6 9 9 1 7 0
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ln = 2 l9 0 > ( n -1 5 1 8 1 (n = 6 7 2 )
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Appendix D
Industry Classifications of Overseas Target Firms based on the 2 digit SIC Code 
Classification
The table presents the industry classification of overseas target firms based on the 2 digit SIC 
code classification over the 1991-1997 period. The sample consists of 1599 overseas acquisitions. 
The sample excludes acquisitions of bidder firms that make domestic acquisitions in the same 
calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to be less than, $ 5 million value. 
Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded from the sample such as: 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC 
codes from 70 to 89). The geographic diversity of the target firm’s country has been classified as 
"Developed" or "Emerging" in accordance with the emerging market definition of IF C ’s 
Em erging M arkets D ata Base. According to this definition “ A ll stock  markets in developing  
countries a re  considered  to be 'emerging'. D eveloping countries a re  those classified by the 
W orld Bank as e ith er low - o r  m iddle-incom e economies, regardless o f  their particu lar stage o f  
developm ent..".
Industry Classification of Overseas Target Firms at the 2 Digit SIC Code
2Digit SIC Title and Description o f Industries Developed Emerging All TOTAL
Countries Countries Countries
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 9 6 15
Total 9 6 15 15
Divison B: Mining
10 Metal Mining 11 12 23
12 Coal Mining 3 1 4
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 46 32 78
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmtl Minerals, Except 2 3 5
Fuels
Total 62 48 110 110
Division C: Construction
15 Building Construction, Gen Contractors and Oprt 8 - 8
Builders
16 Heavy Construction other than Building Const- 3 - 3
Contractors
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors 9 - 9
Total 20 - 20 20
Division D:: Manufacturing
20 Food and Kindred Products 44 25 69
21 Tobacco Products - 3 3
22 Textile Mill Products 16 5 21
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 8 3 11
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 6 2 8
25 Furniture and Fixtures 5 I 6
26 Paper and Allied Products 30 18 48
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 37 7 44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 110 36 146
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 7 4 11
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 39 4 43
31 Leather and Leather Products 5 - 5
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 18 2 20
33 Primary Metal Products 36 6 42
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 
and Transportation Equipment
45 8 53
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
148 22 170
36 Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment and 
Components, Except Computer Equipment
118 31 149
37 Transportation Equipment 38 10 48
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 
Instruments: Photographic; Medical and Optical 
Goods; Watches and Clocks
79 13 92
39 Miscallenous Manufacturing Industries 16 - 16
Total 805 200 1005 1005
Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas,
and Sanitary Services
40 Railroad Transportation 5 - 5
41 Transit and Passenger Transportation - 1 1
42 Motor Freight Transportation, Warehousing 10 I 11
44 Water Transportation 11 1 12
45 Air Transportation 13 8 21
46 Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas 1 I 2
47 Transportation Services 23 6 29
48 Communications 53 27 80
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 29 17 46
Total 145 62 207 207
Division F: Wholesale Trade
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 91 34 125
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 51 14 65
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 
and Mobile Home Dealers
2 - 2
53 General Merchandise Stores 3 - 3
54 Food Stores 4 2 6
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 5 1 6
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 4 - 4
57 Home Furniture, Furnishing, and Equipment 
Stores
4 “ 4
58 Eating and Drinking Places 9 5 14
59 Miscellaneous Retail 12 I 13
Total 185 57 242 242
TOTAL 1226 373 1599 1599
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Appendix E
Type of Overseas Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on 2 digit 
SIC Code
The table presents the type o f  overseas acquisitions by the industry classification o f  bidder firm's core 
business at the 2 digit SIC code in the year prior to the acquisition. The sample consists o f  1599 overseas 
acquisitions. The sample excludes acquisitions o f bidder firms that make domestic acquisitions in the same 
calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to be less than, S 5 million value. 
Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded from the sample such as: Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 
89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core business does 
not match with that o f the target firm, and we define acquisitions as “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code 
o f  the bidder’s core business is the same o f  the target.
Type of Overseas Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on the 2 Digit SIC Code
Number
2-Digit SIC Title and Description o f Industries o f Acquisitions
Focusing Diversifying Total
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2 3 5
Total 2 3 5 5
Division B: Mining
10 Metal Mining 12 4 16
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 31 5 36
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals, 1 I 2
Except Fuels
Total 44 10 54 54
Division C: Construction
17 Construction-Special Trade Contractors I 2 3
Total 1 2 3 3
Division D: Manufacturing
20 Food and Kindred Products 41 17 58
21 Tobacco Products 1 - 1
22 Textile Mill Products 14 6 20
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 4 2 6
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 2 - 2
25 Furniture and Fixtures 3 8 11
26 Paper and Allied Products 24 12 36
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 20 6 26
• 28 Chemicals and Allied Products 92 51 143
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 10 15 25
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 8 17 25
31 Leather and Leather Products 2 3 5
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 2 2 4
33 Primary Metal Products 8 6 14
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 16 16 32
and Transportation Equipment
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 68 52 120
Computer Equipment
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36 Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment and 66 40 106
Components, Except Computer Equipment
37 Transportation Equipment 27 27 54
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 49 27 76
Instruments: Photo graphic; Medical and Optical
Goods; Watches and Clocks
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 4 9 13
Total 461 316 777 777
Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas,
Sanitary Services
40 Railroad Transportation 4 - 4
42 Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 5 3 8
44 Water Transportation 4 4 8
45 Air Transportation 7 - 7
47 Transportation Services 6 3 9
48 Communications 23 1 24
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 27 4 31
Total 76 15 91 91
Division F: Wholesale Trade
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 29 9 38
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 13 6 19
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, 2 - 2
and Mobile Home Dealers
53 General Merchandise Stores 2 1 3
54 Food Stores I - 1
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores - I 1
58 Eating and Drinking Places 7 - 7
59 Miscellaneous Retail 6 10 16
Total 60 27 87 87
Division G: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
60 Depository Institutions - 4 4
61 Non-Depository Institutions - 3 3
62 Security and Commodity Brokers, - 2 2
Dealers, Exchanges and Services
63 Insurance Carriers - 5 5
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Services - 1 1
- 15 15 15
Division H: Services
73 Business Services - 28 28
78 Motion Pictures - 2 2
80 Health Services - 6 6
87 Engineering, Accounting and Research Services - 4 4
Total - 40 40 40
TOTAL 644 428 1072 1072
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Appendix F
Foreign Sales to Total Sales Ratio and Sales-Based Herfindahl Index 
for Bidder Firms That Make Overseas Acquisitions 
Foreign Sales to Total Sales Ratio (%) for Bidders That Make Foreign Acquisitions
T o ta l F o c u s in g  D iv e rs ify in g
A c q u is itio n s  A c q u is i t io n s  A c q u is itio n s
______________________________ (F )___________________ [D )________
: 4 .4 2  2 3 .7 3  2 5 .0 2
[ 2 2 .1 8 ]  [ 2 3 .7 8 ]  [ 2 1 .8 9 ]
( n - 1 8 0 )  ( n - 8 3 )  ( n - 9 7 )
17 .63  17 .55  17 .80
[ 9 .2 0  ] [ 10 .4 2  ] [ 8 .3 0  ]
( n - 3 2 0 ) ___________________ ( n - 2 2 6 ) _ ______________ ( n - 9 4 ) ______
2 4 .6 2  2 4 .8 8  24 .41
[ 2 0 .3 6 ]  [ 2 1 .7 4 ]  [ 1 9 .1 9 ]
( n = 2 0 l )  ( n - 9 1 ) ( n - 1 1 0 )
19 .92  2 0 .2 2  19 .19
[ 1 1 . 4 5 ]  [ 1 3 . 1 5 ]  [ 9 . 9 7 ]
( n - 3 6 8 ) _ __________________ ( n ° 2 6 2 ) ______________ I n - 106)______
Y e a rO M u lti S e g m e n t 2 5 .6 8 2 6 .5 4 2 4 .9 9
(M ) ( 2 2 .6 4 ] [ 2 4  20] [ 2 0  62]
( n - 2 2 0 ) ( n - 9 9 ) ( n - 1 2 1 )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 2 3 .6 6 2 3 .9 4 2 2 .9 8
(S ) I 18 .75  1 [ 1 9 .6 6  | [ 16 .05  |
(n - 4 0 9 ) ( n —2 8 9 ) ( n - 1 2 0 )
Y e a r  1 M u lti  S e g m e n t 2 8 .4 4 3 0 .1 3 27 .0 2
(M ) [ 2 6 .4 6 ] [ 2 8 .4 2 ] [ 2 3 .8 3 ]
(n = 2 2 1 ) ( n - 1 0 1 ) ( n - 1 2 0 )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 2 7 .4 0 2 8 .3 7 25 .25
(S ) [ 2 4 .9 7  ] [ 2 7 .2 2  ] [ 2 1 .7 6 ]
( n - 4 1 5 ) ( n - 2 8 7 ) ( n - 1 2 8 )
Y e a r  2 M u lti  S e g m e n t 2 7 .5 2 2 7 .0 3 2 7 .8 7
(M ) ( 2 3 .6 4 ] [ 2 3 .6 2 ] [ 2 3 .8 3 ]
(n —184) ( n - 7 8 ) ( n - 1 0 6 )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 2 9 .0 7 2 9 .9 7 26.81
(S ) [ 2 6 .3 6  ] [ 27 .21  ] [ 2 3 .7 4  |
( n - 3 4 1 ) ( n - 2 4 4 ) ( n - 9 7 )
Sales-Based Herfindahl Index for Bidders That Make Foreign Acquisitions
T o ta l F o c u s in g D iv e rs ify in g
A c q u is itio n s A c q u is i tio n s A c q u is itio n s
(F ) (D )
Y e a r - 2 M u lti  S e g m e n t 51 2 4 5 3 1 0 4961
(M ) [ 5 0 0 2 | [ 5 0 0 4 ] [ 4 9 8 9 ]
( n - 1 8 4 ) ( n = 8 6 ) ( n - 9 8 )
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( n - 2 3 4 ) ( n - 1 0 9 ) ( n - 1 2 5 )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 9 5 0 6 9 4 7 6 9 5 7 8
(S ) [ 1 0 0 0 0 1 [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0 0 0 0 ]
(n = 4 4 0 ) f n - 3 1 0 ) ( n - 1 3 0 )
Y e a r  1 M u lt i  S e g m e n t 4 9 3 8 5 1 1 2 4 7 8 2
(M) [ 5 0 0 2 ] [ 5 0 5 0  ] [ 4 8 6 5 ]
(n = 2 3 5 ) ( n = l l l ) ( n - 1 2 4 )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 9141 9 0 6 6 9 3 1 7
(S ) [ 1 0 0 0 0 1 [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0 0 0 0 ]
( t t - 4 5 6 ) (n = 3 1 9 ) ( n - 1 3 7 )
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( n - 1 8 9 ) (n = 8 4 ) (n = 1 0 5 )
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( S ) [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 1 0 0 0 0 ] [ 10000  |
(n = 3 6 7 ) (n —2 6 3 ) ( n - 1 0 4 )
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(M )
S in g le  S e g m e n t 
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Table 1
Number and Frequency of U.S. Acquisitions by U.S. Bidders per Year
The table presents the number and frequency o f  10128 U.S. completed acquisition announcements 
reported in the M&A Journal and confirmed by the Wall Street Journal over the 1991-1997 
period. The sample excludes acquisitions o f  bidder firms that make overseas acquisitions in the 
sam e calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to be less than, S S million 
value. Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded from the sample such 
as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit 
SIC codes from 70 to 89). An acquisition is defined as ‘'‘diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code o f 
the bidder’s core business does not match with that o f  the target firm, and as "focusing" when the 2 
digit SIC code o f  the bidder’s core business is the same o f  the target. Acquisitions that were 
reported in the M &A Journal but for which Compustat data was not available have been identified 
as "other".
Number and Frequency Distribution o f U.S. Acquisitions by Year





























































Sample Description of U.S. Acquisitions by Year
The table presents the final number o f U.S. acquisitions that are included in the sample. The initial sample consists o f 10128 U.S. acquisitions. The sample 
excludes acquisitions o f bidder firms that make overseas acquisitions in the same calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to be less than, 
$ 5 million value. Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded from the sample such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit 
SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). An acquisition is defined as "diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s
Sample Description o f 11 .S. Acquisitions by Year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1991-1997
Number o f  U.S. acquisitions for which we found the merger announcement in 
the M&A Journal and confirmed with The Wall Street Journal.
760 848 1361 1500 1788 1880 1991 10128
Number o f U.S. acquisitions for which the bidder data was not available in 
COMPUSTAT.
389 395 731 748 942 879 797 4881
Number o f  U.S. acquisitions made by bidder firms whose core business is in 
non-manufacturing industries such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2- 
digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89).
18 22 40 66 58 98 91 393
Number of dual U.S. acquisitions in core and non-core lines o f business by 
bidders on the same calendar years.
47 50 98 104 140 166 240 845
Number o f additional U.S. acquisitions made by the bidder in core or non-core 
lines o f business on the same calendar year.
47 49 89 101 147 169 227 829
Number o f U.S. ftrm-year acquisitions included in the final sample 259 332 403 481 501 568 636 3180
Number and frequency o f focusing acquisitions in the final sample 155 168 248 300 308 377 409 1965
59.85% 50.60% 61.54% 62.37% 61.48% 66.37% 64.31% 61.79%
Number and frequency o f  diversifying acquisitions in the final sample 104 164 155 181 193 191 227 1215
40.15% 49.40% 38.46% 37.63% 38.52% 33.63% 35.69% 38.21%
Table 3
Type o f U.S. Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on 2 digit SIC 
Code
The table presents the type o f  U.S. firm-year acquisitions by the industry classification o f  bidder 
firm's core business at the 2 digit SIC code in the year prior to the acquisition. The sample consists 
o f  3180 U.S. firm-year acquisitions. The sample excludes acquisitions o f  bidder firms that make 
overseas acquisitions in the same calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to 
be less than, $ 5 million value. Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been 
excluded from the sample such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 
to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying" 
when the 2 digit SIC code o f  the bidder’s core business does not match with that o f  the target firm, 
and we define acquisitions as Mfocusing” when the 2 digit SIC code o f  the bidder’s core business is 
the same o f  the target.______________________________________________________________________
Type of U.S. Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on the 2 Digit SIC Code
2-Digit SIC Title and Description of Industries
Number 
of Acquisitions 
Focusing Diversifying Total TOTAL
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing









10 Metal Mining 12 3 15
12 Coal Mining 1 - I
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 155 21 176
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals, 3 4 7
Except Fuels 
Total 171 28 199 199
Division C: Construction
13 Building Construction, Gen Contractors and 23 6 29
16
Oprt Builders
Heavy Construction other than Building 5 13 18
17
Const-Contractors
Construction-Special Trade Contractors 5 8 13




Food and Kindred Products 75 30 105
21 Tobacco Products 2 - 2
22 Textile Mill Products 29 23 52
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 16 21 37
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except 11 15 26
25
Furniture
Furniture and Fixtures 11 8 19
26 Paper and Allied Products 39 22 61
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 104 37 141
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 151 86 237
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29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 6 32 38
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 33 38 71
31 Leather and Leather Products 6 2 8
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 10 21 31
33 Primary Metal Products 42 41 83
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except 
Machinery and Transportation Equipment
28 61 89
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment
155 136 291
36 Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment 
and
Components, Except Computer Equipment
137 89 226
37 Transportation Equipment 42 64 106
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 
Instruments: Photo graphic; Medical and 
Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks
151 74 225
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 30 13 43
Total 1078 813 1891
Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, Sanitary Services
40 Railroad Transportation 14 4 18
41 Transit and Passenger Transportation 5 2 7
42 Motor Freight Transportation and 
Warehousing
26 11 37
44 Water Transportation 10 10 20
45 Air Transportation 14 5 19
46 Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas - 6 6
47 Transportation Services 4 3 7
48 Communications 158 17 175
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 85 86 171
Total 316 144 460
Division F: Wholesale Trade
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 90 79 169
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 55 52 107
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden 
Supply, and Mobile Home Dealers
1 4 5
53 General Merchandise Stores 14 10 24
54 Food Stores 29 5 34
55 Automotive Dealers, Gas Service Stations 12 2 14
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 17 12 29
57 Home Furniture, Furnishing, and 
Equipment Stores
14 6 20
58 Eating and Drinking Places 66 7 73
59 Miscellaneous Retail 59 23 82
Total 357 200 557 557
TOTAL 1965 1215 3180 3180
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Table 4
Summary Statistics of Bidder Firms and U.S. Acquisitions
The table presents the summary statistics for bidder firms that made acquisitions in the U.S. over the 
1991-1997 period. The sample consists o f 3180 firm-year acquisitions and includes all acquisitions which 
are of, or assumed to be of, S 5 million value or higher. The sample does not cover bidder and target firms 
which are in non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 
60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We combine the value o f acquisitions for bidder 
firms that made more than one acquisition in a calendar year and count it as one acquisition-year 
observation. Total Sales is defined as the gross sales o f the bidder firm net o f  sales discounts in million S. 
Foreign/Total Sales is the percentage o f foreign sales o f the bidder firm divided by net sales. Market Value 
is defined as the number o f  shares multiplied by the average stock price o f the bidder firm in million S. 
Total Assets is defined as current assets plus net property, plant, and equipment plus other noncurrent 
assets o f the bidder firm in million S. Debt/Total Capital is percentage o f total debt divided by invested 
capital. Number o f Segments is the number of distinct lines of business the bidder firm is operating at the 
2 digit SIC code level. Number o f Acquisitions is the total number of acquisitions completed by the bidder 
firm in the year o f the acquisition. Insider ownership and institutional ownership are the average number 
o f shares held by insiders and held by institutions divided by the average number of shares outstanding for 
the bidder firm respectively. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation 
value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets o f the bidder 
firm. All values refer to the year prior to the acquisition unless otherwise noted above.
Summary Statistics and Sample Characteristics
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Total Sales (million S) 2749 1,845.20 276.58 10.00 123.276.20
Foreign/Total Sales (%) 2780 7.86 0.00 0.00 95.23
Market Value (million S) 2626 1,622.97 231.93 10.02 99,981.00
Total Assets (million S) 2788 1,879.40 230.72 10.04 184,325.50
Debt/Total Capital (%) 2999 39.25 37.73 0.00 94.93
Number o f Segments 3180 1.45 1.00 1.00 7.00
Number o f Acquisitions/year 3180 1.26 1.00 1.00 13.00
Size o f Acquisition(s) (million S) 1631 248.13 42.50 5.00 21,350.00
Insider Ownership (%) 2788 20.37 12.83 0.00 89.00
Institutional Ownership (%) 2714 38.72 39.70 0.00 89.96
Tobin's Q 2570 1.349 1.017 0.10 9.68


















Pre-Acquisition Valuation Measures of Bidder Firms
The table presents the pre-acquisition raw and industry-adjusted (percentage valuation premium/discount) valuation measures o f bidder firms that made 
acquisitions only in U.S. The sample consists o f 3180 U.S. firm-acquisitions over the 1991-97 period. The sample includes all acquisitions which are of, or 
assumed to be of, $ 3 million value or higher. The sample does not cover target firms in non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2- 
digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code of the 
bidder’s core business does not match with that o f  the target firm, and we define acquisitions as “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core 
business is the same of the target. The numbers in cells are the means, the numbers in [ ] brackets arc the medians, and the numbers in parentheses are the 
number o f observations. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long 
term debt divided by total assets. Excess Market Value (EMV) is defined as the market value o f equity less book value o f  equity normalized by total sales. 
Industry-adjusted valuation measures are computed using the methodology o f Berger and Ofck (1995); namely the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f raw 
valuation measure to their imputed value. Imputed performance measures are computed by multiplying the weights o f different business segments with the 
median value o f the performance measures for stand alone firms that are in the same 2 digit SIC code industry and that have size within 50% and 200% o f the 
size o f the bidding firm's business segment. Year 0 is the year o f acquisition. The significance of means difference is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non- 
parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference o f  medians. ♦**, **, and * denote statistical significance for difference o f groups at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Pre-Acquisition Tobin's Q for Bidder Firms That Make U.S. Acquisitions
Kan Tobin's Q Industry Adjusted Tobia'tQ
T otal F ocusing D iversify ing F m ean-D m ean p-valuc T o ta l Focusing D iversify ing Fm ean-D m ean p-value
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Cross Sectional Logistic Regressions Relating Firm Characteristics to Type of Acquisitions
T h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b le  in  th e  lo g i s t i c  r e g r e s s io n  i s  th e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  d u m m y  ta k in g  o n  v a lu e  o r  o n e  i f  th e  b i d d e r  m a k e s  a  d i v e r s i f y i n g  a c q u i s i t io n ,  a n d  a  v a l u e  o f  z e r o  i f  it m a k e s  a  f o c u s in g  a c q u i s i t io n .  T h e  
s a m p le  in c lu d e s  3 1 8 0  f i rm  y e a r  a c q u i s i t io n s .  T h e  s i z e  o f  th e  f i r m ,  l .N ( S A L E S )  i s  th e  n a tu r a l  l o g a r i th m  o f  a n n u a l  s a le s .  T o b i n 's  Q  is  c o m p u t e d  a s  m a r k e t  v a lu e  o f  o u t s t a n d in g  s h a r e s  p l u s  l iq u id a t io n  v a lu e  o f  
p r e f e r r e d  s to c k  p l u s  n e t  c u r r e n t  a s s e t s  p l u s  lo n g  t e r m  d e b t  d iv id e d  b y  to ta l  a s s e t s  o f  th e  b id d e r  f i lm . E x c e s s  M a r k e t  V a lu e  ( E M V )  is  th e  m a r k e t  v a lu e  o f  e q u i t y  l e s s  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  e q u i ty  n o r m a l iz e d  b y  to ta l  s a le s .  
I M P U T E D Q  a n d  I M P U T E D E M V  a r c  t h e  th e o r e t i c a l  im p u te d  v a l u e s  o f  T o b i n 's  Q  a n d  E M V , r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  f o r  th e  b id d e r  i f  i t  w e r e  d e c o m p o s e d  in to  i t s  b u s i n e s s  s e g m e n ts  b a s e d  o n  s a le s  m u l t ip le s  o f  b u s in e s s  
s e g m e n t s  a t  2  d ig i t  S I C  le v e l .  I N D A D J Q  a n d  I N D A D J E M V  a r c  th e  i n d u s t r y - a d ju s te d  T o b i n 's  Q  a n d  E M V  o f  th e  b id d e r s ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  D E B T  is  th e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  to ta l  d e b t  d iv id e d  b y  in v e s te d  c a p i t a l .  I N S ID E R  
a n d  I N S T I T U T E  a r e  th e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  s h a r e s  h e ld  b y  in s id e r s  a n d  in s t i t u t i o n s  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  R D E X P  a n d  A D V E X P  a r e  th e  R & D  a n d  a d v e r t i s in g  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  th e  b id d e r  n o im a l iz c d  b y  to ta l  s a le s .  C C F  a n d  
N C C F  a r e  th e  c a s h  f lo w s  o f  t h e  c o r e  a n d  n o n - c o r e  b u s in e s s  s e g m e n t s  o f  th e  b id d e r s  n o r m a l iz e d  b y  s e g m e n t  s a le s  f ro m  o n e  y e a r  b e f o re .  T h e  c a s h  f lo w s  a r c  c o m p u t e d  a s  o p e r a t in g  i n c o m e  p lu s  d e p r e c ia t io n .  
C A S I I D  a n d  S T O C K D  a r c  th e  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e s  t a k in g  o n  v a lu e  o f  o n e  i f  th e  p a y m e n t  w a s  m a d e  in  c a s h  o r  s to c k  r e s p e c t i v e ly ,  a n d  z e r o  o th e r w is e .  F o r  p a y m e n t s  m a d e  in  b o th  c a s h  a n d  s to c k ,  C A S H D  a n d  
S T O C K D  ta k e  o n  v a lu e  o f  o n e .  D I V E S T D  i s  a  d u m m y  v a r ia b le  t a k i n g  o n  a  v a l u e  o f  o n e  i f  th e  t a r g e t  w a s  d i v e s te d  b y  i t s  p a r e n t ,  a n d  z e r o  o th e r w is e .  A l l  v a l u e s  a r c  f ro m  o n e  y e a r  b e f o r e  th e  a c q u i s i t io n ,  t - v a lu c s  
a r e  s t a te d  in  p a r e n th e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s io n s  c o n t a i n  c a l e n d a r  y e a r  d u m m ie s .  " ,  a n d  * d e n o t e  s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  a t  1 % , 3 %  a n d  1 0 %  l e v e l s  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
P a n e l  A :  C r o s s  S e c t i o n a l  L o g i s t i c  R e g r e s s i o n s  R e l a t i n g  F i r m  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  l o  T y p e  o f  A c q u i s i t i o n s  f o r  S i n g l e - S e g m e n t  F i r m s
la d e p e a d e n l  V a r ia b le s (1 ) (2 ) <3> (4 ) (S ) <*> <7>
C onstan t 0 .344 0 3 1 5 0 3 8 9 0.321 0  326 0.413 0.381
(6 .7 3 7 )* ” (6  194)*** (7 .1 7 1 )* * * <5 9 7 7 )*** (6  4 4 6 )” * < 7 .051)*** (6 .529 )***
L N (S A L E S ) 0 .0 0 6 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 4 0.014
(0 .9 6 6 ) (1 110) (1 4 7 7 ) (0 9 4 0 ) (0  566) ( 2 .1 0 8 ) " (2 .1 1 2 )”
IM P U T E D Q - 0 0 3 9 4 )0 4 8
( -2 .9 9 9 )* ” (-3  6 4 6 )“ *
IN D A D JQ 0.023 0  0 20
(1 .336 ) (1 .354 )
IM P U T E D E M V 4 ) 0 3 6 4 )0 4 3
(-3  225 )*** (-3 .793 )***
IN D A D JE M V 0 0 1 4 0.012
(I  684)* (1 .370)
D E B T 4 )0 0 1 4 )001 4 )001
(-3  204 )*** (-3 .3 5 6 )* ” (-3 .0 9 6 )* ”
IN S ID E R 4)0 0 1 4 )0 1 0 4 )0 0 1
(-1 .781)* ( I  835)* (-1 .959)*
IN S T IT U T E 4 )001 41001 4 )001
(-2  7 3 5 ) " * ( - 2 .3 4 2 ) " (-2 .319 )**
R D E X P 0  252 0 2 8 6 0.287
(2  3 2 4 )” (2  6 0 1 ) " * (2  6 1 1 ) * "
A D V E X P -0  733 4 )5 9 7 4 )6 6 5
(-1 4 2 2 ) ( I  161) (-1 .294 )
C C F 41024 4 )0 0 8 -0 0 0 4
(4 )6 0 8 ) (4 )  199) ( 4 )0 9 5 )
C A S IID 4 )0 7 2 4 ) 0 6 9 4 )0 6 3 4 )0 7 0 4 )0 6 9 4 )0 6 8 4 )0 6 5
( - 3 .7 9 6 ) " * (-3 .6 2 2 )* * * (-3  4 48 )*** (-3 .693 )*** ( - 3 .6 2 7 ) " * (-3 .598)*** (-3 .414 )***
S T O C K D •0 0 2 8 4 ) 0 2 6 4 )0 3 4 4 )031 4 )0 2 8 4 )0 3 8 4 )0 3 5
(-1 .265 ) ( -1 .2 0 1 ) (-1 5 6 8 ) ( -1 4 2 1 ) (-1 266) (-1 .723)* (-1 .6 0 9 )
D IV E S T D 4 )0 0 9 4)18)9 4 )0 0 8 4 ) 0 1 0 -0 0 1 1 41(8)3 4 )0 0 3
( 4 )4 1 4 ) ( 4 )3 8 9 ) ( -0 3 5 7 ) ( 4 )4 3 7 ) ( 4 )4 8 2 ) (4 )  150) ( 4 )1 3 3 )
L ike lihood  ra tio  tes t sta tistic 4 . 2 7 1 * " 4 .4 8 9 " * 4 .1 5 2 * * * 3 .6 6 7 * ” 3 34 6 * ” 4 .4 1 6 * ” 4 .4 9 9 * ”
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Post-Acquisition Valuation Measures of Bidder Firms
The table presents the post-acquisition raw and industry-adjusted (percentage valuation premium/discount) valuation measures o f bidder firms that made 
acquisitions only in U.S. The sample consists o f  3180 U.S. firm-acquisitions over the 1991-97 period. The sample includes all acquisitions which are of, or 
assumed to be of, $ 3 million value or higher. The sample does not cover target firms in non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2- 
digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code o f  the 
bidder's core business does not match with that o f the target firm, and we define acquisitions as “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core 
business is the same o f the target. The numbers in cells arc the means, the numbers in [ ] brackets are the medians, and the numbers in parentheses are the 
number of observations. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long 
term debt divided by total assets. Excess Market Value (EMV) is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. 
Industry-adjusted valuation measures are computed using the methodology o f Berger and Ofek (1993); namely the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f raw 
valuation measures to their imputed value. Imputed industry adjusted performance measures are computed by multiplying the weights o f different business 
segments with the median value o f the performance measures for stand alone firms that arc in the same 2 digit SIC code industry and that have size within 
30% and 200% o f the size o f the bidding firm's business segment. Year 0 is the year o f  acquisition. The significance o f  means difference is computed by one­
way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference of medians. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance for difference 
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Table 8
Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Changes in Post-Acquisition Valuation Measures to Effects of Diversification
The dependent variables in the cross sectional regressions are the change in valuation measures or the domestic bidders from the end of year -  I till the end of years 1,2, and 3. The sample includes 3180 
firm-year acquisitions. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets of the 
bidder firm. Excess Market Value (EMV) is computed as the market value of equity less the book value of equity normalized by total sales for the bidders. Industry-adjustment is made by using the 
methodology of Berger and Ofek (1993). The raw dependent variables arc normalized by the pre-acquisition average of valuation measures. The constant term captures the effect of diversification on 
multi-segment firms that made focusing acquisitions. MULTIDIVERD is a dummy variable taking on the value of one if a multi-segment bidder made a diversifying acquisition, and zero otherwise. 
SINGLEFOCUSD is a dummy variable taking on the vulue of one if a single-segment bidder made a focusing acquisition, and zero otherwise. SINGLEDIVERD is a dummy variable taking on the value 
of one if a single-segment bidder made a diversifying acquisition, and zero otherwise, t-values for independent variables and p-valuc for the models are stated in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 3% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Post-Acqulsltion Changes In Raw Valuation Measures to Effects of Diversification
D c n e a d e n t  V a r i a b l e s C o n s t a n t M U L T ID I V F J R I ) S I .N G L E F O C I J S D S IN G L E D I V E R D
F -V a lu e  
p - v a lu e
R ’
A d i- K '
A Q f - l t o + I V A V G Q .^ , , , 0 .1 9 6 -0 .061 -0  0 91 -0 .0 4 4 1.373 0 .001
(4 .1 4 2 )* * * ( -0  9 9 6 ) ( 1 .7 7 5 ) * ( -0 .7 8 5 ) (0 .2 4 9 ) 0 .0 0 0
A  ( M - l l o ^ y A V G Q , 0 .2 3 5 -0 .0 8 2 -0 .1 0 9 -0 .0 7 6 2 .2 1 9 * 0 .0 0 2
(5 .9 0 2 )* * * (-1 .5 9 9 ) ( -2  5 1 7 )* * ( -1 .6 3 2 ) (0 .0 8 4 ) 0 .001
A Q ( - l t o O V A V O Q ,w „ 0 .3 2 4 - 0 .1 1 9 -0  147 •0 .1 3 3 3 .5 3 7 * * 0 .0 0 3
(7 .7 3 8 > * » * (-2 .2 0 9 )* * ( -3 .2 3 8  ) • • • (-2 .7 0 7 )* * * (0 .0 1 4 ) 0 .0 0 2
A  E M V  <■ 1 t o t  1)/(1 + A  V G E M V , w  „ ) 0 .0 9 7 -0 .0 2 2 -0 .0 6 2 -0 .0 5 5 1.868 0 .0 0 2
(3 .4 1 3 )* * * ( - 0 5 9 3 ) (-2 .0 0 3 )* * ( -1 .6 4 5 )* ( 0 .1 3 3 ) 0 .001
A  E M V  ( - l to * 2 ) /< l+ A V G E M V , w „ ) 0 .1 1 8 -0  041 -0 .0 6 7 •0.081 2 .9 2 6 * * 0 .0 0 3
(4 .6 5 7 )* * * (-1 .2 6 6 ) ( -2 .4 4 7 )* * (-2 .7 4 1 )* * * (0 .0 3 3 ) 0 .0 0 2
A  E M V ( - l lo * 3 ) / ( l+ A V G E M V , ^ „ ) 0 .1 4 8 - 0 .0 4 0 -0 0 6 1 - 0 .0 9 0 3 .2 2 8 * * 0 .0 0 3
(5 .6 9 2 )* * * (-1 -1 9 1 ) ( -2 .1 6 0 )* * (-2 .9 4 3 )* * * (0 .0 2 2 ) 0 .0 0 2
Panel B; Crow Sectional R e g r e s s i o n s  Relating Post-Acqulsltion Changes In Industry-Adlusted Valuation Measures lo Effects of Diversification
D e p e n d e n t  V a r ia b le s C o n s t a n t M U L T I D I V E R D S I N G L E F O C U S D S IN G L E D I V E R D
F -V a lu e
p - v a lu e
R*
A d i - R '
A I N D A D J Q ( - l l o * | ) 0 .0 0 2 - 0  0 4 5 -0 .0 6 8 -0 .0 9 2 1.948 0 .0 0 2
( 0 0 6 9 ) ( -1 .0 3 2 ) ( -1 .8 4 6 )* ( -2 .3 0 0 )* * (0 .1 2 0 ) 0 .001
A  I N D A D J Q ( - l lo + 2 ) •0 .001 -0 .0 6 5 - 0  0 6 8 -0  118 3 .3 4 7 * * 0 .0 0 3
( -0 .0 3 5 ) (-1  5 3 4 ) ( -1 .9 1 8 )* ( -3 .0 5 7 )* * * (0 .0 1 8 ) 0 .0 0 2
A I N D A D J Q ( - l l o J 3 ) - 0 .0 0 6 - 0  0 4 4 -0 .0 6 4 -0 .0 8 5 2 .0 7 6 0 .0 0 2
( -0 .2 1 5 ) ( I  137) (-1 .9 4 6 )* ( -2 .3 9 4 )* * ( 0 .1 0 1 ) 0 .001
A IN D A D J E M V  ( - l l . n l ) - 0 .0 4 8 -0 .0 2 0 -0 .1 0 3 •0 .1 4 4 2 2 2 6 * 0 .0 0 2
( - 0  8 0 5 ) ( - 0 2 5 7 ) ( -1 .5 8 5 ) ( -2 .0 4 3 )* * ( 0 .0 8 3 ) 0 .001
A  IN D A D J E M V  ( - l to + 2 ) - 0 .0 8 8 -0 .0 2 8 -0  0 4 9 -0  123 1.597 0.002
( -1 .5 1 3 ) ( -0 .3 7 8 ) ( -0 .7 7 4 ) ( -1 .8 0 2 )* (0 .1 8 8 ) 0 .001
A  IN D A D J E M V  ( - l to + 3 > - 0 0 9 2 0 .0 0 0 •0 .0 9 7 ■0.152 3 .6 0 0 * * 0 .0 0 3


















Pre-Acquisition Univariate Analysis of Bidders' Core and Non-Core Business Performance
T h e  U tblc p r e s e n t s  th e  m e a n s  ( m e d ia n s )  o f  th e  c o r e  a n d  n o n - c o r e  b u s i n e s s  p e r f o r m a n c e  m e a s u r e s  a t  th e  s e g m e n t  le v e l  o f  b i d d e r  f i r m s  th a t  m a d e  d o m e s t i c  a c q u i s i t i o n s  o v e r  th e  1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 7  p e r io d .  Y e a r  t  i s  th e  
y e a r  o f  th e  a c q u i s i t io n .  T h e  s a m p le  in c l u d e s  a l l  a c q u i s i t i o n s  w h ic h  a r e  o f ,  o r  a s s u m e d  to  b e  o f ,  S  5  m i l l io n  v a lu e  o r  h ig h e r .  T h e  s a m p le  d o e s  n o t  i n c lu d e  b id d e r  a n d  t a r g e t  f i r m s  in  n o n - m a n u f a c tu r in g  in d u s t r ie s  
s u c h  a s  F in a n c e ,  I n s u r a n c e  a n d  R e a l  E s t a t e  ( 2 - d ig i t  S I C  c o d e s  f r o m  6 0  t o  6 7 ) ,  a n d  S e r v i c e s  ( 2 - d i g i t  S I C  c o d e s  f ro m  7 0  to  8 9 ) .  T h e  s a m p le  a l s o  d o c s  n o t  c o v e r  b i d d e r  f i r m s  th a t  m a d e  b o t h  "diversifying*  a n d  
"focusing"  a c q u i s i t io n s  in  th e  s a m e  c a l e n d a r  y e a r .  W e  d e f in e  a c q u i s i t i o n s  o s  "diversifying"  w h e n  t h e  2  d i g i t  S I C  c o d e  o f  th e  b i d d e r ’s  c o r e  b u s i n e s s  d o c s  n o t  m a t c h  w i lh  th a t  o f  th e  t a r g e t  f i r m ,  a n d  "focusing"  
w h e n  th e  2  d ig i l  S I C  c o d e  o f  th e  b i d d e r 's  c o r e  b u s i n e s s  i s  th e  s a m e  o f  t h e  ta r g e t .  W e  c o m b i n e  th e  v a l u e  o f  a c q u i s i t io n s  f o r  b i d d e r  f i r m s  t h a t  m a d e  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  a c q u i s i t io n  in  a  c a l e n d a r  y e a r  a n d  c o u n t  i t  a s  o n e  
a c q u i s i t i o n - y e a r  o b s e r v a t io n .  C a s h  F lo w  is  d e f i n e d  a s  o p e r a t i n g  i n c o m e  p l u s  d e p r e c ia t io n .  T h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  m e a n s  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  c o m p u t e d  b y  o n e - w a y  A N O V A . N o n - p a r a m c t r i c  W i lc o x o n  R a n k - S u m  te s t  is  
u s e d  to  t e s t  f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  m e d ia n s .  • • * ,  • • ,  a n d  * d e n o t e  s t a t i s t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  g r o u p s  a t  l*/«, 5 %  a n d  1 0 %  le v e l s  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
Panel A. Pre-Acquisition Sales for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Multi Segment 19.656 19007 0.619*** 0000 19616 19078 0538*** 0001 0 040 0.815 •0.071 0.690
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Multi Segment 20043 19257 0 786*** 0000 19910 19377 0533*** 0000 0133 0.327 -0120 0419
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Panel B. Pre-Acquisition Assets for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
F ocusing  A cqu is itions 
F ocusing  F ocusing 
C o re  N on-C ore  D iffe ren ce  p -valuc  
( F C  ) ( F N C  1 ( F C -F N C  )
D ivcreify ing  A cquisitions 
D iversify ing  D iversify ing
C o re  N on-C ore  D ifference  p-valuc 
t l ) C  ) ( D N C  ) ( D C -D N C  )
| C o re  
D iffe rence  p-value 
( F C - D C )
N n n C o re
D iffe rence  p -value 
1 F N C - I 3 N C )
ln ( A u c u ) t-2  M ulti S egm en t 19.444 18 869  O S ? } ’ ** 0 0 0 }  
(M )  [1 9 .4 * 9 1  1 1 9 .0 0 8 )  | 0 4 6 l * * * )  0 0 0 6  
( n -2 0 9 )  ( n - 198)
S ing le  S egm en t 18.596 
(S )  [ 1 8 .5 8 9 )
( n -1 0 7 6 )
M  S  p -v a lu e  0  8 4 8 * * *  0 .0 0 0  
[M  SI p -v a lu e  I 0 .8 8 0 * * *  1 0 .0 0 0
1 9 3 7 8  1 9051  0 3 2 7 * *  0 (M 8  
| I 9 4 5 7 |  |  1 9 0 9 6 |  1 0 .361**  ] 0 0 4 9  
( n -3 1 4 )  (n -3 0 5 )
18 463  
I 18 361 )
( n -4 4 9 )
0 9 1 5 * * *  0  0 00  
1 1.096*** 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 6 6  0 .702  
[ 0 0 1 2 ]  0 .865
0.133  0 .268  
[ 0 2 2 8 ]  0.183
-0 .182  0 .326  
|  4) 0 8 8  ) 0 .325
ln [A ssc ts)t-l M u lti S eg m en t 19 .628 18 945  0  6 8 3 * * *  0  000  
(M )  |  19.625 |  [ 18 9 98  |  |  0  6 2 7 * * *  ) 0 0 0 0  
( n -2 6 0 )  (n -2 5 8 )
S ing le  S egm en t 18.797 
(S )  [  18 754  )
( n - l 3 44 )
M -S  p -v a lu e  0 .8 3 1 * * *  0 0 0 0  
IM -S I p -valuc  1 0 .8 7 1 * * *  1 0 0 0 0
1 9 4 6 3  19.183 0  280* 0 0 5 7  
|  19 613  |  |  19 144 |  [ 0  469**  ] 0 0 4 2  
( n -3 9 2 )  ( n -3 9 2 )
1 8 6 0 9  
( 18 543 )
( n —585)
0  854***  0 .0 0 0  
1 .070*** 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 6 5  0 .289  
[ 0  012  0 .455
0 .188*  0 .060  
1 0 .2 1 1 * * ]  0 .044
-0 .238  0 .155  
[ 4 ) 1 4 6 )  0  217
In lA sse tsg  M ulti S egm en t 19.914 19 214  0 .7 0 0 * * *  0 .0 0 0  
( M )  1 1 9 .9 0 3 )  |  19 3 1 1 )  | 0  5 9 2 * * * ) 0 0 0 0  
( n -2 9 6 )  (n -2 8 8 )
S ing le  S egm en t 19.122 
(S )  |  19.095 )
( n -1 5 2 6 )
M -S  p -va luc  0 .7 9 2 * * *  0 .0 0 0  
IM -S | p -value  1 0 .8 0 8 * * * 1 0 .0 0 0
19 6 5 0  19.396 0 .254*  0  0 60  
|  19 744 |  |  1 9 4 1 9 )  |  0 .3 2 5 —  |  0 0 4 9  
( n -4 4 1 )  ( n -4 2 7 )
18 8 36  18.372 0  464*  0  080  
|  18.817 ] |  18.277 ) [ 0 .S 40**  ) 0  015  
( n -6 6 7 )  (n -9 8 )
0 8 1 4 * * *  0 0 0 0  1 .024*** 0 0 0 0  
0 .9 2 7 * * *  1 0 .0 0 0  I 1 I 4 2 * * * ) 0 0 0 0
0 2 6 4 *  0 0 5 9  
( 0 .1 5 9 )  0 .117
0 .286***  0 0 0 1  
[ 0  278***  ] 0.001
4 ) .I8 2  0 .248  
[ -0 .108  ) 0.321
Panel C. Pre-Acquisition Growth in Sales for the
Focusing  A cqu is itions
F ocusing  F ocusing 
C o re  N on-C on : D iffe ren ce  p-value 
( F C  ) I F N C  ) ( F C -F N C  )
Core and Non-Core Business Segment of tl
D iversify ing  A cquisitions
D iversify ing  D ivereify ing
C ure  N o n -C o re  D ifference  p -value 
( D C  ) ( D N C  ) ( D C -D N C  )
ne Bidder
|  C o re  
D iffe rence  p-valuc 
( F C -D C  )
N on-C ore
D iffe rence  p-value 
( F N C -D N C  I
S ales t- l/S a le s t-2  M ulti S egm en t 1.205 1 .300 -0  0 9 5  0  241 
(M )  [ 1 .0 8 3 ]  ( 1 .1 0 9 )  | - 0 0 2 6 ]  0  791 
( n -2 0 6 )  ( n - l 96 )
S ing le  S egm ent 1.317 
( S )  1 1 -172)
(n —1039)
M -S  p -va lue  -O .l 12** 0 0 2 7  
[M -S ] p -va lue  1 -O 0 8 9 * * *  ] 0 .0 0 0
1.180 1.259 4 )0 7 9  0  140 
| I  063  ) | I  0 7 5 )  1 4 )  012  |  0  323 
( n - 3 l l )  ( n -2 9 5 )
1.287
1 1 1 5 2 )
( n -4 3 7 )
•O .I07*** 0 .007  
1 4 )0 8 9 * * *  10  000
0  025  0  643 
|  0 .020**  ) 0.035
0 .0 3 0  0  380  
( 0  0 20  |  0 .132
0.041 0 .6 0 9  
1 0 .0 3 4 )  0 .219
Salcv l/S alcs l- l  M u lti S eg m en t 1.325 1.283 0  0 4 2  0  4 86  
(M )  | 1 .1 3 4 )  | I . I 0 7 )  1 0  0 2 7 * * )  0  022  
( n -2 5 9 )  ( n -2 4 6 )
S ing le  S egm en t 1.430 
( S )  1 1 .2 0 9 )
( n -1 2 9 8 )
M -S  p -v a lu c  4 ) 1 0 5 * * 0 0 1 4  
[M -S ] p -v a lu c  |  -0 .0 7 5 * * *  ) 0 .000
1 184 1 282  4 )0 9 8 * *  0  0 3 0  
| I  0 6 4 )  |  1.107 ] |  -0 .043***  ) 0  003 
( n -3 8 5 )  ( n -3 7 0 )
1 346 
| I I 7 8 |
(n * 5 4 3 )
-() 162*** 0  0 00  
I A) I I 4 * # * 1 0  (K)0
0 .1 4 1 * * *  0 .002 
|  0 .070***  ) 0 .000
0 0 8 4 * *  0.011 
| 0 0 3 l * * )  0  022
0.001 0 .978  

















C a sh  F low  t - l /S a k s  1*2
C a sh  R o w  t/S alcs l-1
C a p  E xp  I-1 /S a k s  t-2
C a p  E xp  I /S a le s  I-1
Panel D. Pre-Acquisition Cash Flows for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
Focusing A cqu is itions D iversify ing A cquisitions
F ocusing
C ore
( F C )
Focusing  
N on-C ore  
( F N C >
D iffe ren ce  




( D C )
D iversify ing
N on-C ore
( D N C )
D ifference 
( D C -D N C  )
p-valuc
| C o re  
D ifference 
( F C - D C )
p-value
N on-C ore  
D ifference 
( F N C -D N C )
p-value
M ulti S egm ent 
<M)
S in g le  S egm ent 
(S )
M -S  p -valuc  
IM -S I p-vaJuc
0 .2 0 6  
|  0 .167  | 
( n -2 0 2 )
o m i  
1 0  1531 
(n -1 0 1 7 )  
0 0 2 5  0 1 5 9  
1 O .O H —  1 0  035
0 2 1 9  
1 0 .1 7 0 1 
( n M 9 l )
4 1 0 1 3  
|  4 )  00 3  |
0 6 5 1
0 2 6 8
0 1 6 4  
[ 0 .140  
(n -3 0 8 )  
0 1 6 4  
1 0  1 5 0 )  
(n —125) 
0 .0 0 0 0 9 %  
1 4 ) 0 1 0 1 0  363
0 2 1 0  
( 0 .1 5 6 )  
( n -2 9 8 )
- 0 0 4 6 —
|  4 )  016*  |
0 0 2 0
0.097
0  0 4 2 -  
|  0 .0 2 7 —  
1
0 .017  
|  0 .0 0 3 )
0 0 1 5
0 0 0 1
0  293 
0 .472
0 0 0 9  
1 0 .014  ]
0 .758
0 6 4 7
M ulti S egm ent 
<M>
S in g le  S egm ent 
(S )
M -S  p-valuc  
IM -S I inva lue
0 .222  
( 0  1 6 9 )  
( n -2 5 2 )  
0 2 0 1  
|  0  159 J 
( n —1279) 
0 0 2 1 0  235 
1 0 .0 1 0 ”  I 0  IH3
0  200  
|O .I 5 7 1  
(n -2 4 1 )
0 0 2 2  
|  0 .012*  J
0 2 5 8
0 0 6 7
0 .158  
( 0 .1 3 8 )  
( n -3 8 4 )  
0 1 5 0  
( 0 .1 4 0 )  
( n -5 4 2 )  
0 0 0 8  0 6 1 2  
1 4 ) 0 0 2  1 0 8 6 6
0.204  
( 0  1 6 5 )  
(n -3 6 9 )
-0  0 4 6 —
|  4) 0 2 7 —  )
0 0 0 4
0 0 0 3
0 0 6 4 —  
| 0  0 3 l  —  
1
0.051 —  
[ 0 .0 1 9 —  
1
0.000
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 5
0.001
-0 0 0 4
( 4 ) 0 0 8 )
0  837 
0 .5 %
Panel E. Pre-Acquisition Capital Expenditures for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
Focusing  A cq u is itio n s  D iversify ing  A cquis itions
F ocusing
C ore
( F C )
F ocusing
N o o 4 ’o rc
( F N C )
D iffe rence  




( D C )
D iversify ing  
N on-C ore  
( D N C  )
D tlfcrence 
( D C -D N C  )
p-valuc
|  C o re  
D ifference 
( F C -D C  )
p-valuc
N on-C ore 
D ifference 
( F N C -D N C )
p-value
M ulti S egm en t 
(M )
S ing le  S egm ent 
(S )
M -S  p-valuc  
IM -S I p-valuc
0 1 4 9  
1 0  0 5 1 J 
(n -2 0 2 )  
0 2 5 4  
1 0  0 63  | 
(n -1 0 2 1 )  
-0 .1 0 5 —  0 .002  
1 - 0 .0 1 2 - 1 0 0 6 5
0 1 2 3  
1 0 0 ) 7  ] 
(n -IK K )
0  02 6  
|  0 .0 0 4 )
0 5 0 1
0 2 7 2
0 0 7 8  
) 0 0 4 1 )  
tn - 3 0 8 )  
0 .128  
( 0 0 5 1  | 
( n -4 2 9 )
-0  0 5 0 — 0  02 0  
1 4 ) 0 1 0 —  1 0 0 0 6
0 1 7 5  
|  0 .0 4 9 )  
( n -2 9 7 )
4 ) 0 9 7 -  
|  4 1 0 0 8 — )
0 0 1 6
0 .009
0 0 7 1  —  
[ 0 0 1 0 — )
0  n O -  
I O o n —
0 .006
0 .018
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 8
-0.052 
|  -0.002 |
0 .292
0 .286
M ulti S egm ent 
(M )
S ing le  S egm en t 
(S )
M -S  p-valuc  
IM -S I p -value
0 2 2 5  
|  0 0 5 5 )  
(»»—2 51) 
0 .299  
|  0 .063  | 
( n -1 2 9 1 )  
4 ) 0 7 4  0  140 
1 4 )  008  1 0  229
0 1 2 4  
1 0  0 4 7 )  
( n -2 4 0 )
0 .101  —
1 0  0 0 8 —  |
0 0 3 8
0 0 3 0
0 0 8 6  
1 0  043  | 
(n -3 8 2 )  
0 .177 
|  0 0 5 7  | 
( n -S 4 2 )  
4 ) 0 9 1 - — 0 0 0 1  
1 4 ) 0 1 4 — 1 0 0 0 1
0  133 
|  0  05 2  J 
( n - 3 6 6 |
41.047—
( 4 )  0 0 9 —  |
0 0 2 6
0 0 0 2
0  139—  
| 0 .0 1 2 —
0  122—  
( 0 0 0 6 —
0 0 0 2
0 .000
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 6
4 )0 0 9  




Post-Acquisition Univariate Analysis of Bidders’ Core and Non-Core Business Performance
The tabic presents the means [medians] o f the core and non-core business performance measures at the segment level o f bidder firms that made domestic acquisitions over the 
1991-1997 period. Year t is the year o f  the acquisition. The sample includes all acquisitions which arc of, or assumed to be of, S 5 million value or higher. The sample does not 
include bidder and target firms in non-manufacturing industries such as Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes 
from 70 to 89). The sample also does not cover bidder firms that made both "diversifying” and "focusing" acquisitions in the same calendar year. We define acquisitions as 
“diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code o f  the bidder’s core business does not match with that o f the target firm, and "focusing” when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core 
business is the same o f the target. We combine the value o f acquisitions for bidder firms that made more than one acquisition in a calendar year and count it as one acquisition- 
year observation. Cash Flow is defined as operating income plus depreciation. The significance o f means difference is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-paramctric Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference o f  medians. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance for difference o f groups at 1%, S% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A. Post-Acquisition Sales for Core and Non-Core Business Segments
F ocusing  A cqu is itio n s  D iversify ing  A cqu is itions
IrKSafcsH
ln (S a le s)iM
ln (S a k s)t+ 2
F ocusing F ocusing D iversify ing D iversify ing C ore N on-C ore
C o te N o n -C o te D iffe rence p-valuc C o te N on-C ore D ifference p-valuc D ifference p-valuc D ifference p-value
( F C ) ( F N C ) ( F C - F N C ) ( D C  ) ( D N C  ) ( D C -D N C  I ( F C -D C  ) ( F N C -D N C )
M ulli S eg m en t 2 0 0 4 3 1 9 2 5 7 0 7 8 6 — 0 0 0 0 1 9 9 1 0 1 9 3 7 7 0 .5 3 3 — 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 .327 •0 .120 0 .419
(M ) 1 2 0  0 4 4 ) |  19 3 2 6 ) ( 0 .7 1 8 —  | 0 .000 ( 2 0  0 8 4 ) |  19 4 2 6 1 | 0 6 5 8 —  ) 0 0 0 0 |- O O 4 0 | 0 .488 | -0 .1001 0 .4 6 0
( n -2 9 6 ) ( n -2 8 8 ) ( n —441) ( n -4 2 8 )
S in g le  S eg m en t 19.033 1 8883 17.849 1 0 3 4 — 0  000 0  172* 0 0 7 7
<s> |  1 9 1 0 9 ) ( 18 9 3 7 ) | 17 831 ] |  1 .106—  ) 0  000 |  0 .172*  ) 0  066
( r i-1 5 1 8 ) ( n -6 6 6 ) ( n -9 9 )
M -S  p -v a lu e 0 .9 8 8 —  0 .0 0 0 1 0 2 7 —  0  000 1.528* • • 0 .0 0 0
IM  S ) p -v a lu c  )0 .9 3 5 * * *  1 0 .0 0 0 [ 1 147— -  | 0  0001 1.595—  1 0 0 0 0
M ulli S egm en t 2 0 2 0 4 1 9 3 6 2 0 .8 4 2 — 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 9 19.490 0 5 1 9 — 0  000 0 .195 0  146 -0.128 0 .395
(M ) |  2 0  2 0 0 ) [ 19 433  | |  0  7 6 7 —  | ooou ( 2 0 .1 4 0 ) |  19 594  | |  0 .S 4 6 —  ) 0  000 | 0 0 6 0 ) 0 .238 | - 0  161 | 0 .383
( n -2 9 6 ) (n -2 7 0 ) ( n —441) ( n - 4 I S )
S ing le  S egm en t 19.309 19 189 17.934 1 2 5 5 — 0 0 0 0 0  120 0  197
IS ) |  19.363 | |  19 241 ) |  17.897 J ( 1 3 4 4 —  | 0 0 0 0 ( 0  1 22 ) 0 .158
( n —1554) ( n * 6 9 l) ( n —155)
M -S  p -valuc 0 .8 9 5 —  0 .0 0 0 0  8 2 0 —  0  00 0 1 5 5 6 -  0  00 0
|M -S )  p -v a lu e  |  0  8 3 7 —  ) 0 .000 | 0  8 9 9 —  10  0 0 0 | 1 6 9 7 —  |  0  00 0
M ulti S egm en t 2 0 3 5 6 1 9 4 7 2 0 8 8 4 — 0 0 0 0 20  153 1 9 6 3 7 0 5 1 6 — 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 .156 -0 1 6 5 0  344
(M ) ( 2 0  311 | |  1 9 5 7 6  | |  (17 3 5 —  | 0 0 0 0 ( 2 0 2 7 1  | |  19.824 ) ( 0  4 4 7 —  | 0  001 |  0 .0 4 0 | 0  246 |  -0 .248 | 0.361
( n -2 4 1 ) ( n - 2 1 I ) (n -3 7 0 ) ( n -3 4 2 )
S ing le  S egm en t 19.404 1 9 2 8 8 18.082 1 2 0 6 — 0 0 0 0 (1 116 0 .258
( S ) |  19.441 ) |  19 2 9 7 ) |  17.971 ) |  1 32 6 — ( 0 0 0 0 ( 0 I 4 4 | 0 .165
( n —1241 ( n - 5 8 1 ( n —146)
M -S  p -v a lu c 0 .9 5 2 —  0 .0 0 0 0  8 6 5 —  0  00 0 1.555—  0(810
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Panel B. Post-Acquisition Assets for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
Focusing A cqu is itions D iversify ing A cqu is itions
p-valuc
Focusing  
C o re  
I P C )
Focusing  
N o n -C o te  
I F N C  )
D ifference 




( D C )
D iversify ing 
N on-C ore  
( D N C  I
D ifference 
1 D C - D N C )
p-value
| C o re  
D ifference 
( F C - D C )
p-value
N on-C ore  
D ifference 
( F N C - D N C )
M ulli S egm ent 19.914 1 9 2 1 4 0 7 0 0 — 01)00 1 9 6 5 0 1 9 3 9 6 0 .254* 0 .060 0 2 6 4 * 0 .059 -0 .182 0 .248
(M ) |  19 9 03  | |  19 311 | |  0 .5 9 2 —  | 0(100 I 19 744 | [ 19 41 9  | |  0 .325**  | 0 0 4 9 | 0  159] 0 .117 |  - 0 . I 0 8 | 0.321
( n -2 9 6 ) ( n -2 8 8 ) (n -4 4 1 ) (n —427)
S in g le  Segm ent 19.122 18 836 18 372 0.464* 0 .080 0 .2 8 6 — 0.001
IS ) I 19.095 ) |  18 8 1 7 ) | IB 277 | 1 0 .5 4 0 * *  ) 0 0 1 5 1 0 .278***  | 0.001
I n - 1526) ( n -6 6 7 ) ( n -9 8 )
M -S  p-value 0 .7 9 2 * * *  0 .0 0 0 0 .8 1 4 — 0 .0 0 0 1.024—  0 .0 0 0
IM -S I p-value  I 0  8 0 8 —  ] 0 0 0 0 1 0 .9 2 7 —  10 .0001  1 .142—  1 0 .000
M ulli S egm ent 2 0 0 6 7 1 9 3 4 5 0 .7 2 2 — 0 0 0 0 19.786 19.484 0 .302** 0  027 0.281** 0 0 4 0 -0 .139 0.388
( M l |  19.987 | |  1 9 4 1 9 ) 1 0  5 6 8 — 1 0 0 0 0 |  1 9 .7 4 3 ) I 1 9 .5 7 4 ) | 0 .169**  ) 0 0 ) 1 |  0 .244* ) 0  079 I -O .I 5 5 ) 0  366
( n -2 9 6 ) (n -2 7 1 ) ( n -4 4 0 ) ( I I - )  13)
S ing le  S egm ent 1 9 3 1 8 19 0 ) 2 18 181 0 .8 6 1 * * * 0 .000 0 .2 7 6 — 0.002
(S ) I 19 331 | |  18 98 4  | |  17921  | |  1 .063*** ) 0 0 0 0 |  0 .347***  ) 0.001
In —15-43) ( n -6 9 2 ) ( n -1 5 7 )
M -S  p-value 0  7 4 9 —  0 0 0 0 0 .7 4 4 — 0 0 0 0 1.303— 0.000
[M -S | p-valuc | 0 6 5 6 —  1 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .7 5 9 —  10  00 0 1  1 6 5 3 —  10 .000
M ulti S egm ent 2 0 2 2 6 1 9 4 9 2 0  7 3 4 — 0 0 0 0 19 958 19 63 0 0 .328** 0 0 2 8 0.268* 0 0 7 4 -0  138 0 .454
(M ) | 2 0  151 | |  19 622  ) |  0 .5 2 9 —  | 0 0 0 0 |  2 0  1 1 0 ) | 19 69 9  ] I 0 .4 1 1** ) 0 0 ) 2 | 0 O ) l  ) 0 .143 |  -0 .0 7 7 ) 0 .460
(n -2 3 9 ) ( n -2 1 0 ) (n -3 6 8 ) I n —341)
S ing le  S egm ent 1 9 4 0 0 19 089 18 248 0 .8 4 1 * * * 0 .000 0 .3 1 1*** 0 0 0 2
IS ) [ 1 9 4 4 7  | ( 19 2 0 ) ) ( I 7 .7 4 0 | |  1 .461—  ) 0 .0 0 0 ( 0 .2 4 3 —  | 0 .002
(n -1 2 3 2 ) (n —577) ( n —141)
M -S  p-valuc 0 .8 2 6 —  0  0 0 0 0 .8 6 9 —  0 0 0 0 1.382— 0.000
|M -S )  p-valuc |  0 .7 0 4 —  ) 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .9 0 6 —  10 .0001  1 9 5 9 —  10 .0 0 0
Panel C. Post Acquisition Growth in Sales for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
F ocusing A cquis itions D iversify ing A cqu is itions
p-valuc
Focusing 
C ore  
( F C  )
F ocusing 
N on-C ore  
1 F N C  )
D ifference
1 F C -F N C  )
p-valuc
D iversify ing  
C o re  
( 1  > C )
D iversify ing  
N im C n rc  
( D N C )
D iffe rence  
1 D C - D N C )
p -valuc
| C ore 
D ifference 
< F C -D C  1
p-valuc
N on "Core 
D iffe rence
< F N C - D N C )
M ulti S egm ent 1.275 1.184 0 0 9 1 * * 0 0 4 3 1 159 1 .20) -0 .045 0  185 0  116*** 0 0 0 3 -0  02 0 0.621
(M ) I 1 124 | |  l .0 9 0 | | 0 0 3 4 * * *  1 0  00 8 |  1 .IWI ) I 1 0 94  ) ( - 0 0 1 3  ) 0 4 3 7 1 0 .043***  ) 0 0 0 0 ( - 0 0 0 4 ) 0.827
( n -2 9 3 ) ( n -2 5 7 ) ( n -4 3 0 ) ( n -3 9 6 )
S ing le  S egm ent 1.373 1 3 8 4 1.70) -0 3 2 0 * * 0 .048 -0 0 1 1 0 7 5 3
(S ) I 1.196 | 1 1 .1 7 5 ) |  1 2 2 6 | |  -0 .051**  ] 0 0 4 5 | 0  0 2 1 * * ) 0 0 3 3
(n -1 4 6 9 ) (n -6 2 0 ) <n**80)
M -S  p-valuc - 0 0 9 8 * * 0 .0 1 1 -0 .225***  0.188) -0 .500*** 0 0 0 2
[ M S I  revalue  1 -0 .0 7 2 —  1 0 .0 0 0 I 4 )0 9 4 * * *  10.0001 41.132— 1 0 .000
M ulli S egm ent 1 160 1.135 0 0 2 5 0 .507 1.130 1 2 3 6 -0 106** 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 1 0  317 -0  101** 0 0 4 9
(M ) I 1 0 8 5  | ( 1 0 7 3 ) 1 0 0 1 2  J 0  177 |  1 0 6 5 ) 1 1 0 8 2 ) ( - 0 0 1 7 ) 0 3 0 7 |  0  0 2 0 ) 0 1 2 3 1 - 0 0 0 9 ] 0 .366
( n -2 3 7 ) ( n -1 9 8 ) ( n -3 6 4 ) < n -3 2 0 )
S ing le  S egm ent 1.234 1.270 1 4IM -0.134* 0 0 8 7 -0 036 0 2 3 2
(S ) |  1.120 | I I 121 1 1-1521 ( - 0  0 2 9 ) 0  200 | -0 0 0 3  ) 0 7 8 5
( n - l 177) (n -5 3 9 ) ( n - 101)
M -S  p-value 4 ) 0 7 4 * * 0  0 1 6 -0  140—  0  00(1 -O 168** 0  04 9
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Panel D. Post-Acquisition Cash Flows for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
Focusing  A cqu is itions D iversify ing  A cquisitions
Focusing
C o re
( F C )
Focusing
N on-C ore
( F N C )
D ifference 




( D C )
D iversify ing  
N on-C ore  
( D N C  )
D ifference 
I D C - D N C )
p-valuc
| C o re  
D ifference 
( F C -D C  (
p -valuc
N on-C ore 
D ifference 
( F N C -D N C
p-value
M ulli 0 .2 1 7 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 6 0  331 0 1 5 5 0 2 0 5 -0  050*** 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 2 * * * 0 .0 0 0 -0.0(M 0.805
S egm ent 1 0.171 ) 1 0 .164  ] ( 0 0 0 7 ) 0 2 2 9 1 0  1 4 2 ) |  0 .1 6 0  ] |  -0 .018**  ) 0 0 1 6 ( 0 0 2 9 * * *  ) 0 0 0 0 ( 0  0 0 4 ) 0 6 6 3
(M )
S ing le
< n -2 * 9 )
0 .183
(n -2 5 9 ) (n -4 3 4 )
0.145
( n -4 0 4 )
0 2 5 5 -0  110* 0  056 0 0 3 8 * 0 0 6 7
S egm ent |  O I 5 2 | 1 0  1 3 5 ) |  0  195 ) |  -0 0 6 0 * *  ) 0 0 1 1 |  0 0 1 7 * * *  ) 0 .000
IS )  ( n -1 4 3 1 )
M -S  p-valuc  0  03 4 * *  00.11 
IM -S I n -value  I 0 0 1 9 * * *  1 0 0 0 5
( n -6 1 7 )
0 0 1 0 0 6 1 5
( 0 0 0 7 1 0 1 8 0
(n —87)
•0  0 5 0  0  370  
( - 0  035  ) 0  393
M ulli 0 2 0 5 0.182 0  023 0 2 3 0 0.164 0.202 -0 0 3 8 * * 0  021 0 .0 4 1*** 0 0 0 2 -0 0 2 0 0 .360
S egm ent |  0 .1 7 0 ) ( 0 1 6 0 ) 1 0 0 1 0 *  | 0 .098 ( 0 1 4 9 ) ( 0 .1 5 9  ) ( - 0 0 1 0 * *  ) 0  038 1 0 .0 2 1 * * *  ) 0  002 | 0 0 0 1  ) 0.631
(M )
S ing le
(n -2 3 7 )  
0  157
( n -2 0 1 ) In -3 6 4 )  
0  128
( n —313) 
0  207 -0 0 7 9 0  112 0  029** 0  037
S egm ent |  0  .1 4 0 ) |  O I 2 3 | ( 0 1 7 5 ) |  -0 0 5 2 * * *  ) 0 0 0 2 1 0 .0 1 7 * * *  1 0 0 0 7
(S )  ( n - l 157)
M -S  p -va luc  0 0 4 8 * * * 0 .0 0 1  
|M -S )  p -va lue  |  0  0 3 0 * * *  1 0  0 0 0
(n -5 2 1 )  
0 .0 3 6 * * *  0 0 0 8  
|  0  026* * *  ) 0  00 6
( n - 9 7 )  
-0 0 0 5  0  912  
( - 0 0 1 6  ) 0 4 3 9
Panel E. Post-Acquisition Capital Expenditures for Core and Non-Core Business Segment o f the Bidder
Focusing  A cq u is itio n s  D iversify ing  A cquisitions
Focusing  
C o re  
( F C )
Focusing
N on-C ore
( F N C )
D ifference 
( F C -F N C  )
p-vafuc
D iversify ing 
C ore  
( D C )
D iversify ing  
N on-C ore  
( D N C  )
D iffe rence  
( D C -D N C  )
p-value
| C o re  
D iffe ren ce  
( F C -D C  )
p-valuc
N on-C ore  
D ifference 
( F N C -D N C  )
p-valuc
M ulti 0  143 0 .104 0 0 3 9 0 1 6 0 0 0 9 7 0 1 2 1 -0 0 2 4 0.175 0 0 4 6 0 1 0 8 -0 0 1 7 0.294
Segm ent |  0  0 5 3 ) |  0  0 4 9 1 | 0 0 0 4 ) 0 1 2 4 | 0 0 4 4 ) ( 0  052  ) ( - 0 0 0 8 * * *  | 0 .002 ( 0 0 0 9 * * *  ) 0 0 0 1 | -0 .0 0 3 ) 0 .226
(M )
S ing le
(n -2 8 6 )
0.241
(n —257) ( n -4 3 1 )  
0  178
( n -3 9 8 )  
0  362 -0  184 0 1 6 1 0 0 6 3 * 0  033
Segm ent ( 0 0 6 2 ) ( 0  0 5 2 ) 1 0 0 7 4  ) ( 41.022*** | 0 0 0 6 |  0.010*** | 0 0 0 0
(S )
M -S  p -valuc
(n -1 4 2 1 )  
-0 ,098***  0 0 0 2
( n -6 1 5 )
-0  0 8 1** 0 0 1 2
( n - 8 5 )
- 0 2 4 1 * 0 0 6 3
IM -S I n -valuc  1 -0 .0 0 9 * 1 0 .0 7 5 1 -0 .008**  1 O O l 1 I -0  022**  1 0  01 6
M ulti 0 1 4 9 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 8 0 4 2 9 0  079 0 1 2 9 -0 .050*** 0 0 0 2 0 .0 7 0 *  • 0 0 1 8 -0.008 0 7 5 7
S egm ent 1 0  0 5 6  | ( 0 0 5 2 ) ( 0 0 0 4 ) 0 4 5 9 |  0 0 4 3  ) | 0  0 5 l  ] ( - 0  008***  ) 0 0 0 3 | 0 .0 1 3 * * *  ) 0 .008 (0 0 0 1  | 0.377
(M )
S ing le
(n -2 3 2 )
0 2 0 3
( n -1 9 8 ) ( n -3 6 3 )
0.145
(n -3 1 1 )
0 2 7 6 -0.131* 0 0 8 7 0 0 5 8 * 0 .068
S egm ent ( 0 0 5 7 ) ( 0 0 4 7  | |  0 0 6 5 ) |  -0 0 1 8  * * •) 0 0 0 2 ( 0 0 1 0 * * * ) 0  000
(S )  ( n - l 148)
M  S  p-value  - 0 0 5 4  0  101 
(M -S ) p -value  |  - 0 0 0 1 )  0.401
( n -5 1 6 )
■0 0 66**  0 0 1 7  
| - 0 0 0 4 1 0 2 9 2
( n -9 5 )
-0  147** 0 ,044  
|  -0 0 1 4 *  |0 0 6 9
Table 11
Core and Non-Core Capital Expenditures of Single- and Multi-Segment Bidders
The table presents the core and non-core capital expenditures o f single- and multi-segment bidden included in our sample. The sample 
consists o f 3 ISO U.S. firm-acquisitions made over the 1991-97 period. 2438 of the firm-year acquisitions are made by single-segment bidden 
while the remaining 742 are made by multi-segment bidden. The core business segment o f  the bidder is defined as the line o f business that 
has the highest sales as percentage of the total sales o f the firm at 2 digit SIC level. The non-core business segments o f the bidder are defined 
as the entirety o f all lines o f  businesses other than the core business at 2 digit SIC level. The core and non-core capital expenditures are 
defined as the capital expenditures o f  the core and non-core segments respectively scaled by the total sales o f the bidders from the previous 
year. Core Cash Rows (CCF) and Non-Core Cash Rows (NCCF) are defined as the operating income plus depreciation o f the core and non­
core business segments respectively normalized by the segment sales from the previous year. Tobin's Q is computed as market value of 
outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets. Industry 
adjusted valuation measures, INDADJQ, are obtained by the approach of Berger and Ofek (I99S) using sales multipliers as the natural 
logarithm o f  the ratio o f  Tobin's Q  o f  the bidder to its imputed value. We define acquisitions as “diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code of 
the bidder’s core business does not match with that o f the target firm, and we define acquisitions as “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code of 
the bidder’s core business is the same o f  the target 1668 of the single-segment firms in our sample made focusing acquisitions and the 
remaining 770 single-segment firms made diversifying acquisitions. 297 of the multi-segment firms in our sample made focusing acquisitions 
and the remaining 445 multi-segment firms made diversifying acquisitions. Year 0 is the year o f  acquisitions, t-values of coefficients are in 
paranthescs. ***. •*, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel Al: Core Capital Expenditures of Single-Segment Firms That Make Focusing Acquisitions
C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P
Independen t V ariables ( t -0 ) ( t - l ) ( t - 2 )
C onstan t 0.240 -0.119 0.176
(2 .443)** (-1 .256) (5 .973)***
C C F  t- l 0 .789 0.270 0 .120
(4 .462)*** ( 1 3 0 9 )* * (3 .599)***
Q t- I 0 0 0 3 0.271 0.012
(0 .058) (5 .0 0 9 )* * * (0 .637)
IN D A D JQ  t- l •0.050 •O .I54 0.027
(-0 .530) (-1 .774)* (1 .038 )
F -V alue 6.687 11.706 5.935
p-value (0 .000)*** (0 .000 )*** (0  001 )***
r ! 0.012 0.021 0 0 1 1
A di-R : 0.0 to 0 .019 0.009
Panel A2: Core Capital Expenditures of Single-Segment Firms That Make Diversifying Acquisitions
C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P
Independen t V ariables ( r -0 ) ( t - l ) (t®2)
C onstant 0.168 0.127 -0.337
(4 .396)*** (1 .897)* ( -0 8 3 8 )
C C F  t - l ■0.034 0.064 0.118
(-0 .358) (0 .783) (0 .284)
N C C F  t- l 0.005 -0.031
(0 .131 ) (-0 .032)
Q t - I 0 .008 0.013 0.511
(0 .363) (0 .477) (2 .852)***
IN D A D JQ  t- l 0 .035 0 .038 •0.121
(1 .0 (6 ) (0 .902) (-0 .400)
F-V alue 1.115 1.040 3.281
p-value (0 3 4 2 ) (0 .396) (0 .011)**
R: 0.004 0.005 0.017
Ad]-R: 0 .000 0 .000 0 0 1 2
Panel B: Non-Core Capital Expenditures of Single-Segment Firms That Make Diversifying Acquisitions
N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E
Independen t V ariab les C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P
( t - 0 ) ( t » I i ( t -2 )
C onstant 0 .087 0 .040 0.029
(16 .817)*** (4 .636)*** (6 .544 )***
C C F  t- l -0.014 0.037 0.018
(-1 .116) (3 .4 8 6 )* * • (3 .942 )***
N C C F  t- l 0 .006 0.039
(1 3 0 2 ) (3 .734 )***
Q t- I 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0 .715) (0 .262 ) (0 .997)
IN D A D JQ  t - l 0.001 -0.001 ■0.003
(0 .242) (-0 .092 ) (-0 .780)
F -V alue 0.926 3 3 7 8 7.043
p -value (0 .428) (0 .009 )*** (0 .000 )***
R2 0.004 0.017 0.036
A di-R 2 0.000 0.012 0.030
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Panel Cl: Core Capital Expenditures of Multi-Segment Firms That Mike Focusing Acquisitions
C O R H C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E  C A P  E X P
Independen t V ariab les ( t-O ) ( t-O ) ( t - l ) ( t - l ) ( t - 2 ) ( t - 2 )
C onstan t •0.005 -O J2 0 0.056 0 .005 -0 .009 0 .024
(-0 .081) (-2 .5 9 7 )” (1 .589 ) (0 .068) (-0 .208) (0 .343 )
C C F t-1 0 .980 0.941 0 3 9 0 0-350 0.794 0 .790
(4 .1 0 4 )— (4 .0 7 4 )— (3 .6 9 7 )* ” (3 .268 )*** (5 .8 7 2 )* ” (5 .6 5 0 )” *
N C C F t-1 •0.053 -0 .169 -0.162 -0.182 -0 .134 -0.137
(-0-354) (-1 .159 ) (-1 .464) (-1 .643) (-0 .950 ) (-0 .966)
Q t - I 0.301 0 .057 -0.021
( 3 .7 9 0 )— (1 .261) (-0 .4 8 9 )
IN D A D J Q t-l -0 .002 0.013 0 .036
(-0 .0 2 7 ) (0 .253) (0 .624 )
F -V alue 8.555 11.352 7.061 4.505 17.410 8.760
p-value (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 2 )— (0 .0 0 0 )” * (0 .0 0 0 )” *
R2 0.055 0.135 0 .046 0.058 0 .106 0.107
A di-R 2 0.049 0.123 0 .039 0.045 0.100 0.095
Panel C2: Core Capital Expenditures of Multi-Segment Firms That Make Diversifying Acquisitions
C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P C O R E C A P E X P
In deccndcn t V ariab les ( t-O ) ( t-O ) ( t - l ) ( t - l ) ( t - 2 ) ( t - 2 )
C onstan t 0 .029 0 .007 -0 .007 -O.OOI 0.007 0 .024
(4 .1 6 8 )* — (0 .621 ) (-0 .394 ) (-0 .029 ) (1-352) (2 .2 4 5 )”
C C F t- l 0 .132 0.125 0 .436 0 .426 0.291 0 .288
(4 .3 4 3 )* ” (4 .1 5 9 )* ” (6 .5 1 4 )— ( 6 .3 6 5 ) * " (1 4 .3 5 7 )— (1 4 .2 5 8 )—
N C C F t- l 0 .003 0 .004 0.001 0.000 •0.005 -0.007
( 0 .2 1 1) (0 .248 ) (0 .026 ) (-0 .008) (-0 .387 ) (-0 .514)
Q  t - l 0 .022 0.003 •0.011
(3 .0 0 9 )* ” (0 .133 ) (-1-516)
IN D A D J Q t-l 0.001 0.033 0 .018
(0 .139 ) (1 .429 ) (2 .1 9 3 )”
F -V alue 9.565 9 .285 2 1 2 2 2 11.756 103.185 53.122
p-value (0 .0 0 0 )* ” (0 .0 0 0 )* ” (0 .000 )*** (0 .0 0 0 )* ” (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )—
R2 0.041 0.078 0 .088 0.097 0.318 0 3 2 6
A dj-R : 0 .037 0 .069 0 .083 0.088 0.315 0 .320
Panel PI: Non-Core Capital Expenditures of Multi-Segment Firms That Make Focusing Acquisition!!
N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E
Independen t V ariab les C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P
(t-O ) (t-O ) ( t - l ) ( t - l ) ( t - 2 ) ( t - 2 )
C onstan t 0 .004 0.021 0.017 0.029 0 .016 0.023
(0 .333 ) (0 .832 ) ( 2 .8 0 6 ) " * (2 .540 )*  * (2 .7 5 4 )— (2 .3 9 9 )”
C C F t-1 0.111 0.103 0.044 0.044 0.052 0 .050
(2 .3 6 4 )” (2 .1 8 0 )” <2.4261” (2 .3 8 5 )” (2 .7 8 8 )— ( 2 .5 9 0 ) * "
N C C F t- l 0 .083 0 .082 0.031 •0.032 0 .04! 0 .040
(2 .8 1 4 )— (2 .7 4 5 )— (1 .643 )* (1 .662 )* (2 .1 3 6 )” (2 .0 7 4 )”
Q t - I -0 .009 -0.009 -0 .004
(-0 .534) (-1 .111) (-0 .680)
1N D A D J t- l 0 .023 0.012 0.009
(1 .251 ) (1 .331) (1 .124 )
F -V alue 8.515 4 .695 5.419 3.172 8.252 4.432
p-value (0 .0 0 0 )* ” (0 .0 0 1 )— (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 1 4 )” (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 2 )—
R2 0.055 0 .060 0 .036 0 .042 0.053 0.057
A di-R 2 0.048 0 .048 0 .029 0.029 (0 .047 ) 0 .044
Panel D2; Non-Core Capital Expenditures of Multi-Segment Firms That Make Diversifying Acquisitions
N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E N O N -C O R E
Independen t V ariab les C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P C A P E X P
(t= 0 ) ( t-O ) ( t - l ) ( t - l ) ( t - 2 ) ( t - 2 )
C onstan t 0 .020 0 .020 0 .015 0.017 0.022 0 .030
(3 .3 7 0 )” * ( 1 0 5 1 ) ” (3 .0 2 3 )— (1 .909 )* (5 .5 1 5 )— (3 .6 7 8 )—
C C F t-1 0 .040 0.037 0 0 8 9 0.088 0.038 0 .036
(1 .690 )* (1 .482 ) (4 .5 0 0 )— (4 .4 1 9 )— ( 1 4 9 3 ) ” ( 1 3 8 2 ) ”
N C C F t- l 0 .066 0 .066 0 .052 0.052 0 .062 0.061
(4 .9 4 4 )— (4 .9 1 7 )— (4 .3 6 9 )— ( 4 3 4 0 ) — (6 .0 0 2 )— (5 .8 0 5 )* ”
Q t-1 0 .002 -0.001 -0.004
(0 1 7 6 ) (-0 .115) (-0 .769 )
IN D A D J Q t-l 0 .008 0.005 0 .010
(1 .0 0 0 ) (0 .762 ) (1 .6 4 5 )
F -V alue 14.146 7.733 19.863 10.129 2 1 1 1 3 11.826
p-value (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )—
R2 0 .060 0 .066 0 .082 0.084 0.091 0 .097
A dj-R 2 0 .050 0 .057 0 .078 0.076 0 .0 8 7 0.089


















Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Post-Acquisition Valuation Measures to Internal Capital Market Variables
T he dependen t variab les in  the  c ro ss sectional reg re ssions a rc  the  post-acqu is ition  in dustry -ad ju sted  v aluation  o f  th e  b id d e rs  b ased  o n  T o b in ’s  Q. T o b in 's  Q  is  com jiu tcd  a s  m arke t va lue  o f  outstanding shares  p lu s  liqu id a tio n  value  o f  prefe rred  
stock p lu s  net cu rren t asse ts p lu s  long te rm  deb t d iv id ed  by  to ta l asse ts. T h e  v a lu a tio n  p rcm iu m 'd isco u n t is  co m p u ted  u s in g  th e  m ethodo logy  o f  B erger a n d  O fck  (1995). T h e  sam p le  includes 3180  firm  year acqu is itions . 2438  o f  d ie  firm -year 
acqu is itions a re  m ad e  by  s ing le-segm ent b idders w h ile  d ie  rem ain ing  742 a re  m ade  b y  m u lti-segm en t b idders. W e d e fin e  a cqu is itions a s  “’d iversify ing" w h en  the  2 d ig it S IC  c o d e  o f  th e  b id d e r’s  co re  busine ss d o es  no t m a tch  w ith  tha t o f  the  target 
firm , an d  w e  define  acqu is itions a s  " fo cu s in g "  w hen  th e  2  d ig it S IC  co d e  o f  th e  b id d e r 's  co re  busin ess  is  th e  sa m e o f  th e  target. 1668 o f  the  sing le-segm ent firm s in  o u r  sam p le  m ade  focusing  acqu is itions an d  the  rem ain ing  7 70  sing lc-segm ent 
firm s m ade  d iversify ing  acqu is itions 297  o f  the  m u lti-segm en t firm s in  o u r  sa m p le  m ad e  focusing  acqu is itions an d  the  rem ain in g  445  m ulti-segm ent firm s m ade  d iversify ing  a cqu is itions D IV E R D  is a n  ind icato r variab le  tak in g  th e  value  o f  o n e  i f  
the  b idder m ade  a  d iv ers ify in g  acqu is ition  an d  ze ro  o therw ise . T h e  size  o f  th e  firm , L N (S A L H S ), is  th e  n a tu ra l lo g arith m  o f  an n u a l sa les D E B T  is th e  percen tage  o f  to ta l d eb t d iv id ed  b y  invested  cap ita l. IN S ID E R  a n d  IN S T IT U T E  are  the  
percen tage  o f  sh a re s  held  b y  in siders a n d  institu tions respec tive ly . R D E X P  an d  A D V E X P  are  th e  K & D  a n d  adv ertisin g  exp en d itu res o f  th e  b idder n o rm alized  by  to ta l sa les o f  the  b idder. C C F  an d  N C C F  a rc  th e  cash  flow s (th e  o p era tin g  incom e 
p lu s  dep recia tion ) o f  the  co re  and  non -co rc  busin ess  s e g m en ts  o f  th e  b id d ers  n o rm aliz ed  by  segm ent sa le s  from  o n e  y ea r  befo re . T h e  co re  business segm en t o f  the  b idder is d e fined  a s  th e  line  o f  business tha t h a s  th e  h ighest sa les a s  percen tage o f  
the  to tal sa les o f  th e  firm  a t 2 d ig it S IC  level. T h e  n o n -co re  busin ess  seg m en ts o f  th e  b idder a re  de f in ed  a s  th e  en tire ty  o f  a ll lin es o f  busine sse s o th e r  th an  th e  co re  busin e ss  at 2  d ig it S IC  level. Y ear 0  is  the  y ea r  o f  acqu is itions , t-va lucs o f  
coeffic ien ts a re  in paran theses. ***, ** , a n d  * d en o te  sta tis tica l sign ificance  a t 1% , 5 %  an d  10%  levels respec tive ly .
Panel A: Industry-Adjusted Tobin's Q Valuation of Single-Segment Firms
A ll S ing le-S egm en t B idders F ocusing  S ing le-S egm en t B idders D iversify ing  S ing le-S egm ent B idders
Independen t
V ariab les
IN D A D JQ
0 * 0 )
IN D A D JQ
o - l )
IN D A D JQ
( t - 2 )
IN D A D JQ
(t-O )
IN D A D JQ
( t - l )
IN D A D JQ
( t - 2 )
IN D A D JQ
(t-O )
IN D A D JQ
( H i )
IN D A D JQ
( t - 2 )
C onstan t 0 0 4 6 -0 0 9 6 *0 101 -0 0 7 1 -0 1 5 2 -O .I36 0 2 9 0 0 .0378 4 )031
D IV E R D
(0  811) 
0 .065  
(2 .228 )**
(-1 576) 
0 0 5 8  
(1 .938 )*
(-1 .7 6 3 )*
0 0 1 8
(0 .6 6 9 )
( I 0 5 8 ) (-2 .116 )** (-1 .991 )** (2 9 5 6 )* * * ( 0 3 4 5 ) ( 4 )2 9 7 )
L N (S A L E S ) -0 0 5 1 -0 0 3 2 -0 0 2 5 4 )0 3 7 - 0 0 2 7 -0 0 1 1 - 0 0 7 7 •0.040 4 )0 4 8
(-6 .309 )*** ( -3  736 )*** (-3 .0 6 5 )* * * ( .3 9 2 6 )* * * (-2 .658 )*** (•1 141) (-4 .831  )*•* (-2 .384 )** (-3 .036 )***
D E B T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0(8) 0  001 0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 1 - 0 0 0 I 0.001
(-0 .392 ) (0 3 4 3 ) (0  154) (0  264 ) ( 1 4 8 7 ) ( -0  149) ( -0  803) (-1 .296 ) (0 .765 )
IN S ID E R 0.003 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0.002
(3 .4 6 7 )* * * (2  792)*** (1 6 7 9 )* (2  724 )*** (1 973)** (1 294 ) (2 .279 )** (2 .176 )** (1 .345 )
IN S T IT U T E 0 0 0 1 0  000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 )0 01 4 )0 0 1
( 2 0 1 9 )* * (0  644 ) (0  204) (2  8 03 )*** (1 249) ( 0 7 8 2 ) ( -0 0 4 7 ) ( 4 )5 0 9 ) (-0 .444 )
R D E X P 0 0 0 8 0.008 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 .048 0 0 0 7 0 .027
(2 .055 )** (2  064 )** (2 0 5 6 )* * (2 .312 )** (1 122) (2  353)** (0 .8 0 4 ) (1 .493) (0 .913 )
A D V E X P 0 2 9 5 1 619 0 .898 0 4 8 3 1 182 •0 4 6 3 -0.119 2.813 1.338
(0 .722 ) (2 4 4 1 )* * ( 1 6 9 4 )* ( 0 8 7 6 ) (1 581) ( -0  599) (-0 .188 ) ( 2 0 3 5 )* * (1 .267 )
C C F 0  144 0  102 0  260 0 0 9 1 0  102 0  246 0 3 5 1 0 1 0 5 0.281
N C C F  a  D IV E R D
(3.57H )*** (2  799)*** (5 .0 0 0 )* * *  
0  157 
(1 .3 0 0 )
(2  105)** (2 .399 )** (4  325)*** (3 6 5 6 )* * * (1 .509) (2 .389 )**
0.219
(1 .5 5 4 )
F-V alue II  140 6.275 5 .206 5 7 7 1 3 2 9 1 3 9 7 6 9 0 7 5 4.584 4 2 3 3
p-valuc (0 .000 )*** (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0  0 0 0 )* * * (0  0 0 0 )* * * (0  0 02 )*** (0  0 00 )*** (0 .000 )*** (0 .000 )*** (0 .000 )***
R1 0 0 3 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 2 4 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 6 0 .077 0 .040 0.043

















Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q Valuation of Multi-Segment Firms
A ll M u lti-S eg m en t B id d ers hocu s in g  M ulti-S eg m en t H idden. D iversify ing  M ulti-S egm ent d id d e rs
Independen t
V ariables
IN D A D JQ
(t-O )
IN D A D JQ
(1 -1 )
IN D A D JQ
( t - 2 )
IN D A D JQ
0 - 0 )
IN D A D JQ
( t - l )
IN D A D JQ
( t - 2 )
IN D A D JQ
(t-O )
IN D A D JQ
( l - l )
IN D A D JQ
( t - 2 )
C onstan t 0  222 0 .1 8 6 4 )1 0 3 0 1 1 9 -0 0 0 4 0 .012 0.303 0.128 -0.181
(1 .9 7 5 )* * (1 .684 )* ( -0 9 3 2 ) ( 0 7 0 5 ) (4 )0 2 5 ) ( 0 0 7 2 ) (2 .109 )** (0  889 ) ( -1 .308 )
D IV E R D 0 0 1 2 - 0 0 2 0 4 )0 1 1
( 0 2 7 7 ) ( -0  45 5 ) ( 4 )3 0 5 )
L N (S A L E S ) •0 .072 -0 0 7 6 -0 0 4 7 4 )0 4 6 4 )0 3 5 4 )0 3 3 4 )0 8 9 4 )091 -0 0 5 7
(-S .248 )*** ( .5 .2 8 3 )* * * (-3  574)*** ( -2 .I6 I )* * (-1 .5 7 8 ) (-1 6 4 2 ) (-4 .926 )*** (-4  883)*** (-3 .250 )***
D E B T -0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 .000 4 )0 0 1 4 )0 0 2 41001 0 .000 0 0 0 1 0.001
1-0 .875) ( -0 4 5 6 ) (0 0 0 6 ) (-1 .018 ) ( I 560) ( -1 .0 2 0 ) (4 ). 142) (1 .297 ) (0 .7 9 7 )
IN S ID E R -0.004 -0.003 41.003 4 )0 0 3 4)18)2 4 )0 0 4 4 )0 0 5 4 )0 0 3 4 )0 0 2
(-2 .7 7 0 )* * * (-2 .0 1 6 )* * (-2 .391 ) • • ( 1 4 3 2 ) ( 4 )8 9 4 ) ( -2 0 9 4 )* * (-2 .373 )** ( -1 6 2 0 ) (-1 .0 7 4 )
IN S T IT U T E 0 .000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 )0 0 2 -0 .002 4 )0 0 1 0.001 0 0 0 2 0.002
(0 .1 9 7 ) (0 .299 ) ( 0 6 1 3 ) ( 4 )9 1 0 ) ( 4 )9 7 1 ) ( 4 )4 0 7 ) (0 .9 5 8 ) (1 .355 ) (1-305)
R D E X P 0.993 4 )0 2 5 1.112 0  518 4 )0 0 3 -2 .077 1.135 2 607 2.746
(1 .3 1 9 ) ( -0 3 3 3 ) (1 322 ) 10.379) (4 1 0 4 2 ) ( -1 5 3 7 ) (1 230 ) (3 .729 )*** (2 .5 4 2 )—
A D V E X P -0 .232 0  352 0 0 8 0 0  195 1.019 0 7 5 5 4 )7 4 9 -2.811 -0.755
(-0 2 IM ) ( 0 3 5 6 ) (0  0 7 5 ) (0  129) (0 .8 9 9 ) (0 .5 3 4 ) ( -0 4 3 7 ) (-1 .441 ) (41.485)
C C F 0 3 9 5 0 4 5 7 0 .702 0 4 3 5 0 6 7 1 0  745 0 3 5 9 0 4 3 4 0 .7 3 0
(3 .3 1 0 )* * * <3.891 ) • • • (5 .5 7 1 )* * * (2  6 8 8 )*** (3 .7 6 4 )* * * (4  147)*** 11.957)* (2 .724 )*** (4 .1 3 8 )* * *
N C C F 0 .142 0 .328 0 2 8 4 0 2 0 5 0.283 0 0 9 7 0  119 0 3 3 1 0 .350
(1 .5 6 1 ) (3 .5 6 3 )* * * (3 .3 1 7 )* * * (1 234 ) (1 557 ) ( 0 6 3 4 ) (1 .0 5 9 ) (3 .101 )*** (3 .3 1 2 )* * *
F-V alue 6.247 7.005 7.352 2 6 40 3.682 3 6 1 4 4 .7 7 0 7.712 6 .167
p- value (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0 0 0 8 )* * * ( 0 0 0 0 )* * * (0 .001  ) • • • (0 0 0 0 )* * * (0 .000 )*** (0 .0 0 0 )* * *
R ' 0.071 0 .0 7 9 0 0 8 3 0 0 6 8 0 0 9 3 0 0 9 1 0 .0 8 0 0 1 2 4 0.102
A di-R ’ 0 0 6 0 0.068 0 0 7 2 0 0 1 2 0 .068 0 0 6 6 0.064 0.108 0.085
Table 13
Number and Frequency of Overseas Acquisitions by U.S. Bidders per Year
The table lists the number and frequency o f 1599 overseas completed acquisition announcements reported in the 
MdcA Journal and confirmed by the Wall Street Journal over the 1991-1997 period. The sample excludes acquisitions 
o f  bidder firms that make domestic acquisitions in the same calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or 
assumed to be less than, S S million value. Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded 
from the sample such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit 
SIC codes from 70 to 89). An acquisition is defined as ‘'diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core 
business does not match with that o f the target firm, and as “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code of the bidder's core 
business is the same o f  the target. Acquisitions that were reported in the M&A Journal but for which Compustat data 
was not available have been identified as “other”. The geographic diversity o f the target firm’s country has been 
classified as "developed" or "emerging” in accordance with the emerging market definition of IFC’s Emerging 
Markets Data Base. According to this definition “ All stock markets in developing countries are considered to be 
‘emerging’. Developing countries are those classified by the World Bank as either low- or middle-income economies, 
regardless o f  their particular stage of development..".
Number and Frequency of Overseas Acquisitions per Year
Y e a r F o c u s in g D iv e r s i f y in g O th e r T o ta l F r e q u e n c y  ( % )
[991 D eveloped  C ountries 34 23 30 87
59.65% 40.35%
1991 E m erg ing  C ountries 4 4 1 9
50.00% 50.00%
1991-Total 38 27 31 96 6.00%
58.46% 41.54%
1992 D eve loped  C ountries 44 24 31 99
64.71% 35.29%
1992 E m erg ing  C ountries 6 6 5 17
50.00% 50.00%
1992-Total 50 30 36 116 7.25%
62.50% 37.50%
1993 D eveloped  C oun tries 62 49 83 194
55.86% 44.14%
1993 E m erg ing  C ountries s s 15 18 55
59.46% 40.54%
1993-Total 84 64 101 249 15.57%
56.76% 43.24%
1994 D eve loped  C oun tries 79 65 67 211
54.86% 45 .14%
1994 E m erg ing  Countries 25 9 18 52
73.53% 26.47%
1994-Total 104 74 85 263 16.45%
58.43% 41 .57%
1995 D eve loped  C ountries 71 49 95 215
59.17% 4 0.83%
1995 E m erg ing  C ountries 41 18 18 77
69 .49% 30.51%
1995-Total 112 67 113 292 18.2674
6 1 5 7 % 37.43%
1996 D eve loped  C oun tries 74 64 70 208
53.62% 46.38%
19%  E m erg ing  C ountries 4 6 16 15 77
74 .19% 25.81%
1996-Total 120 30 85 285 17.82*4
60 .00% 40.00%
1997 D eveloped  C ountries 88 71 53 212
5 5 .35% 44 .65%
1997 E m erg ing  Countries 48 15 23 86
76 .19% 23.81%
1997-Total 136 86 76 298 18.64%
6 1 .26% 38.74%
1991-97 D eve loped  C ountries 4 52 345 429 1226
5 6 .71% 43.29%
1991-97 E m erg ing  Countries 192 83 98 373
6 9 .82% 30.18%
1991-97-Total 644 428 527 1599 100%
6 0 .07% 39.93%
















Sample Description of Overseas Acquisitions by Year
The table presents the final number o f overseas acquisitions that arc included in the sample. The initial sample consists o f 1599 overseas acquisitions. The 
sample excludes acquisitions o f bidder firms that make domestic acquisitions in the same calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to be 
less than, $ 5 million value. Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded from the sample such as: Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). An acquisition is defined as “diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code 
of the bidder’s core business does not match with that o f the target firm, and as "focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder's core business is the same
Sample Description o f Overseas Acquisitions by Year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1991-1997
Number o f overseas acquisitions for which we found the merger announccmcni 
in the M&A Journal and confirmed with The Wall Street Journal.
96 114 249 263 292 285 298 1599
Number o f  overseas acquisitions for which bidder data was not available in 
COMPUSTAT.
31 36 101 85 120 89 79 541
Number o f overseas acquisitions made by bidder firms whose core business is in 
non-manufacturing industries such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2- 
digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89).
3 3 6 13 8 10 12 55
Number o f dual overseas acquisitions in core and non-core lines o f  business by 
bidders on the same calendar years.
6 8 II 30 20 33 34 142
Number of additional overseas acquisitions made by the bidder in core or non- 
core lines o f business on the same calendar year.
2 3 22 18 20 25 25 117
Number o f overseas firm-year acquisitions included in the final sample 54 64 109 117 124 128 148 744
Number and frequency o f focusing acquisitions in the final sample. 33 43 62 75 82 80 96 471
61.11% 67.19% 56.88% 64.10% 66.13% 62.50% 64.86% 63.31%
Number and frequency o f diversifying acquisitions in the final sample. 21 21 47 42 42 48 52 273
38.89% 32.81% 43.12% 35.90% 33.87% 37.50% 35.14% 36.69%
Table 15
Type of Overseas Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on 2
digit SIC Code
The table presents the type of overseas firm-year acquisitions by the industry classification o f bidder firm's 
core business at the 2 digit SIC code in the year prior to the acquisition. The sample consists of 744 
overseas firm-year acquisitions. The sample excludes acquisitions o f bidder firms that make domestic 
acquisitions in the same calendar year and acquisitions which are less than, or assumed to be less than, S 
5 million value. Acquisitions in non-manufacturing industries have also been excluded from the sample 
such as: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC 
codes from 70 to 89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s 
core business does not match with that o f  the target firm, and we define acquisitions as ‘ focusing” when 
the 2 digit SIC code of the bidder’s core business is the same o f the target.____________________________
Type of Overseas Acquisitions by Industry Classification of Bidder Firms based on the 2 Digit SIC 
Code
2-Digit SIC Title and Description o f Industries
Number 
of Acquisitions
Focusing Diversifying Total TOTAL
Division A: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 









10 Metal Mining 10 3 13
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 21 5 26
14 Mining and Quarrying Nonmetal Minerals, 1 I 2
Except Fuels 




Construction-Special Trade Contractors I 2 3




Food and Kindred Products 22 4 26
21 Tobacco Products 1 - 1
22 Textile Mill Products 9 6 15
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products 4 2 6
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except 2 - 2
25
Furniture
Furniture and Fixtures 2 7 9
26 Paper and Allied Products 15 10 25
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 16 5 21
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 68 37 105
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 5 7 12
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 7 15 22
31 Leather and Leather Products 2 2 4
32 Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 2 1 3
33 Primary Metal Products 8 5 13
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery 11 10 21
and Transportation Equipment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 53 46 99
Computer Equipment
36 Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment 50 29 79
and
Components, Except Computer Equipment
37 Transportation Equipment 19 16 35
38 Measuring, Analyzing and Controlling 33 19 52
Instruments: Photo graphic; Medical and
Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 3 8 11
Total 332 229 561 561
Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, Sanitary Services
40 Railroad Transportation 3 3
42 Motor Freight Transportation and 5 2 7
44
Warehousing 
Water Transportation 3 3 6
45 Air Transportation 6 - 6
47 Transportation Services 5 3 8
48 Communications 14 1 15
49 Electric. Gas and Sanitary Services 22 4 26
Total 58 13 71 71
Division F: Wholesale Trade
50 Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 23 6 29
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 10 5 15
52 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden 1 - 1
53
Supply, and Mobile Home Dealers 
General Merchandise Stores 2 1 3
54 Food Stores 1 - I
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores - 1 1
58 Eating and Drinking Places 6 - 6
59 Miscellaneous Retail 3 4 7
Total 46 17 63 63
TOTAL 471 273 744 744
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 16
Summary Statistics o f Bidder Firms and Overseas Acquisitions
The table presents the summary statistics for bidder firms that made overseas acquisitions over the 1991- 
1997 period. The sample consists of 744 firm-year acquisitions and includes all acquisitions which are of, 
or assumed to be of, S 5 million value or higher. The sample does not cover bidder and target firms in 
non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and 
Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We combine the value o f acquisitions for bidder firms that 
made more than one acquisition in a calendar year and count it as one acquisition-year observation. Total 
Sales is defined as the gross sales o f the bidder firm net o f sales discounts in million S. Foreign/Total 
Sales is the percentage o f foreign sales o f the bidder firm divided by net sales. Market Value is defined as 
the number o f shares multiplied by the average stock price o f the bidder firm in million S. Total Assets is 
defined as current assets plus net property, plant, and equipment plus other non-current assets o f the 
bidder firm in million S. Debt/Total Capital is percentage of total debt divided by invested capital. 
Number o f Segments is the number of distinct lines o f business the bidder firm is operating at the 2 digit 
SIC code level. Number o f Acquisitions is the total number of acquisitions completed by the bidder firm in 
the year o f the acquisition. Insider ownership and institutional ownership are the average number of 
shares held by insiders and held by institutions divided by the average number o f shares outstanding for 
the bidder firm respectively. Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f  outstanding shares plus liquidation 
value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets o f the bidder 
firm. All values refer to the year prior to the acquisition unless otherwise noted above.
Summary Statistics and Sample Characteristics
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Total Sales (million S) 690 3,969.31 739.33 11.31 152,172.00
Foreign/Total Sales (%) 608 21.53 16.38 0.00 94.56
Market Value (million S) 666 4,003.86 676.20 11.14 121,716.00
Total Assets (million S) 699 4,572.70 594.19 10.77 243,283.00
Debt/Total Capital (%) 710 38.76 37.40 0.00 94.64
Number of Segments 744 1.63 1.00 1.00 5.00
Number of Acquisitions/year 744 1.15 1.00 1.00 5.00
Size o f Acquisition(s) (million S) 326 182.99 54.65 5.00 4,980.00
Insider Ownership (%) 685 14.83 7.31 0.00 87.07
Institutional Ownership (%) 670 47.23 51.14 0.00 87.26
Tobin's Q 643 1.362 1.036 0.12 8.29


















Pre-Acquisition Valuation Measures of Bidder Firms That Make Overseas Acquisitions
The table presents the raw and industry-adjusted (percentage valuation premium/discount) valuation measures o f bidder firms that made only overseas 
acquisitions The sample consists o f 744 overseas firm-acquisitions over the 1991-97 period. The sample includes all acquisitions which arc of, or assumed to be 
of, $ 5 million value or higher. The sample does not cover target firms in non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes 
from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying’’ when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core business 
does not match with that o f  the target firm, and we define acquisitions as ‘'focusing” when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core business is the same o f the 
target. The numbers in cells are the means, the numbers in [ ] brackets are the medians, and the numbers in parentheses arc the number o f  observations. 
Tobin’s Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by 
total assets. Excess Market Value (EMV) is defined as the market value o f  equity less book value o f equity normalized by total sales. Industry-adjusted 
valuation measures are computed using the methodology o f Berger and Ofek (1995); namely the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f raw valuation measure to their 
imputed value. Imputed performance measures are computed by multiplying the weights o f different business segments with the median value o f the 
performance measures for stand alone firms that are in the same 2 digit SIC code industry and that have size within 50% and 200% o f the size o f the bidding 
firm's business segment. Year 0 is the year o f acquisition. The significance o f means difference is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon 
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 Panel C: Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q for Bidder Firms That Make Foreign Acquisitions
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Panel P: Industry Adjusted Excess Market Value for Bidder Firms That Make Foreign Acquisitions
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Cross Sectional Logistic Regressions Relating Firm Characteristics to Type of Overseas Acquisitions
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Post Acquisition Valuation Measures of Bidder Firms That Make Overseas Acquisitions
The table presents the raw and industry-adjusted (percentage valuation premium/discount) valuation measures o f bidder firms that made only overseas 
acquisitions The sample consists o f 744 overseas firm-acquisitions over the 1991-97 period. The sample includes all acquisitions which are of, or assumed to be 
of, $ S million value or higher. The sample does not cover target firms in non-manufacturing industries: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes 
from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). We define acquisitions as “diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder’s core business 
does not match with that o f  the target firm, and we define acquisitions as “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder's core business is the same o f the 
target. The numbers in cells are the means, the numbers in [ ] brackets are the medians, and the numbers in parentheses are the number o f  observations. 
Tobin's Q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by 
total assets. Excess Market Value (EMV) is defined as the market value o f equity less book value o f equity normalized by total sales. Industry-adjusted 
valuation measures are computed using the methodology o f Berger and Ofek ( 199S); namely the natural logarithm o f the ratio o f raw valuation measure to their 
imputed value. Imputed performance measures are computed by multiplying the weights o f  different business segments with the median value o f  the 
performance measures for stand alone firms that are in the same 2 digit SIC code industry and that have size within S0% and 200% o f the size o f the bidding 
firm's business segment. Year 0  is the year of acquisition. The significance o f means difference is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-paramctric Wilcoxon 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Panel B: Post-Acquisition Excess Market Value (EMV) for Bidder Firms That Make Overseas Acquisitions
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(M> |  53  9 0 ) ) 5 9 .7 5  | 1 5 0  3 0 ) | 9 4 5 ) 0 9 1 1 ) -44 2 7 —  | |  -54  53— •  ) |  -1 6 0 6 * *  ) ( -3 8 .4 7  ) - 0 .018
( n -1 9 5 ) ( n -8 6 ) ( n - l ( W ) ( n —181) ( n -8 0 ) ( n —101)
S ing le  S egm ent 98 .32 102 95 8 6 6 7 16 28 0  305 - 3 2 2 4 — -3 1 .8 2 — -33 .41** 1.59 0.927
(S> |  54 6 0 ) 1 55  35 ) | 5 4  4 0 | |  0 9 5 ) 0  161 |  -2 0  4 5 —  ) | -18 .07*** ) 1 -22 2«*  1 I 4 1 4 ) 0.792
( n -3 6 6 ) ( n -2 6 2 ) ( n -1 0 4 ) (n —330) ( n -2 4 3 ) (n * 8 7 )
M m can-S m can  p-valuc - 1 3 .1 6 0 2 1 6 -23 3 8 * 0 0 7 4 2 8 9  0  872 -6  19 0 .577 -27 77* 0 .062 11.74 0  525
IM m ed-S m ed l p -valuc 1 -0  70  1 0  875 1 4  4 0  1 0 6 2 8 1 -4  10 1 0 5 1 3 1 -23 8 2 1 0  309 ( - 3 6 4 6  1 -  0 .036 ( 6 .1 5  10 .862
Y ear 3 A ll F irm s 84  88 89.23 7 7 8 1 1 1 4 2 0 2 2 5 -32 .95*** -3 8 .1 0 — -2 4  4 5 — -13  65 0 .2 1 9
|  53 25 I | 5 4  5 0 | I 52 25  | 1 2 2 5  ) 0  941 [ -28  8 9 —  ) I -3 1 .1 7 — | | -1 6 .8 8 — * ) 1 -1 4 .2 9 ] 0 .257
(n -4 3 6 > ( n -2 7 0 ) ( n -1 6 6 ) ( n -3 9 5 ) (n “ 2 4 6 ) ( n —149)
M ulti S egm ent 79.25 83 .15 7 6 3 3 6  82 0  6 1 6 -3 9 3 2 * * * -5 7 .7 6 — •2 6 2 1  — -31 55* 0.071
(M l 1 51-50 | 1 59  45  ) |  4 6  7 0 1 |  I2  75 | 0 5 1 0 |  -35  8 6 —  | |  -57 3 8 —  | | -22  0 7 -  | 1 -3 5 .3 1 ) 0  136
(n -1 5 4 ) (n -6 6 ) ( n - 8 8 ) ( n -1 4 2 ) <n—59) (n —83)
S ing le  S egm ent 87 .96 91 2 0 79  4 8 I I  72 0 3 5 8 -29 .37*** •31 8 9 — -2 2 2 5 * - 9 6 4 0 .519
(S> |  54  2 0 ) I V) 55 | |  6 0 6 5 | | -10 1 0 ) 0 7 3 1 | - I 8  13— | | -1 9 .1 6 — ) |  -16  27) 1 -2 .8 9 ] 0 .474
Cn—282) (n -2 (W ) ( n —7 8 ) (n -2 5 3 ) ( n - l 8 7 ) (n -6 6 )
M m can-S m can  p -valuc -8  71 0 .353 -8 0 5  0  531 -3  15 0 8 1 5 -9 9 5  0 .380 •25 8 7 0  115 -3 .96  0 .8 0 6

















Panel C: Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q for Bidder Firms That Make Foreign Acquisitions
D a a m t k (D O M ) B M tfe n M u H inational (M N K ) B id d e r s
Tola) F ocusing D iversifying Fm ean-D m can T tiul F ocusing Diversifying Fm ean-D m can
Total A cq F ocusing Acq D iversify ing  A cq
A cquisitions A cquisitions A cquisitions (F m cd -Ih n cd ) A cquisitions A cquisitions A cquisitions (F m cd-D m cd)
D O M m can-M N F m can  IX )M m ean-M N F.m can IX JM m ean M N hm can
(F ) ID ) (F) (D )
ID O M m ed-M N K m cd) |D O M m ed -M N Iim ed | (D O M m cd-M N liroed)
YcarO A ll F in m •9.53** •7 1 7 •1 3 5 4 * 6  37 -27  82*** -33 9 3 ***
■ IB 76*** *15 17* 18 2 9 *** 2 6 7 6 — 5 2 2
I H 4 8 )
I -8  7 7 — *) |  -6  9 2 * * | ( • I 4  5 8 - ) ( 7 6 6 ) |  2 9 )8 * * * ) 1-36 13***) (-2 6  06* * * ) ( -1 0  07  )• ( 2 0 6 1  )•* * ( 29  21 J***
( n -2 3 8 ) in -1 5 0 ) (n -8 8 ) < n -330) ( n -1 9 7 ) ( n -1 3 3 )
7 0 6 23 7 1 - •7.82
M ulli Segm ent •21 10*** -1 0 6 9 * •31 23** 2 0  54 •28  16*** • 34 4 0 *** •2 3 4 1 * * *
• 1 0 9 9
(M ) |  -I5 .7 3 * * * ) | - 6  0 2 * | ( - 2 3  2 0**) 1 1 7  1 8 ) |-3 4  13***) ( 4 8  34***) |-2 7  3 2 * * * | ( - 2 1 0 2 )
|  1 8 4 0 ) ( 4 2  32 )** ( 4 1 2 )
(n -7 1 ) i» - 3 5 ) ln -3 6 ) (n -1 3 2 ) (n -5 7 ) (n -7 5 )
27  64***  
( 2 1 4 2  )—
11.44 
|  I6  8 8 |S ingle  Segm ent  
(S )
•4 61
|  -7 .3 9 * |
-6  10 
| - 7  39* |
-I 30  
1 -8 4 0 )
4 8 0
| i  o i l
-27 59***  
(-28  S I* * * )
-33 74—  
( -2 8 8 I * * * )
• 1 2 7 4  
(-25  2 8 * |
• 2 1 0 0
l - J H I
2 2 9 8 * * *
|2 I . I 2 ) * * *
(n -1 6 7 ) |n - U 5 ) I n - 52 ) (n - ! 9 8 ) (n -1 4 0 ) (n -5 8 )
M m can-Sm can p-valuc • 16 4 9 * 0 0 3 ) •4 59  0  597 -29  9 J *  0 0 5 7 - 0 5 7 0 9 3 8 - 0 6 6 0 9 1 6 • 1 0 6 7 0 4 2 6
IM m ed-Sm edl n* value 1 -R 34 1 0 2 1 6 1 1 3 7 ) 0 9 2 7 1 -14 8 0 1 0 ) 1 6 1 -5 62  1 0 9 1 7 1 -1 9  53 1 0 8 9 9 1 - 2 0 4 1 0 4 8 8
Year 1 A ll Firms • I I - 14*** •7 81 -16  80** 8 9 9 •29  ) ) • • • •34  58*** •21 4 6 — -13 12*
18 19*** 2 6 7 7 * * * 4  66
1 .7  2 5 - * ) 1 -6  0 8* ) |  -1 3 .I I* * ) ( 7 0 3  ) | • 33 68* * * ) (-3 6  9 3 ***) (-24  77***) | -12 16 )• ( 2 6  4 3  J***
( 30  8 5  )* •* ( 1 1 6 6 )
In -2 3 8 ) | n - 150) (n -8 8 ) (n -3 3 5 ) |n - 2 0 l ) (n -1 3 4 )
9  2 8 2 8 3 8 - • 7 6 5
M ulti Segm ent • 19 50*** •9 41 •29  59*** 2 0 1 8 • 28 78*** •37 79*** •21 94*** • 1 585
(M ) ( I 7  2 I* * * ) 1 -6  58) |  32 55***) | 2 5  9 7 | (•34 26***) ( 4 5  9 0 * * * ) (-24  0 5 * * * | ( -21 85  )*
( 1 7 0 5  ) ( 39 32 )* * • ( - 8  .5 0 )
|n *  70) (n -3 5 ) (n -3 5 ) (n -1 3 2 ) (n -5 7 ) (n -7 5 )
25  9 9 —
( 2 6  34)***
1 2 4 9  
|  32 79)
S in g le  Segm ent
IS)
•7 6 5  
| 4  8 l* )
• 7 3 2  
1 -5  5 9 * )
•8 36  
| . ) 2 5 J
1 04
( 4 3 4 )
-29  6 9 ***
( 32  33***J
-33  31***  
(-31 9 3 ***)
•20  85*
|  -34  0 4*)
-1 2 4 6  
1 2  1 1 )
22 0 4 * * *
( 27  52 )***
( n -1 6 8 ) |n - H 5 ) (n -5 3 ) (n -2 0 3 ) |n - 1 4 4 ) i n -5 9 )
M m can-Sm can p -valuc • 1 1 .8 5 0  162 -2 0 9 0 8 3 4 -21 23  0 1 4 7 0 9 1 0 9 0 2 4  4 8  0  656 -1 U 9 0 9 3 3
(M m cd-Sm cdl n-value I - 12 4 0 1 0  228 1 - 0 9 9 1 0 9 7 7 1 -31 30  ) 0  116 1 -1 9 3  1 0 8 2 3 ( - 1 3 9 7  1 0 4 5 9 ( 9 9 9 ( 0 8 3 5
Year 2 A ll Firms • 15 41*** -I I  06** •22  89** II 83 -2 6  33*** •35  14*** • 1 4 0 1 * * •21 13**
11.12* 24 08*** •8.88
(•13  8 6 — ) l - l l  7 I * * | |-2 2  16**) ( 1 0 4 5  ) ( 30  34***) ( 4 0  4 8 ***) ( - I 7  78**) |  22 70)*** ( 16 48)*
( 28  77)*** { 4 .3 8 )
(n -1 8 2 ) i n - l 15) (n -6 7 ) (n -2 7 0 ) In -1 6 0 ) ( n - l 10)
4 4 3 381 •8 99
M ulti Segm ent •29  3 9*** • 3 3 2 2 - * •26  0 8* 7 |4 -24  9 6 *** •37 0 3 *** • 1 709 * * -19  94*
|M > |-2 6  15***) |-2 5  27***) 1 -27 0 3 * ) ( 1 7 6 ) |  24  2 7 — ) (•3 7 .9 2 * — ) (-2 0  57**) 1 -17 35 )
1 - 1 8 8 ) ( 1 2 6 5 ) ( - 6 .4 6 )
( n - 5 4 | < n -2 5 ) (n -2 9 ) (n -1 0 9 ) (n -4 3 ) (n -6 6 )
29  5 5 — • 1 1 0 9
S in g le  Segm ent •9 5 2 * 4 9 0 •2 0 4 6 * 15 56 • 27 60*** •34  4 5 *** -9 3 7 •25 08*
18 0 8**
IS) |  -8  82* | |  5 4 3 * ) 1-21 I0 * | ( 1 5 6 7 ) (•35  0 9 * * * | ( 4 2  32***) |  -8 16) |  -34 1 6 |—
( 2 6  27  ) • • ( 36  89  ) • • * (■ 1 2 9 4 )
(n -1 2 8 ) (n -9 0 ) (o * 3 8 ) (n -1 6 1 ) 1 0 -1 1 7 ) (n -4 4 )
M m can-Sm can p -valuc • 19 87* 0 0 5 4 •28 32** 0 0 1 3 -5 6 2 0  772 2 6 4  0  744 •2 58 0  808 -7 72 0  587
1 -17  3 )  |» 0 0 6 3 I 1 9 8 4  | * * « 0 2 ) 1 - 5 9 3  1 0 9 2 9 1 10 82 1 0  784 1 4 4 0  1 0 9 4 3 I -1 2 4 1  1 0 3 6 0
Year 3 A ll Firms •20  8 6*** •20  5 8*** -21 3 5 - 0  77 •2 2 7 9 * * * -27  95*** • 14 81 — -1 3 1 4
1 9 1 7 3 7  
1 12 32 )
•6.54
1-0 -141(-I 4  07* * * ) ( - 1 5 4 7 — ) 1 -1 2 3 4 * ) 1 -1  H I (-2 1 6 4 * * * ) |  27  7 9 - * ) (-12 20**) ( -1 5  59  )
( 7 57 )
(n -1 5 1 ) in -9 6 ) ( 0 -5 5 ) |n - 2 1 4 ) ( n - l  3(1) (n -8 4 )
•9 78 -6 5 3 -1 0 5 6
M ulti Segm ent ■34 74*** • 39  6 2*** -30  64* 8 9 8 •24 96*** • 33 09*** -20  0 8*** -1301
(M) ( - 2 8  8 3 * * * | 1-39 2 8 * * * | 1 -2 5 0 9 * ) 1 - 1 4 1 9 ) 1*23 57***) (-2 9  56***) |- I 5  IS ***) I * I 4 4 |  ) I - 5 2 6 J 1 -V 7 2 ) 1 1
(n-46) (n -2 1 ) ln - 2 5 ) (n -K 8 | (n -3 3 ) (n -5 5 )
6  4 9  
1 14 7 1 J
1 094  
|  1 9 0 2 )
•It 79  
1 -2  271S in g le  Segm ent 
IS)
• 14 78*  
1 -5  83**)
-15 25* 
| . 5  2 5 * |
•1 3 6 1 *
|  -6 0 4 * )
•1 6 4
[I1 7 9 |
•21 27***
( 2 0  54***)
•26  19***  
1-24 2 7 — )
4  82  
1 -3  77)
•21 37 
( -20 50)
(n -1 0 5 ) (n -7 5 ) (n -3 0 ) (n -1 2 6 ) (n -9 7 ) (n -2 9 )
M m can-Sm can p -valuc - 1 9 9 6 0 1 0 8 -24 37 0 ) 1 6 -1 7 0 3 0 4 2 8 •3 6 9  0  684 •6 9 0 0  578 - 1 5 2 6 0 3 5 6

















Panel P: Industry Adjusted Excess Market Value for Bidder Firms That Make Foreign Acquisitions
PMRCStk (D O M ) B id d er* M u tt lu c ie « a J (M N F .) B id d er*
T o u l F ocusing D iversifying F m ean-D m can T o u l Focusing D iversifying F m ean-D m can T o u l A cq F ocusing A cq D iversifying A cq
A cquisitions A cquisitions A cquisitions (Im cd -D m cd ) A cquisitions A cquisitions A cquisitions (F m cd-D m ed) D O M m can-M N Fm can D O M m can-M N F m can  D O M m ean-M N Fm can
IF) ID ) (F ) (D ) ID O M m ed-M N F m cd) (D O M m ed-M N F m ed) ID O M m cd-M N Fm ed]
YcarO A ll Firm* • II 38 •9  8 6 • 1 3 9 0 4 0 4 • 4 4 6 1 * * * •50  8 7*** •35  17*** -1 5 7 0 3 )  23***
4 1 .01*** 21.27
( - 6 6 3 ] 1 -6  6 5 ) ( - 5  57) H O * ) (•3 9  6 7* * * ) ( - 3 )  II* * * ) ( •2 6  08***J ( 27  0 3  ) ( 33 02  )•* * ( 4 6  4 6  )**•
( 2 0 5 1  |
( n * 2 !3 ) (n -1 3 3 ) (n -8 0 ) (n -3 2 6 ) (n -1 9 6 ) (n -1 3 0 )
43  97** 5.36
M ulti Segm ent -J9 .36*** •34  91* * * -44  10** 9 1 9 6 2  32*** .7 8  88*** -49  4 6*** -29  42
2 2 9 6
(M ) |-2 9  87***} |-2 8  67 * * * ) | - 3 4 9 |* * | ( 6 2 4 ) 1 -5 3 2 4 * * * ) (-75  I2 * * * l | - ) 9  4 J * * * | ( 3 5 6 9 )
( I 3  37 J | 4 6 4 5  |* ( 4 5 2 )
(n -64> (n -3 3 ) (n -3 1 ) (n -1 3 5 ) (n -5 9 ) (n -7 6 )
3 7 2 1 * * 2 0 2 5
S ingle  Segm ent 0 6 4 -I 59 5 2 0 •6 7 9 •32 09*** -38  80*** -1 3 0 5 - 2 ) 7 5 32 7 )* *
( S | | 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 ) ( 2 34) | - 2  3 4 | (-27  52***) |-3 9 4 3 * * * ) ( - 1 5 8 ) 1 1 - 2 ) 6 0 ) ( 27  52 )***
( 39 4 )  )** ( I B  17)
( n * 149) ln - 1 0 0 ) ( n -4 9 ) (n -1 9 1 ) ( n -1 3 7 ) i n -  54)
M m can-Sm can p-valuc  
IM m ed-Sm edl p-valuc
•40  00 * * *  0 0 0 9 •33  32** 0 0 3 3 •49  3 0 * 0 0 9 5 • ) 0  2 3 * * 0 0 ) l • 4 0 0 8 * * 0 0 4 3 • 3 4 4 1  0  151
1 -29  8 7  l* * * 0 0 0 7 1 -2 8 6 7  I** 0 0 4 7 I -37  2 5  1 * 0 0 5 9 1 -25 72 1 * 0 0 5 3 1 -33 6 9 1 * 0 0 8 2 1 - 2 ) 6 0 1 0  115
Year 1 A ll Firm* -12 .59 • 1 0 6 2 • 1 6 0 0 5 ) 8 -48  41*** -52 27*** -42 62*** •9 65 35 82***
41 65*** 2 6 6 2
|  >12 83") 1 -7  8 8 ) 1 -2 2  0 4*) ( 1 4  1 6 ) ( 50  2 0 * * * ) (-57  18*** | 1-41 26***) ( - 1 5 9 2  1 ( 37  37 ) • • • ( 4 9  3 0 )* * * ( 19 22 )*
( n * 2 |8 ) (n -1 3 8 ) ( n -8 0 ) ( n -3 2 8 ) (n -1 9 7 ) (n -1 3 1 )
16 72 -1 7 0 4
M ulii Segm ent • 54 .39*** -44  17** •65 60* 21 4J 53 83*** .6 0  8 9*** -48  56*** -1 2 3 3 -0  5 6
(M ) (-3 4  8J***) |-2 7  89* * ) 1-63 03* * * ) | 3 5  1 4 ) J-5S 24***J (•7 5 .4 1 * * * ) ( 4 3  84***) ( - 3 1 5 7 )
1 2 0 4 1  ) ( 4 7  52 ! ( - 1 9 .1 9 )
(n -6 5 ) ( n - 34) ln - 3 1 ) (n -1 3 8 ) (n -5 9 ) |n - 7 9 )
4 8 9 3 * * * 4 8 9 7 *
S ingle  Segm ent 5 17 0  35 1 ) 3 9 • 1 5 0 4 -44 48*** -48  58*** • 3 )  58* •1 3 0 0 4 9  6 5***
(S> 1 -3 77) | - 4  0 7 ) ( 7 4 3 ) ( - 1 1 5 0 ) ( -4 6  68 * * * ) |  5I 88***) 1 -23 9 2* ) ( - 2 7  96J
( 4 2  91 )*** |  4 7  81 ) • • * (3 1 .3 5 )*
(n -1 5 3 ) ( n » !0 4 ) (n -4 9 ) ( n -1 9 0 ) ( n - l ) 8 ) (n -S 2 )
M m can-Sm can p-value •S9 5 6 * * * 0 0 0 l -44  52** 0  0 34 •8 0  9 9* * *  0 0 0 8 - 9 ) 5 0  4 64 - 1 2 3 1 0 4 6 9 • 1 4 9 8 0 4 8 7
IM m ed-Sm edl p-valuc 1 -31 0 6  I*** 0 0 0 ) 1 -2 3  82  1 * 0 0 8 5 1 -7 0  4 6  1*** 0  007 1 8  5 6  ) 0 2 6 9 1 - 2 ) 5 ) 1 0 2 6 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 ) 0 3 4 0
Year 2 A ll Firm* •1 9  18* -22 37* - I 3 7 | •8 6 6 -45 79*** -53 85*** •34  26*** • 19 39
2 6 6 1 * * 31 48* 20.55
|  -8  3 6 * * | |  I 2 0 0 * * | ( 3 6 5 ) ( - 8 ) 5 ) I-52 42 * * * ) ( 6 4  95***) (•27  32***) ( - 3 7  63) ) 4 4  0 6)** ( 52 95)**
( 2 3 6 7 )
(n -1 6 8 ) ( n -1 0 6 ) |n - 6 2 ) (n -2 6 0 ) (n -1 5 3 ) (n -1 0 7 )
3 26 -1 6 5 3 21.32M uln Segm ent •36  28** -66  12*** -11 58 •54 54* •39  54*** -49  59*** • 32 9 0** -1 6 6 9
(M ) (-37  7 I* * * ) 1 -47 5 6 * * * | ( - 1 5 2 6 ) ( -32 JO) ( 50  74***) ( 5 9  85 * * * ) (-23  97* * ) ( - 3 5  8 8  j ( 1 3 0 3 ) ) I 2 2 9 J 1 **71J
(n -5 3 ) (n-*24) ( n -2 9 ) ( n - l 13) (n -4 5 ) (n -6 8 )
4 6  OS** 2 1 0 6
S ingle  Segm ent •II  29 -9  57 -1 5 5 8 6 0 1 -50  59*** • 55 62*** •3 6 6 4 * •1 8 9 8 39 30**
(S) 1 -3  8 1 ) ( - 4 6 1 ) [ 2 3 4 ) ( 4 , 9 5 ) I-52 93 * * * ) ( 7 0 4 1 — J (-3 I 0 1 * ) |  - 3 9 4 0 ) ( 4 9  12 )* * ( 6 5  8 0 )* *
| ) 3 ) 5 )
( n - l I S ) (n -8 2 ) ln - 3 3 ) I n - 147) (n -1 0 8 ) (n -3 9 )
M m can-Sm can p-valuc -24 9 9  0  224 •56 55** 0 0 3 6 4  0 0  0  902 II 0 5  0  448 6  0 ) 0  767 3 74 0  882
IM m ed-Sm edl p-value 1 -33 9 0  1 0  134 1 -42 9 5 l* * 0 0 4 6 1 - 1 7 6 0 ) 0 7 8 3 | 2 1 9 ) 0  708 |  10 56  ) 0 9 6 5 I 7 0 4 1 0 8 2 6
Year 3 A ll Firms • 1541 •22 05* -5 0 4 •1701 -40  78*** -45 87*** -3 )  OS*** • 1 2 8 2
25 37** 23 82 280 1
1 *5 78* ) | I O h l * | ) I 2 8 | 1 - 1 1 8 9 ) j-45  87***) (-65  9 4* * * ) ( 3 1  87***) ( - 3 4  0 7 1 ( 4 0  16 )* * | 5 5 ) ) |
( 3 ) 1 5 )
(0 * 1 2 8 ) ( n -7 8 ) (n -5 0 ) (n -2 0 4 ) (n -1 2 3 ) ( i i* 8 l)
• 2 ) 8 0 15 97
MuJli Segm ent -39  4 2** -68  22** -1 8 6 9 -49  5 ) -38  25*** •44 42*** -34 66*** -9  76 •1 17
IM ) |  -3 6 9 0 * *  | ( - 5 7  3 4 * * ) 1 -4  2 6 ) ( • 5 ) 0 8 ) | - ) l  87***) ( -5 )  32**) (-30  6 6* * ) ( -2 2  6 6 )
1 - 5 0 3  1 H « 2 | ( 2 6 4 0 1
(n -4 3 ) (n -1 8 ) ( n -2 3 ) (n -8 7 ) | n - ) 2 | (n -5 5 )
38 19* 3 8 2 7
S ingle  Segm ent •3 26 •8 20 8 6 1 •1 6 8 1 •42 67*** -46  )9 * * * •29  66* -16  73 3 9 4 1 * *
IS! | 0  0 0 ) | - l  1 5 ) 1 5 3 4 ) ( -6 4 9 ) ( 56  7 4 * * * | (-68  0 )* * * ) ( •4 I 6 0 * | ( 2 6 4 3 ) ( 56 74)**
( 6 6  88)* ( 4 6 9 4 )
(n -8 S ) (n -6 0 ) ( n -2 3 ) (n -1 1 7 ) t n - 9 | ) (n -2 6 )
M m can-Sm can p-value • 36 16* 0 0 9 4 • 6 0 0 2 * 0 0 3 7 •27 3 0 0 ) 2 8 4  4 2  0  770 1 9 7  0 9 2 4 ■ 5 0 0 0 8 3 )
IM m ed-Sm edl p-value 1 -36 9 0 1 * 0  054 1 -5 6  19 ) • •  0 0 ) 9 ( - 9 6 0  ) 0 2 4 8 1 24 87 ) 0  834 1 14 7 1 ) 0  943 |  10 9 4  1 0  824
Table 20
Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Changes in Post-Acquisition Valuation Measures to Effects of Diversification
The dependent variables in the cross-sectional regressions arc the change in post-acquisition valuation measures of the overseas bidder from the end of year - I till the end of years 1,2 and 3. The sample 
includes 744 overseas firm-year observations. Tobin's Q is computed as market value of outstanding shares plus liquidation value of preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total 
assets. Excess Market Value (EMV) is defined as the market value of equity less book value of equity normalized by total sales. Industry-adjustmenl is made by using the methodology of Berger and Ofek 
(1995). The raw dependent variables are normalized by the pre-acquisition average of valuation measures. The constant term in the cross-sectional regressions reported in Panels AI and A2 captures the effect 
of Ihe overseas acquisition on single-segment bidders that make diversifying acquisilions. SINGLEFOCUSD is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the bidder is a single-segment firm that makes a 
focusing acquisition overseas, and zero otherwise. MULTIDIVERD is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if a multi-segment bidder makes a diversifying acquisition overseas and zero otherwise. 
MULTIFOCUSD is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if a multi-segment bidder makes a focusing acquisition and zero otherwise. The constant term in Ihc cross-sectional regressions reported in 
panels Bl and B2 captures the effect of the overseas acquisition on single-segment multinational bidders that make diversifying acquisitions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.
Panel Al: Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Post-Acquisition Changes in Kaw Tobin’s Q and EMV to Effects of Diversification
D e p e n d e n t V a ria b le C o n s ta n t
S IN G L E
F O C U S
D U M M Y
M U L T I
D IV E R
D U M M Y
M U L T I
F O C U S
D U M M Y
F -v a lu c
p -v a lu c
R ’
A d j- R ’
A  0 ( - l l o r  1y A V G Q , 0 .2 9 7 0 .0 4 9 0  0 2 5 0 .0 1 6 9 .4 9 9 0 .1 0 4
( 4 .3 2 7 )* ” ( 0 .9 1 3 ) ( 0 3 7 8 ) (0 .2 3 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ” * 0 .0 9 3
A Q ( - l l o + 2 y A V G Q ,w „ 0 ,4 6 5 0 .0 5 1 0 .0 7 7 0 0 1 6 1 1 .063 0 .1 1 9
( 6 .2 7 9 )* ” ( 0 .8 8 3 ) ( 1 .0 6 8 ) ( 0 .2 1 0 ) (0 .0 0 0 )* * * 0 .1 0 9
A Q H t o + a y A V C iQ .w , , 0 .5 3 4 -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 0 3 •0 .0 0 8 9 .9 3 4 0 .1 0 9
( 7 .9 0 1 ) ” * ( -0 .2 0 9 ) ( -0 .0 4 7 ) ( -0 .1 1 4 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 )* “ 0 .0 9 8
A  E M V  ( - l l o * i y ( l  + A V G E M V ), * .„ ) 0  107 0 0 9 9 0 .0 8 9 0 .0 7 5 4 .9 6 7 0 .0 5 7
( 2 .0 3 3 ) ” ( 2 .4 0 0 ) ” ( 1 7 3 5 ) * (1 .4 2 8 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 )* ” 0 .0 4 6
A E M V  ( - l lo O y O + A V G I - M V ) ,  _ „ ) 0 .1 6 9 0 .0 6 8 0 .1 0 2 0 .0 5 7 5 .5 9 9 0 .0 6 4
( 3 .2 0 3 )* ” (1 .6 4 9 )* ( 1 .9 8 8 ) ” (1 .0 8 2 ) (0 .0 0 0 )* * * 0  0 5 3
A  E M V  ( - l lo + 3 y < I M V G E M V ) ,  w „ ) 0 .2 4 0 0 .0 6 0 0 .0 6 9 0  0 8 0 3  6 6 7 0 .0 4 3
( 3 .6 4 4 ) ” * ( 1 .1 5 8 ) (1 .0 8 0 ) ( 1 2 1 4 ) (0 .0 0 0 )* * * 0 .0 3 1
Panel A2: Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Post-Acquisition Changes in Industry-Adjusted 'l obin’s Q and EMV to Effects of Diversification
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Panel B2: Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Posl-Acquisltion Changes in Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q and EMV to Effects of Diversification
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Pre-Acquisition Univariate Analysis of Bidders' Core and Non-Core Business Performance
The table presents the means [medians] o f  the core and non-core business performance measures at the segment level o f bidder firms that made overseas acquisilions over the 1991-1997 period. Year I is the 
year of the acquisition. The sample includes all acquisilions which are of, or assumed to be of, $ 5 million value or higher. The sample docs not include bidder and target firms in non-manufacturing industries 
such as Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes from 70 to 89). The sample also does not cover bidder firms that made both "diversifying” and 
"'focusing" acquisitions in the same calendar year. We define acquisitions as "diversifying” when the 2 digit SIC code of the bidder's core business docs not match with that o f the target firm, and “focusing" 
when the 2 digit SIC code of the bidder's core business is Ihe same of the target. We combine the value o f  acquisitions for bidder firms that made more than one acquisition in a calendar year and count it as one 
acquistlion-year observation. Cash Flow is defined as operating income plus depreciation. The significance of means difference is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-paramctric Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test is 
used to lest for the difference o f medians. • • • ,  and •  denote statistical significance for difference of groups at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
ln (Sa lcs)t-2
Ln( S ales )t-l
L n fS a lcsg
Panel A. Pre-Acquisition Sales for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel B. Pre-Acquisition Assets for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel C. Pre-Acquisition Growth in Sales for the Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel D. Pre-Acquisition Cash Flows for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel E. Pre-Acquisition Capital Expenditures for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Table 22
Post-Acquisition Univariate Analysis of Bidders’ Core and Non-Core Business Performance
The tabic presents the means [medians] o f  the core and non-core business performance measures at the segment level o f bidder firms that made domestic acquisitions over the 
1991-1997 period. Year I is the year o f  the acquisition. The sample includes all acquisitions which arc of, or assumed to be of, S 5 million value or higher. The sample docs not 
include bidder and target firms in non-manufacturing industries such as Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 67), and Services (2-digit SIC codes 
from 70 to 89). The sample also docs not cover bidder firms that made both "diversifying," and "focusing” acquisitions in the same calendar year. We define acquisitions as 
"diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code o f  the bidder's core business does not match with that o f the target firm, and “focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder's core 
business is the same o f the target. We combine the value o f acquisitions for bidder firms that made more than one acquisition in a calendar year and count it as one acquisition- 
ycar observation. Cash Flow is defined as operating income plus depreciation. The significance o f means difference is computed by one-way ANOVA. Non-parametric Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sum test is used to test for the difference o f medians. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance for difference o f  groups at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Panel B. Post-Acquisition Assets for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel C. Post Acquisition Growth in Sales for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel D. Post-Acquisition Cash Flows for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Panel E. Post-Acquisition Capital Expenditures for Core and Non-Core Business Segment of the Bidder
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Core and Non-Core Capital Expenditures of Single- and Multi-Segment Bidders That Make Overseas Acquisitions
The lablc presents the core and non-core capital expenditures o f single- and multi-segment bidders included in our sample. The sample consists o f 744 overseas firm-acquisitions made over the 1991 -97 period. 
500 of the firm-ycar acquisitions are made by single-segment bidden while the remaining 244 arc made by multi-segment bidders. The cote business segment o f the bidder is defined as the line o f  business that 
has the highest sales as percentage o f the total sales of the firm at 2 digit SIC level. The non-core business segments of the bidder are defined as the entirely o f all lines o f businesses other than the core business at 
2 digit SIC level. The core and non-core capital expenditures are defined as the capital expenditures o f the core and non-core segments respectively scaled by the total sales o f the bidders from the previous year. 
Core Cash Flows (CCF) and Non-Core Cash Flows (NCCF) are defined as the operating income plus depreciation o f the core and non-core business segments respectively normalized by the segment sales from 
the previous year. Tobin's Q is computed as market value o f outstanding shares plus liquidation value o f preferred stock plus net current assets plus long term debt divided by total assets. Induslry-adjustment is 
made by the methodology o f Berger and Ofck (1995) using sales multipliers. We define acquisitions as "diversifying" when the 2 digit SIC code of the bidder's core business does not match with that o f the target 
firm, and we define acquisitions as "focusing" when the 2 digit SIC code o f the bidder's core business is the same o f  the target. FSTSD is a dummy variable taking on a value o f one if the bidder has a foreign 
sales to total sales ratio o f 10% or higher in year t-l, and zero otherwise. DIVERD is a dummy variable taking on value o f one if the bidder makes a diversifying acquisition in year 0, and value o f zero if the 
bidder makes a focusing acquisition in year 0. 356 of the single-segment films in our sample made focusing acquisitions overseas and the remaining 144 single-segment firms made diversifying acquisitions. 115 
of the multi-segment firms in our sample made focusing acquisitions overseas and the remaining 129 multi-segment firms made diversifying acquisitions. Year 0 is the year of acquisitions, t-values o f coefficients 
are in paranthcses. ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Panel A2: Core Capital Expenditures of Slaele-See meat Firms That Make DiversifWne Acgulsiltoas Overseas
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h w l  Bl: Core C»pll»l Espmdllures of Multi-Segment Firms That Make Focusing Acquisitions Q vtrw n
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N  C C F l- l 0 .167 0 1 7 5 -0 .098 0 2 5 4 4 ) 16* 0.183 4 )0 7 5 -0 5 3 8 0 4 7 3
(0 .6 1 5 ) (2 .8 7 4 )* * * ( -0 8 7 3 ) (0 5 7 2 ) ( 4 )3 0 9 ) (2 .225 )** (-0 .7 0 0 ) (-3 .4 0 0 )* * * (2 .089 )**
0  t- l -0 0 * 3 •0 .0 )7 • 0 0 2 9 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 8 -0 0 1 5 0 .020 0.037 4 )0 5 3
( -0 9 8 5 ) (-1 .916)* (-1 720)* ( -0 4 6 3 ) (0  306) (-1 .187 ) (1 .2 0 7 ) (1 2 1 9 ) ( -1 3 9 5 )
IN IM D JQ  l- l 0 0 8 6 0  025 0 0 4 3 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 5 0.004 -0 .006 4 )0 0 3 0.013
(1 .2 2 2 ) 11.762)* (1 .4 6 6 ) (0 2 8 3 ) ( 0 0 6 0 ) (0 2 2 7 ) (4 )3 1 2 1 (4 )0 8 8 ) (0 .3 0 9 )
F -V aluc 4  130 22 .366 7 9 8 4 2.460 16 174 6 3 6 5
|>-value (0 .004 )*** (0 .000 )*  • • (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0 0 1 4 )* * (0 .0 0 0 )* * * (0 .0 0 0 )* * *
R 1 0 1 3 1 0 4 5 1 0  225 0  174 0.581 0.353
A di-R 1 0 .099 0 4 3 1 0  197 0 1 0 3 0 5 4 5 0 .298
Pawl H : Core Capital Expenditures of Multi-Segment Firm* That Make Diversifying Acquisitions Overseas
Independen t V ariab les
C O R E  C A P E X P  
(1 -0 )
C O R E  C A P E X P  
( l - l )
C O R E  C A P E X P  
(1 -2 )
C O R E  C A P E X P  (1 -0 )
(»  F S T S D )
C O R E  C A P E X P  ( l - l )
(*  F S T S D )
C O R E  C A P E X P  ( t - 2 )
(«  F S T S D )
C onslan l 0 0 3 0 -0 0 1 0 0 0 * 6 0  034 0  0 29 4 )0 3 4 0 0 6 9 0 .0 0 9 0 .026
(1 .5 6 1 ) (4 1 5 0 6 ) (3 .4 1 5 )* * * (1 064 ) ( 0 7 1 2 ) (-1 .1 6 7 ) (1 .846)* (0  371) (0 9 3 2 )
C C F l- l 0 0 8 1 0  143 4 ) 0 1 6 0 0 7 6 0  0 2 6 0  303 4 )  166 0 .014 4 )0 6 2
(2  0 2 4 )— (2 .7 8 1 )— * (4 )6 3 3 ) (1 .286 ) (0  313) (2 .3 6 4 )— (-1 2 1 6 ) (0 .3 9 8 ) (-1 .0 7 1 )
N C C F  l- l 4 )0 2 7 -0 .032 -0 0 0 8 -0 0 1 8 4 )1 6 1 0 0 0 5 4 )0 8 5 4 )0 0 3 -0 0 0 7
( -1 4 9 3 ) ( -0  946 ) (4 )6 2 2 ) ( -0  828) (-1 .702)* (0 .1 1 9 ) (-1 .0 8 7 ) (4 )2 0 4 ) (-0 .2 7 0 )
0 1 -1 0.018 0 0 3 9 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 .009 0.048 -0 .040 0.0-11 4 ) 0 2 6
(1 4 3 9 ) ( 3 .8 2 1)*** ( 0 9 5 1 ) (1)022) (0 .2 3 8 ) (2 .193 )** (-1 .569 ) (2 .255 )** (-1 2 5 4 )
IN D A D IQ l-l 0 0 2 8 0 .010 0.015 0 0 0 3 0  032 0  0 29 0.001 4 )0 3 4 0  042
(1 .621 ) (0 6 1 3 ) (1 131) (0 1 0 3 1 ( 0 8 6 8 ) (1 .427 ) ( 0  0 3 1 ) (-1 .875 )* (2 .0 4 8 )* *
F -V alue 4.493 1 1 0 2 9 1 9 0 7 2.701 7.692 1.552
p-valuc (0 .002 )*** ( 0 0 0 0 )* * * <0 113) (0 0 0 7 )* * * (0 .000 )*** (0 .1 3 8 )
R1 0 .127 0 .262 0 0 5 8 0 1 7 0 0 3 6 8 0 1 0 5
A di-R 1 0.098 0  239 0  028 0 1 0 7 0 .320 0  037
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Table 24
Cross Sectional Regressions Relating Post-Acquisition Valuation Measures to Internal Capital Market Variables
T h e  dependen t variab les in  th e  c ro ss  sec tiona l reg re ss io n s arc  th e  post*acqutsition  industry*ad justed  valuation  o f  th e  b id d e rs  based  o n  T o b in ’s  Q . T o b in ’s  Q  is  co m p u ted  a s  m ark e t value  o f  o u tstand ing  sha res p lu s  liqu ida tion  v a lue  o f  p refe rred  
stock  p lu s  net cu rren t asse ts  p lu s  long  te rm  d eb t d iv id ed  by  to tal assets. T h e  valu a tio n  prcm iunV discoun t is  com p u ted  u sing  th e  m e thodo logy  o f  B e rg er an d  O fek  (1 9 9 5 ) T h e  sam p le  in c ludes 744  firm  year acqu is itions . 5 00  o f  the  firm -year 
acqu is itions a re  m ade  by  s ing le-segm ent b id d ers  w h ile  the  rem ain ing  2 44  are  m ad e  b y  m u lti-segm en t b idders. W e d e fin e  acqu is itions a s  ’’d iversify ing”  w h en  the  2 d ig it S IC  co d e  o f  the  b id d e r 's  co re  busine ss d oes not m a tch  w ith  that o f  the  target 
firm , a n d  w e  d e fin e  acqu is itions a s  “fo cusing”  when th e  2  d ig it S IC  co d e  o f  the  b id d e r’s  co re  business is  d ie  sam e o f  the  target. 3 56  o f  the  sing le-segm en t firm s in o u r  sam p le  m ade  focusing  acqu is itions an d  th e  r em ain ing  144 s ing le-segm ent firm s 
m ade  d iversify ing  acqu isitions. 1 15 o f  th e  m u lti-segm en t firm s in  o u r  sam p le  m ade  fo cusing  acqu is itions a n d  the  rem ain ing  129  m u lti-segm en t firm s m ad e  d iversify ing  acqu is itions . D l V E R D  is a n  ind icato r variab le  tak ing  th e  value  o f  o n e  i f  the  
b idder m ade  a d iversify ing  acqu is ition  an d  ze ro  o therw ise . T h e  size  o f  th e  firm , L N (S A L E S ), is  th e  natu ra l logarithm  o f  ann u a l sa les F S T S D  is a  d u m m y  variab le  u k in g  o n  a  value  o f  o n e  i f  th e  b idder h a s  fo re ign  sa les to  to ta l sa les ra tio  o f  m ore  
th an  10% , an d  ze ro  i f  less than  10% . D E B T  is  th e  p ercen tag e  o f  to ta l d eb t d iv id ed  by  invested  cap ita l. IN S ID E R  a n d  IN S T IT U T E  are  th e  p ercen tag e  o f  shares h e ld  b y  in siders an d  in stitu tio n s  respec tive ly . K D E X P  an d  A D V E X P  are  th e  R & D  
a n d  advertising  expend itu res o f  the  b idder n o rm aliz ed  b y  to ta l sa les o f  th e  b idder. C C F  an d  N C C F  a rc  the  cash  flow s ( th e  operating  incom e p lu s  d ep rec ia tion  ) o f  th e  co re  a n d  n on -co re  busin ess  seg m en ts o f  th e  b idders n o rm alized  b y  segm ent 
sa les from  o n e  y ea r  before. T he co re  b u sin e ss  se g m en t o f  th e  b idder is  de f in ed  a s  th e  line o f  busin ess  tha t h a s  th e  h ighest sa le s  a s  p e rcen tag e  o f  the  to ta l sa les o f  the  firm  a t 2 d ig it S IC  level. T h e  non -co re  busin ess  se g m en ts  o f  th e  b idder are  
d efined  a s  the  en tire ty  o f  a ll lines o f  b u sin e sse s  o th e r  th an  th e  co re  busin ess  at 2 d ig it S IC  level. Y ear 0  is  th e  y ea r  o f  acqu is itions , t-va lues o f  co effic ien ts  a rc  in paren theses. * * * , " ,  an d  * d en o te  sta tistica l s ign ificance at 1% , 5 %  a n d  10%  levels 
respectively .
Panel A: Industry-Adjusted Tobin's Q Valuation of Single-Segment Firms
A ll S ing le -S eg m en t B idders F ocusing  S ing le -S egm en t B idders D iversify ing  S ing le-S egm ent B idders
IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ IN D A D JQ
Independen t (1 -0 ) (I“ l ) (1 -2 ) (1 -0 ) ( l - Q (1 -2 ) 0 - 0 ) ( l - l ) 0 - 2 )
V ariab les
C onslan l - 0 0 W -0 2 7 1 -0 .187 -0  176 -0  218 4 ) 2 1 6 0 2 1 6 4 )3 8 8 4 )1 9 8
(-0  629 ) (-1 .639 ) ( -1 2 1 3 ) (-1.0571 ( I  137) ( - 1 2 1 1 ) (0 .7 1 3 ) (-1 .284 ) (-0 .5 6 6 )
D IV E R I) 0 .024
( 0 3 5 6 )
-0 0 3 5
(-0.4B 9)
-0 0 1 3  
(•0  2 (H )
L N (S A L E S ) -0 .044 -0 0 2 1 -0 .018 -0 0 1 9 0  005 4 )0 1 1 4 )1 3 9 4 )0 9 4 4 )0 4 7
( - 2 4 2 3 ) — (-1 .1 1 9 ) (-0 .9 4 6 ) ( -0 9 9 0 ) (0 2 4 3 ) ( 4 )5 2 4 ) ( -3 .0 0 9 )— (-2 .487 )** (-1 .0 0 9 )
F S T S D -0 160 -0 1 7 3 -0  301 -0 .176 -0  188 -0 2 7 9 -0 0 7 1 4 )1 5 1 4 )3 8 5
( - 2 .3 1 4 ) - ( - 2 .2 2 1 ) " (-3 .8 8 5 )— (-2 .2 6 2 )— (-2  0 8 2 )— (-3  I 8 9 |— (-0 .4 7 3 ) (-1 .007 ) (-2 .3 6 9 )”
D E B T 0.000 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 2 4 )0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 .0 0 0
(4 ) 160) (0 5 2 0 ) ( -0  176) (-1 263) 1-0 586) (4 J.232I (1 .5 4 9 ) ( 1 .8 6 2 ) ' (0 .1 5 8 )
IN S ID E R 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6 OOIM 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 .000 -0.002
(2 .0 8 2 )— 11.487) 11.008) (2 .7 6 2 )— <1 733)* (1 823)* (0 .0 3 1 ) (0 1 2 2 ) (-0 .525 )
IN S T IT U T E 0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 41002 0 0 0 0 0 .003 0.003 0 .004
( 0 6 1 2 ) (0 .0 3 6 ) ( 0 8 0 5 ) (0 .2 5 1 ) ( -0  883) ( 4 )0 5 7 ) ( 0 8 1 7 ) (0 .9 1 7 ) (1 .2 2 8 )
R D E X P 0 .159 0.508 0 5 0 3 0  143 0 3 8 0 0  773 0 .075 0.585 0.387
(1 365) (3 .1 6 8 )— (3 3 0 3 )— * (1 147) (1 880)* (2  7 5 1 )— (0 2 6 5 ) (2 .1 8 3 )” ( I .W O ) '
A D V E X P 1.647 2 .5W 3 411 1.483 1 0 7 5 1.971 2 .210 4 .5 9 0 7.487
(1 136) (1 .6 7 5 )- (2 .0 4 3 )— ( 0 8 8 4 ) (0  557) ( 1 0 6 3 ) (0 .7 7 9 ) (1 .746 )* ( 2 .0 2 5 ) -
C C E 0 4 1 7 0.478 0 3 5 8 0 3 6 8 0  373 0 5 6 3 0 6 6 7 1.451 -0 0 2 7
(3  0 6 6 )— ( 4 .1 7 3 )— (2 .1 5 3 )— (2 .3 6 5 )— (3 .1 9 2 )— (2 8 3 9 )— • (2  4 0 1 )— (3  4 0 6 )— (41.075)
N C C E  * D IV E R D 0  153 
(0 .1 1 3 )
0 .835
(0 .S 00)
F-V alue 3 740 4.236 3 5 6 9 3 4 06 2 .980 3 4 2 6 I .W 3 3.579 1.959
p -value 1 0 0 0 0 )— ( 0 .0 0 0 )— (0 .0 0 0 )— (0  0 0 1 )— ( 0  0 0 3 )— ' (0 .0 0 1 )— ' ( 0 0 5 8 ) ' (0 .0 0 1 )— ( 0 0 4 9 ) —
R ' 0 0 6 4 0 0 7 2 0 0 6 8 0 0 7 3 0 0 6 4 0 0 7 3 0  103 0.175 0 .116
A di-R 1 0  047 0 0 5 5 0.1M9 0 0 5 1 0 IH 3 0 0 5 2 0 0 5 0 0  126 0.057
Panel B; Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q Valuation of Multi-Segment Firms
A ll M u lli-S eg m en l B id d ers F ocusing  M u ln -S cg m cm  B idders D iversify ing  M ulli-S cgm ent B idders
Indcpcndcn i
V ariab les
IN D A D JQ
(1*0)
IN D A D JQ
(1*1)
IN D A D JQ
(1*2)
IN D A D JQ
0 - 0 )
IN D A D JQ
( l - l )
IN D A D JQ
(1 -2 )
IN D A D JQ
(t-O )
IN D A D JQ
( l - l )
IN D A D JQ
(1 -2 )
C onstan t •0 .226 •0.337 -0 .655 -0 3 3 4 4 ) 6 1 0 4 )7 7 1 4 )2 2 9 -0 1 1 9 4 )1 0 8
(-0 .9 8 0 ) (-1 .5 4 6 ) (-3 .W 2 )* * * (-1 I I I ) (-1 .914)* (-2 .9 4 1 )* * * (4 1 6 5 6 ) ( 4 )3 7 8 ) ( 4 )3 0 4 )
D IV E R D •0.009 0  036 0 .148
(-0 .1 2 8 ) (0 .5 2 5 ) (2 .3 7 7 )* *
L N (S A L E S ) -0 0 4 5 -0 0 2 2 -0 0 1 2 4 )0 3 6 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 6 4 )0 4 1 4 )0 6 3 -0 .054
(-1 .980 )** (-0 .9 8 6 ) ( -0 5 4 4 ) (-1 262) ( 0 6 9 9 ) (0 .5 7 0 ) (-1 .1 3 7 ) (-1 .890 )* (-1 .5 0 6 )
F S T S D -0.058 •0.067 0 0 0 4 -0 0 8 7 •0  172 4 )0 2 7 0.007 0.060 0.063
(-0 .6 9 0 ) (-0 .7 8 1 ) (0 .0 4 8 ) ( -0  780) ( -1 3 5 4 ) ( -0 2 4 7 ) (0 0 6 0 ) (0 .505 ) (0 .314 )
D E B T 0.002 0.002 0 0 0 1 0001 0 0 0 1 0.001 0 0 0 3 0.002 0.002
(1 .4 3 5 ) ( 1 1 2 2 ) (1 .1 0 0 ) (0  4 6 9 ) (0 4 5 9 ) (0 7 1 8 ) (1 5 3 4 ) ( 1 1 6 2 ) (0 .910 )
IN S ID E R 0.004 0 .004 0.002 0 .006 0 .007 0 0 0 1 0.002 0.001 0.002
(1 .3 9 8 ) (1 .4 3 4 ) (0 .7 4 4 ) (1 .782)* (2 .009 )** ( 0 3 4 2 ) (0 4 6 8 ) (0 .3 4 5 ) (0 .513)
IN S T IT U T E •0.003 -0 0 0 3 -0 .002 4 )0 0 3 -0 0 0 3 4 )0 0 3 -0 0 0 4 4 )0 0 3 4 )0 0 2
(-1 .5 3 5 ) (-1 .429 ) ( -1 .1 6 9 ) (-1 .101 ) ( -1 0 5 1 ) (-1 .390 ) (-1 .1 7 8 ) ( 4 )9 3 7 ) (-0 .697 )
R D E X P 3 697 1.575 2.657 -1 .110 -1 7 3 5 -2 3 46 5 9 49 1.750 4.411
(2 .9 3 1 )* — (1 .692)* (3 .0 2 6 )* * * (-0  531) (4 )6 9 8 ) (-1 159) (3 .393 )*** (1 .676)* (3 .736 )***
A D V E X P 3.212 3.473 2.435 6 4 1 6 4 8 1 7 6 9 9 9 0.301 3.128 •2.610
(2 .020 )** (2 .090 )** (1 .4 4 4 ) (2  9 00 )*** (1 735)* (3  2 64 )*** (0 .1 2 6 ) (1 380) ( 4 )9 6 9 )
C C F 0.274 0.375 0 .964 0.133 0 6 6 9 0 5 2 6 0.528 0 3 4 3 1.779
(1 .080 ) (1 .852 )* (4 .2 4 1 )* * * ( 0 4 4 1 ) ( 1 6 9 9 )* (1 .9 5 8 )* (1 .1 4 9 ) (1 359) (4 .644 )***
N C C F 0 3 8 5 0 .1 8 0 0 .3 6 0 1.150 0 2 7 0 0 4 6 1 0  227 0 .178 0.548
( 1 6 5 4 )* (1 554 ) (1 733)* (2 .208 )** (0 .5 9 7 ) ( 1 4 1 8 ) (0 8 0 0 ) ( 1 4 1 8 ) (1 .942 )*
F -V alue 3.309 2.125 3 5 3 7 2 8 1 8 1.896 2.827 2.470 1 586 3 0 3 7
p-value ( 0  0 0 0 )*  • • (0 .023 )** ( 0 0 0 0 )* * * (0  0 0 5 )*** ( 0 0 6 0 )* (0 0 0 5 )* * * (0 .0 (3 )* * (0 1 2 7 ) (0 .0 0 3 )* * *
R ' 0.124 0.084 0 .132 0.195 0 1 4 0 0 1 9 5 0 1 5 7 0.107 0.187
A d j-R ' 0.087 0 0 4 4 0.095 0  125 0 0 6 6 0 1 2 6 0.094 0  0 40 0.125
